Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed a superior court order concluding that defendant violated 13 V.S.A. 3701(c) by intentionally knocking down a tree that belonged to plaintiff and trespassed on plaintiff’s land, and granted plaintiff $1 in damages plus attorney’s fees and costs. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that defendant violated the statute; (2) that nominal damages did not support an award of attorney’s fees; and (3) that the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees of $22,406 based on $1 of actual damages. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Evans v. Cote" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs’ family began renting a lakeside property 1949 and eventually purchased it in 1976. Throughout their lease and ownership of the Mahoney Lot, and by the terms of their deed, plaintiffs enjoyed the use of approximately seventy-five feet of lake frontage. The adjacent lot to the northeast (the Tara Lot) was owned by Vermont Catholic Charities, Inc. (VCC) from 1958 until 2006 when it was sold to defendant. During VCC’s ownership of the Tara Lot, VCC recognized the disputed boundary line where plaintiffs believed it to be and marked it with signs. In 2007, defendant filed an application to subdivide the Tara Lot and included in the application a survey showing its southerly boundary line cutting plaintiffs’ beach in half (the Disputed Portion). In response to defendant’s development application, plaintiffs filed a complaint to quiet title in December 2007. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss in January 2008, which the trial court granted, but did not file an answer or counterclaim, nor did it assert affirmative defenses. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim that they had acquired the land by adverse possession and remanded to the trial court for further development of the factual record to determine whether VCC’s use of the property qualified for the exemption. On a second appeal to the Supreme Court, plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in holding that plaintiffs’ suit to quiet title and defendant’s unilateral grant of permission for plaintiffs to use the disputed land tolled the statute of limitations on their adverse possession claim, that 12 V.S.A. 462 did not apply to acquiescence claims, that the trial court erred in determining that plaintiff’s predecessors did not acquire the property by acquiescence prior to 1949 when Camp Tara bought the property, and that, as a result of erroneous fact finding, the trial court failed to correctly determine the time during which the statute of limitations for adverse possession ran in plaintiffs’ favor. Though its reasoning was different in certain aspects, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Mahoney, et al. v. Tara, LLC" on Justia Law

Thirteen Town of Williston residents appealed the Superior Court, Environmental Division’s grant of a discretionary permit to All Metals Recycling, Inc., to establish an outdoor storage area and install a scale and scale house. The discretionary permit allowed All Metals to continue operating a previously unpermitted scrap-metals recycling business in Williston. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision. View "In re All Metals Recycling, Inc." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court reviewed rulings by the environmental and civil divisions concerning a subdivision application for a property located within a residential development in the City of Burlington. Appellants’ principal contention was that the courts erred in concluding that the subdivision had the requisite access to a public road. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments. View "Regan v. Pomerleau, DeForest Realty, Inc. and City of Burlington" on Justia Law

Developer Vermont North Properties (VNP) appealed from the trial court’s decision in favor of the Village of Derby Center. The dispute centered on VNP’s rights, if any, to water and sewer allocations from the systems managed by the Village in connection with a VNP construction project. The trial court determined that: the Village could charge fees for reserved water and sewer allocations; the Village’s fees were reasonable; the Village could revoke VNP’s reserved allocations for nonpayment of fees; and the Village was not estopped from denying water and sewer connections to VNP on account of nonpayment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that VNP had enforceable reserved water and sewer allocations, but the Village could charge equitable fees for these reservations and may revoke the reservations for nonpayment. Furthermore, the Court concluded that VNP failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the unreasonableness of the Village’s reservation fees, and on that basis the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. View "Vermont North Properties v. Village of Derby Center" on Justia Law

In February 2005, tenants Brian Ayer and Debbie Martell began leasing a single-family home from landlord-plaintiff JW, LLC. Tenants resided in the home with their children and animals, including dogs and chickens. At the time tenants moved in, the house was relatively new and in excellent condition. The monthly rent was $1300. Tenants paid no rent in March and April 2012. They paid rent in May 2012 plus $300 in arrears, but made no further rental payments. Landlord filed for eviction in July 2012. The court issued a rent escrow order. Tenants made only a partial rental payment in August, and the court issued an order for a writ of possession. The writ issued on August 10, 2012 and was served ten days later. The writ stated that tenants had to vacate the premises by midnight on September 6, 2012. On the return of service, the sheriff noted that he had explained the writ and tenants had no questions, and, although tenants refused to take the paperwork, the sheriff left it at the residence. Landlord denied tenant further access to the residence to claim property. Landlord also denied tenant access to the items that landlord had retained. Landlord claimed that the justification for retaining tenants’ personal property was based on two statutes. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on the status of tenants’ personal property, which landlord cleared from the leased premises at the time a writ of possession was executed. The trial court concluded that landlord did not rightfully have possession of the property and ordered landlord to return it to tenant. Landlord argued that pursuant to statute he was entitled to retain the property, and, in the alternative, the court erred in denying his request for a writ of attachment for the property. The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court that 12 V.S.A. 4854a only allowed a landlord who has evicted a tenant to dispose of trash without the threat of liability, and for other property requires a landlord "to make reasonable efforts to find out what tenant plans to do and to store the property for 60 days." Because the dwelling unit was not abandoned and the tenant did not vacate, 9 V.S.A. 4462 did not apply, and there was no statutory basis to require a landlord to store property remaining in a dwelling unit after an eviction. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "JW, LLC v. Ayer and Martell" on Justia Law

