Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Randy J. Rouleau appealed the decision of the Washington Civil Division which held that Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A., as Trustee for the registered holders of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Security Corp., Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2001-CF2 (Wells Fargo), was entitled to enforce his personal guaranty of a promissory note secured by mortgages on five mobile home parks.  The civil division concluded that Wells Fargo could enforce the guaranty as the holder of the note under 9A V.S.A. § 3-301(i), which defines who may enforce a negotiable instrument.  Defendant argued that the court erred in ruling that Wells Fargo has standing to enforce the guaranty because Wells Fargo could not prove the chain of assignments from the original lender to itself and therefore that Wells Fargo, and not some third party, is the assignee of the guaranty.  Defendant also argued that the court erred in treating assignment of the note as sufficient to show assignment of the guaranty because the guaranty, in contrast to the note, is a separate contract that must be expressly assigned.  Finally, defendant argued that because Wells Fargo lacked standing to enforce the guaranty, the court lacked jurisdiction over the enforcement action.  Based on the evidence presented, the Supreme Court could not conclude that the court's finding that Wells Fargo was assigned the note and mortgage was clearly erroneous.  Moreover, the court's finding on this point, essential to Wells Fargo's status as a holder, directly supports its conclusion that Wells Fargo has standing to enforce the guaranty.  Because Wells Fargo had standing, Defendant's final argument that the court lacked jurisdiction over the enforcement action has no merit. The Supreme Court affirmed the civil division. View "Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota v. Rouleau" on Justia Law

This condemnation case was filed in July 1992, "making it very, very old."  On its fourth time reviewing this matter, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the superior court abused its discretion when it declined to find that there had been a material increase in the value of a sand pit owned by Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Company (HS&G) between 2000 and 2009.  Upon review, the Court concluded that the superior court did not abuse its discretion, and affirmed the court’s denial of HS&G’s motion to amend the final judgment. View "In re Chittenden Solid Waste District" on Justia Law

Taxpayer Margaret Murray appealed a superior court's order that dismissed her tax abatement appeal. On appeal to the Supreme Court, she argued that the superior court erroneously concluded that she could not appeal the abatement decision because she failed to challenge the valuation of the property in the appraisal process.  Upon review, the Court concluded that Taxpayer's abatement appeal to the superior court was not foreclosed by her failure to appeal the valuation of her property, and reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Murray v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs James and Heidi Glassford, who brought suit to obtain compensation for an allegedly negligent home inspection, appealed a superior court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of home inspector Defendants The BrickKicker and GDM Home Services, Inc. (a franchisee of BrickKicker) based on the terms of a binding arbitration agreement in the parties' contract. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the superior court erred in rejecting Plaintiffs' contention that the terms of the home inspection contract were unconscionable under the common law and unfair and deceptive under Vermont’s Consumer Fraud Act (CFA). Upon review of the contract in question, as well as the superior court record, the Supreme Court found the contractual provisions limiting liability to the cost of the inspection and yet requiring arbitration that would necessarily cost more than the amount of the liability limit unconscionable. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court’s decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Glassford v. BrickKicker" on Justia Law

Taxpayer-Petitioner Michael Garbitelli appealed a superior court judgment that affirmed the Town of Brookfield Board of Abatement's denial of his request for a tax abatement. During a townwide reappraisal in 2007, Petitioner refused to allow the listers to inspect his property, other than the foyer and the basement. His property was assessed at $1.6 million. Petitioner then appealed this assessment, and the Supreme Court affirmed, noting that Petitioner had refused entry to the tax assessor and therefore failed to provide an adequate basis to demonstrate that the assessment was erroneous. Taxpayer later allowed entry to the listers for 2009, which resulted in an assessment of $957,000. Taxpayer then moved for a tax abatement for the years 2007 and 2008. The Board denied the request, finding that there was no mistake attributable to the listers since they were denied entry and were forced to use the best information available to them. Although the Supreme Court agreed with Petitioner's interpretation of the abatement statute’s meaning, it reached the same result as the superior court: "[Petitioner] argues principally that the 'extreme disparity' between $1.6 million and $957,000 is an 'obvious mistake' amounting to manifest error." The Court disagreed with that premise and affirmed the superior court. View "Garbitelli v. Town of Brookfield" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Craig Pease appealed the trial court’s summary judgment determination that Defendants the Windsor Development & Review Board (DRB) and the Town of Windsor had fully responded to his Public Records Act (PRA) request and had not violated his constitutional rights. On appeal, Plaintiff contended that Defendants’ responses to his PRA requests were improperly made through counsel and the custodian of records and thus did not comply with the statute. He also contended that the trial court erred in both its conclusion that his free speech claims against defendants based on their filing of a motion for protective order were barred by litigation immunity and its conclusion that the remainder of his alleged free speech violations were cured by subsequent hearings. Plaintiff's property abuts another lot that is the site of a proposed subdivision development, Morgan Meadows. The Windsor Development Review Board (DRB) approved the subdivision application; Plaintiff, through counsel, appealed this decision to the superior court. In connection with that appeal, Plaintiff made written pro se public records requests to the Town’s Zoning Administrator, and to the seven individual members of the DRB. One DRB member responded personally to Plaintiff’s requests by sending Plaintiff the records he requested. The remaining members responded through the Zoning Administrator. Following a dispute over whether the DRB fully cooperated with Plaintiff's requests, the Town ultimately filed a motion for protective order asking the superior court to enjoin Plaintiff from requesting additional records or contacting DRB members other than through counsel. The Town argued that his public records requests were actually nothing more than discovery requests in the pending appeal, and therefore, Plaintiff’s attorney of record should be the one seeking the records. Upon review of the superior court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found the DRB complied with Plaintiff's requests, and that Plaintiff's constitutional rights were not violated by any of the DRB's actions. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the DRB. View "Pease v. Windsor Dev. & Review Bd" on Justia Law

