Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Thomas Kellogg owned a house and land in Bethel.  In 1999, he entered into a rent-to-own agreement with William Oren whereby Oren would pay over time for the property, at which point ownership would be transferred to him. Beginning in 2000 and then from 2001 onwards, defendant Cindy Shushereba began to occupy the house with Oren in a romantic relationship. By August 2004, it was contemplated that defendant would co-own the property.  Plaintiff indicated that he wished to come to an agreement to sell the property to defendant and Oren. To that end, defendant liquidated her savings and paid plaintiff for a downpayment on the house.  Plaintiff credited Oren and defendant with the amount Oren had paid in rent.  These two contributions left roughly $98,721 to be paid to reach the purchase price.  The parties agreed orally that the balance would be paid monthly over fifteen years. No written purchase and sale agreement was ever prepared, but the parties intended that Oren and defendant would receive title immediately and give a mortgage secured by a promissory note for the installments. Plaintiff delivered a signed warranty deed to defendant, but defendant never signed the promissory note or the mortgage.  Because defendant could not pay the property transfer tax that would be due on recording, she never recorded the warranty deed.  Plaintiff testified that, at the time, he considered himself the mortgage holder only. Ultimately, the relationship between Oren and defendant dissolved, and, in May 2008, Oren moved out. A couple of months later, plaintiff and defendant became sexually involved.  During this time, plaintiff sought neither rent nor the purchase installments from defendant, and she made no payments. At some point in 2010, plaintiff began seeking rent from defendant, and she did make between two and four monthly rental payments of $650. Plaintiff paid the property taxes on the property throughout the time that defendant lived by herself in the house. Oren then sued plaintiff and defendant, seeking to be declared half-owner of the property along with defendant, from whom he sought a partition and accounting.  In September 2009, the superior court rejected Oren's claims. Defendant counterclaimed, contending that she owned the property or, in the alternative, that plaintiff had been unjustly enriched by defendant’s payments to him.  Prior to trial, the court dismissed as res judicata defendant’s claim that she owned the property, leaving the unjust-enrichment claim in her counterclaim. After a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff’s claims for back rent and property taxes. However, the trial court ruled in favor of defendant with regard to her unjust enrichment claims for the return of the downpayment on the purchase price and several of her alleged capital and repair contributions. Both parties appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the contract between plaintiff and defendant was a contract for deed; the trial court erred in concluding it was a landlord-tenant relationship. Because the agreement between plaintiff and defendant was a contract for deed, the amount of $833 per month that defendant had agreed to pay plaintiff went entirely toward the purchase price plus interest. When the periodic payments were complete, defendant would become the owner of the property, free and clear of any interest of plaintiff, without a further payment. There was not an agreement to pay rent; the $833 monthly payment was not part of a rental agreement between plaintiff and defendant. View "Kellogg v. Shushereba" on Justia Law

Appellees' (two brothers and a sister) family owned and operated a farm in Pomfret. In 2009, neighbors appealed to the Environmental Division from a decision by the Town’s zoning board of adjustment (ZBA) granting a construction permit for a planer building on farm property. They also appealed a ZBA denial of their request to enforce what they considered to be zoning violations concerning the building of a sawmill and kiln buildings on farm property. The trial court issued a written ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, concluding that the wood-processing buildings at issue did not satisfy the criteria for a permit exemption under the Pomfret zoning ordinance, but that factual issues remained as to whether they qualified as “farm structures” exempt from local zoning regulation under state law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found no basis to disturb the judgment the trial court's decision, and affirmed it. View "In re Moore Accessory Structure Permit and Use" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, the common issue centered on whether Vermont laws allowed the Town of Colchester to consider certain intangible factors in assessing seasonal lakefront camps located on leased land. The Supreme Court held that the Town was not precluded from considering such factors in assessing properties. View "Lesage v. Town of Colchester" on Justia Law

Vanderminden, a Family Limited Partnership, owned a contiguous piece of property in the adjoining towns of Poultney and Wells. The Wells portion was at issue in this case: the state appraiser affirmed the Town's valuation of the property. On appeal, the partnership argued that the appraiser failed to supply a sufficient explanation for its decision to accept the Town's valuation; in assessing the Wells and Poultney properties as a single parcel then valuing the Wells portion as a seasonal dwelling; and for not accepting the partnership's evidence that the Wells portion was assessed above fair market value of the entire parcel. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the valuation of a single property in more than one town includes both the fair market value of the entire parcel, and of the portion in the town involved in the appeal. Because the partnership presented evidence to demonstrate that the Wells portion's valuation exceeded the fair market value of the entire parcel, Wells' appraisal should have been reduced accordingly. Furthermore, the state appraiser should have given its reason for the high valuation. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Vanderminden, A Family LTD Partnership v. Town of Wells" on Justia Law

The Town of Hartford and Marc and Susan Wood have been involved in a property dispute for over a decade. At issue: the construction of a large concrete retaining wall along the Woods property. They appealed the latest superior court decision in the matter. In 1999, the Town approved the Woods' application for a zoning permit to construct the wall. In early 2000, Woods began stockpiling recycled concrete slab sections in order to construct it. The Town served Woods a Notice of Violation (NOV) and filed an enforcement action, arguing that the concrete was not what was specified in the zoning permit. A court determined that Woods failed to meet the specifications for the permit. Woods appealed, and thus began the litigation that ultimately wound up before the Supreme Court in this case. In 2011, the superior court concluded that Woods still had not adhered to the permit's specifications. Woods raised thirteen claims of error on appeal, mostly challenging the sufficiency of evidence and errors in interpretation of the zoning code. Finding no error in the superior court's 2011 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Wood NOV, Town of Hartford v. Wood" on Justia Law