Appellant-taxpayer Elaine Hoiska appealed the Vermont State Appraiser’s valuation of her property in the Town of East Montpelier. She argued that the appraisal incorrectly treated her property as comprising two contiguous lots under common ownership, and accordingly assigns a higher value to the property than if it were a single developable lot. More specifically, appellant took issue with the appraiser’s legal conclusion that she legally subdivided the land in 1978 by procuring a survey, not filed in the land records, that includes a line purportedly dividing the lot into two parcels. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the state appraiser’s findings did not support the legal conclusion that appellant effectively subdivided her property in 1978, and reversed. View "Hoiska v. Town of East Montpelier" on Justia Law

Landowners Owen and Katherine Beauchesne appealed various proceedings involving their complaints challenging the operation of Hale Mountain Fish and Game Club. Here, they appealed the Environmental Division of the superior court's judgment that Hale Mountain was entitled to reissuance of a zoning permit for certain enumerated improvements on its property once it received site plan approval from the Town of Shaftsbury Development Review Board. Based primarily on principles of preservation and res judicata, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "In re Hale Mountain Fish & Game Club" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs James and Elise Brault appealed a trial court's order granting judgment to defendant Jeanne Welch in a dispute over a right-of-way. The deed in question purported to convey "a right of way five feet wide leading to the lake along the existing block wall and southerly thereof." The court found this language unambiguous. Its plain meaning was that the right-of-way was located on the south side of the block wall. The court explained that the words "southerly thereof" modified the term right-of-way, and it found this interpretation strongly reinforced by the word "thereof," which meant "of that" or "concerning that." In arguing that the right-of-way had to be located on the northern side of the block wall, the Braults asserted that the words "southerly thereof" modified the words "the existing block wall," that is, the block wall was "southerly" of the right of way. The court found this to be an unreasonable interpretation of the deed language, and one that was inconsistent with how English was spoken and read. The Braults maintained that language in the original deed from the Griffiths to their son and daughter-in-law, "southerly thereof" must mean that the right-of-way was actually northerly of the block wall, primarily because a location northerly of the wall avoided any encroachment over the property line with the neighboring lot. The difficulty with the Braults' argument, the court explained, was that it violated the parol evidence rule. The court found that the question of the circumstances that might have produced the disputed provision in the deed also suffered from a shortage of evidence. Because the exact dimensions of the Welch lot were not established, the court found that it was not known whether the block wall marked the exact boundary on the south side of the lot. Nor could the court discern what circumstances led to the use of the word "southerly thereof" due to "a shortage of evidence." The court concluded that the Braults failed to meet their burden of proof, and it entered judgment in Welch's favor. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Braults maintained that the trial court should have found the description of the right-of-way to be ambiguous because it was a simple scrivener's error that misstated which side of the wall the easement is on. Finding no error, however, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Brault v. Welch" on Justia Law

This case arose following a fire that destroyed a commercial building in Rutland in 2010. Plaintiff Johnathan Lasek leased the northern half of the building and used the space as a workshop for his house-staining business. He stored staining products and other equipment and constructed a business office in the northeastern corner of the building. The southwestern corner of the building contained a fully enclosed room that was occupied by another commercial tenant, Vermont Vapor Inc. (VVI). The remainder of the building was used by landlord Downing Properties, LLC, as storage for ATVs, motorcycles, and snowmobiles. VVI used its space as a laboratory for mixing the liquid filler for electronic cigarettes. VVI owner Adam Tredwell and his father Warren altered the room to Adam's specificationsm, adding sheetrock and other materials to create a “clean room.” He also installed an eight-inch fan on the south wall of the laboratory that vented to the outside of the building. An industrial space heater was suspended from the rafters of the warehouse, above the ceiling of the laboratory. The Tredwells connected the heater to a propane tank so that they could heat the space in the winter months. Warren was the last person in the laboratory the night before the fire. When firefighters arrived shortly after the fire was reported, the northwest corner of the building (plaintiff's corner) had a large hole in the roof and was heavily engulfed in flames. VVI's corner was not on fire at that time. Plaintiff sued VVI for negligence and strict liability, alleging that VVI had caused the fire by mishandling liquid nicotine. He also sued landlord for breach of the implied warranty of suitability for commercial use, negligence, breach of the duty to warn, and unjust enrichment. After plaintiff's presentation of his case, the trial court granted defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law. This appeal followed. Plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred: (1) in excluding the testimony of plaintiff's expert witness on causation; (2) in granting defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law; (3) in excluding an eyewitness's statements to police; (4) by denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial; (5) by awarding all deposition costs to defendants; and (6) in refusing to disqualify counsel for defendant-landlord. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision in all respects, with the exception of the award of deposition costs. View "Lasek v. Vermont Vapor, Inc." on Justia Law