Applicants Howard Smith and Morrill House, LCC appealed a decision of the Superior Court’s Environmental Division that denied their request for a variance to subdivide property located in the Town of Fair Haven, Vermont. They contended on appeal that their application should have been deemed approved because the town zoning board of adjustment failed to issue its decision denying the application within the deadline prescribed by the relevant statute and local zoning ordinance. The Supreme Court found in its review of the applicable legal authority that "[it] held that a decision is rendered so as to avoid the deemed approval language as long as it is 'finally made before the expiration of the forty-five day period, regardless of when, or if, the decision is reduced to writing.' … The board here made a decision within the prescribed period but failed to notify Applicants within that period and the bases for the decision. Following our previous case law, we will strictly construe the deemed approval remedy to apply only when the decision was not made within the prescribed period, which was not the case here." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Division's decision. View "In re Appeal of Morrill House, LLC and Smith Variance" on Justia Law

This is Defendant Robert O'Connor's second appeal in a partition action brought by his former girlfriend Plaintiff Debra Whippie to resolve the parties' respective interests in a house they held as tenants-in-common. The parties had had a ten-year relationship and two children together when they purchased a single-family residence together in 2002. Both parties were obligated on the mortgage, and both their names appeared on the deed. In the beginning, the parties agreed to share expenses equally; however, Plaintiff stopped paying her share of expenses in early 2003. She sought public sale of the property and an equitable division of the proceeds. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's findings that Plaintiff initially acquired an equal share in the property, that she ceased contributing to expenses in early 2003, and that Defendant's letter of no-trespass excluded her from the property. The Court remanded for an accounting of the parties' interests in the property based on their relative contributions, directing the trial court to determine the parties' shares and instructing the court not to credit Plaintiff for certain expenses. On remand, the trial court reconsidered the issues without an evidentiary hearing. The court granted Plaintiff an offset representing half of the rental value for the period of ouster and 61% of the property's value. Defendant then appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that Defendant was entitled to compensation for half of the maintenance costs he paid for the entire period, even after the ouster. On second remand, the trial court was directed to determine the value of Defendant's expenditures on maintenance costs for the period of September 2004 to September 2007. Half of this amount should be deducted from Plaintiff's share. Her share should then be credited with the already determined rental value for the ouster period. View "Whippie v. O'Connor" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute over an administrative amendment to the master development plan for Killington Resort Village granted to its co-applicants, the current owners of Killington Resort Village and SP Land Company. The District One Environmental Commission originally granted this administrative amendment authorizing the creation of fifteen subdivided lots over approximately 368 acres of Killington Resort Village for transfer to SP Land Company for "future development purposes" pursuant to Act 250 Rule 34(D). Mountainside Properties, LLC, an adjoining property owner, appealed the Environmental Court's denial of its motion to alter and amend the grant of summary judgment in favor of SP Land. Mountainside argued that the Environmental Court erred because: (1) administrative amendments under Rule 34(D) require an underlying Act 250 land use permit, and (2) co-applicants' fifteen-lot subdivision cannot be approved without demonstrating compliance with all Act 250 criteria under 10 V.S.A. 6086(a), as required by 10 V.S.A. 6081(a). Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Mountainside's argument and reversed the Environmental Court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re SP Land Co., LLC" on Justia Law

This case originated from a quiet-title action by Defendant Richard Rupe and his father, Michael C. Rupe, who laid claim to certain mineral rights by way of adverse possession. Plaintiff Gary Rupe, Richard's brother, subsequently asserted his own claim to the mineral rights in question, and the probate court granted him a one-third interest in the rights.  Defendant and his father appealed the probate decision to the superior court, which, after first granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on certain issues, ultimately dismissed plaintiff's claim to the mineral rights and awarded all rights, title, and interest to Defendant. Plaintiff appealed the superior court judgment, arguing: (1) the court exceeded its authority by considering more than the issues raised in the statement of questions submitted on appeal from the probate court; (2) the court misstated the elements of proof for adverse possession and misapplied the law; (3) the court erred in failing to find adverse possession through co-tenancy; and (4) the court erred in its requirements relating to a claim of unjust enrichment. Taking each in turn, the Supreme Court reviewed the superior court record and affirmed its decision with respect to all of Plaintiff's issues on appeal. View "In re The Estates of Herbert Allen, Edward Allen and Edna Allen " on Justia Law