The Town of Fairfax cited homeowner Leon Beliveau for changing the use of his property from a single-family dwelling to a rooming-and-boarding house without obtaining the necessary zoning permits. Beliveau argued on appeal that the trial court erred in finding his property was used as a boarding house, and that the Town's zoning laws were unconstitutionally vague. Finding no error in the trial court's view of Beliveau's property, and that the town's zoning laws were not unconstitutionally vague, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Beliveau NOV, Town of Fairfax v. Beliveau" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Patrick and Terese Ayer appealed a trial court's order granting summary judgment to Frances Harris and Louis Hemmingway, III. The dispute arose over plaintiffs' attempts to collect a debt from defendant Hemmingway individually, and doing business as Hemmingway Construction. Plaintiffs obtained a default judgment against Hemingway in February 2001. Plaintiffs subsequently secured a nonpossessory writ of attachment against Hemingway's nonexempt goods and estate. In 2010, Frances Harris brought an unrelated action against Hemingway for damages. The trial court issued a stipulated judgment order that, among other things, awarded Harris judgment against Hemingway plus interest from September 8, 2005 until the release of the lien in favor of plaintiffs, required Hemingway to keep current on payments to plaintiffs pursuant to a written payment agreement signed by Hemingway and plaintiff Terese Ayer, and provided that if Hemingway defaulted on the lien, he would be liable to Harris for any costs, including attorney's fees, to obtain a release of the lien. In May 2011, plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to foreclose on their judgment lien. Plaintiffs cited a 2006 trial court order as controlling and asked the court to renew or revive it. Hemingway filed an unverified answer to plaintiffs' complaint, acknowledging his debt to plaintiffs and offering to make immediate payments pursuant to the 2010 agreement. Plaintiffs moved for a default judgment, but the court denied their request. Harris responded to this order; Hemingway did not. Harris later moved for summary judgment, and plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and default.  In January 2011, the trial court granted Harris's motion, and found that plaintiffs' judgment lien was no longer effective because more than eight years had elapsed from the issuance of the original final judgment on which it was based. In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected plaintiffs' assertion that the 2001 judgment had been renewed or revived by the 2006 stipulated amended order. This appeal followed. Agreeing with the trial court's reason to dismiss plaintiffs' motion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ayer v. Hemingway" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the interplay between rulings and requirements relating to zoning in connection with a planned development and enforcement of restrictive covenants and deed restrictions applicable to property within the development. Plaintiff obtained municipal zoning approval to reconfigure the lot lines in her two-lot farmstead parcel within the Quechee Lakes subdivision, as well as to construct a dwelling on the second, yet-to-be-developed lot. The Environmental Division affirmed the zoning board's award of the latter permit. Notwithstanding that order, in a declaratory judgment action also initiated by plaintiff, the civil division concluded that plaintiff's proposed construction violated the applicable restrictive covenants and deed restrictions. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the Environmental Division's decision resolved the dispute, that the civil division improperly considered extrinsic evidence when the disputed deed restrictions were clear on their face, that defendants' challenge to plaintiff's right to build the proposed dwelling was time-barred, and that the character of the development had changed so much that the disputed deed restrictions are no longer valid. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff's theory of the case was that the deed language was ambiguous; plaintiff was instrumental in framing the trial court's task as one of construing ambiguous deed language; and plaintiff led the way in introducing extrinsic evidence in support of plaintiff's own interpretation. "Given this record, plaintiff cannot now challenge the trial court's consideration of extrinsic evidence to interpret the documents." The Court concluded that plaintiff suffered no prejudice from the trial court's decision to consider the testimony about the context surrounding the disputed deed language - both that offered by plaintiff and by defendants. Finding no error in the trial court's decision to deny the motion for declaratory judgment, the Court reached no other issues plaintiff raised in her appeal and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Marsh Inter Vivos Trust v. McGillvray, et al." on Justia Law

The parties in this case entered into a real estate agreement thirteen years ago. The trial court concluded that the agreement constituted a contract for deed and that the purchasers had therefore acquired an equitable interest in the property in question. The court initiated a foreclosure on that interest, even though it had not been pled. Plaintiffs, the purchasers as found by the superior court, David and Barbara Prue, appealed the foreclosure. Defendant, the seller as found by the court, Larry Royer, appealed the court’s conclusions that the contract was an enforceable contract for deed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the court’s conclusion that the parties entered into a contract for deed and that it was enforceable, but reversed the foreclosure decree as premature. View "Prue v. Royer, Sr." on Justia Law

Appellant landlord appealed the grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the tenant. The trial court concluded that the landlord's eviction of the tenant from a property was wrongful. The landlord also appealed the court's denial of a post-trial motion that tenant was not liable to landlord for rent that accrued post-eviction. Because landlord's notice of default was defective, and because a wrongful eviction releases a tenant from liability for rent accrued post-eviction, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment. View "Vermont Small Business Development Corp. v. Fifth Son Corp." on Justia Law