Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Applicants Howard Smith and Morrill House, LCC appealed a decision of the Superior Court’s Environmental Division that denied their request for a variance to subdivide property located in the Town of Fair Haven, Vermont. They contended on appeal that their application should have been deemed approved because the town zoning board of adjustment failed to issue its decision denying the application within the deadline prescribed by the relevant statute and local zoning ordinance. The Supreme Court found in its review of the applicable legal authority that "[it] held that a decision is rendered so as to avoid the deemed approval language as long as it is 'finally made before the expiration of the forty-five day period, regardless of when, or if, the decision is reduced to writing.' … The board here made a decision within the prescribed period but failed to notify Applicants within that period and the bases for the decision. Following our previous case law, we will strictly construe the deemed approval remedy to apply only when the decision was not made within the prescribed period, which was not the case here." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Division's decision. View "In re Appeal of Morrill House, LLC and Smith Variance" on Justia Law

This is Defendant Robert O'Connor's second appeal in a partition action brought by his former girlfriend Plaintiff Debra Whippie to resolve the parties' respective interests in a house they held as tenants-in-common. The parties had had a ten-year relationship and two children together when they purchased a single-family residence together in 2002. Both parties were obligated on the mortgage, and both their names appeared on the deed. In the beginning, the parties agreed to share expenses equally; however, Plaintiff stopped paying her share of expenses in early 2003. She sought public sale of the property and an equitable division of the proceeds. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's findings that Plaintiff initially acquired an equal share in the property, that she ceased contributing to expenses in early 2003, and that Defendant's letter of no-trespass excluded her from the property. The Court remanded for an accounting of the parties' interests in the property based on their relative contributions, directing the trial court to determine the parties' shares and instructing the court not to credit Plaintiff for certain expenses. On remand, the trial court reconsidered the issues without an evidentiary hearing. The court granted Plaintiff an offset representing half of the rental value for the period of ouster and 61% of the property's value. Defendant then appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that Defendant was entitled to compensation for half of the maintenance costs he paid for the entire period, even after the ouster. On second remand, the trial court was directed to determine the value of Defendant's expenditures on maintenance costs for the period of September 2004 to September 2007. Half of this amount should be deducted from Plaintiff's share. Her share should then be credited with the already determined rental value for the ouster period. View "Whippie v. O'Connor" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute over an administrative amendment to the master development plan for Killington Resort Village granted to its co-applicants, the current owners of Killington Resort Village and SP Land Company. The District One Environmental Commission originally granted this administrative amendment authorizing the creation of fifteen subdivided lots over approximately 368 acres of Killington Resort Village for transfer to SP Land Company for "future development purposes" pursuant to Act 250 Rule 34(D). Mountainside Properties, LLC, an adjoining property owner, appealed the Environmental Court's denial of its motion to alter and amend the grant of summary judgment in favor of SP Land. Mountainside argued that the Environmental Court erred because: (1) administrative amendments under Rule 34(D) require an underlying Act 250 land use permit, and (2) co-applicants' fifteen-lot subdivision cannot be approved without demonstrating compliance with all Act 250 criteria under 10 V.S.A. 6086(a), as required by 10 V.S.A. 6081(a). Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Mountainside's argument and reversed the Environmental Court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re SP Land Co., LLC" on Justia Law

This case originated from a quiet-title action by Defendant Richard Rupe and his father, Michael C. Rupe, who laid claim to certain mineral rights by way of adverse possession. Plaintiff Gary Rupe, Richard's brother, subsequently asserted his own claim to the mineral rights in question, and the probate court granted him a one-third interest in the rights.  Defendant and his father appealed the probate decision to the superior court, which, after first granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on certain issues, ultimately dismissed plaintiff's claim to the mineral rights and awarded all rights, title, and interest to Defendant. Plaintiff appealed the superior court judgment, arguing: (1) the court exceeded its authority by considering more than the issues raised in the statement of questions submitted on appeal from the probate court; (2) the court misstated the elements of proof for adverse possession and misapplied the law; (3) the court erred in failing to find adverse possession through co-tenancy; and (4) the court erred in its requirements relating to a claim of unjust enrichment. Taking each in turn, the Supreme Court reviewed the superior court record and affirmed its decision with respect to all of Plaintiff's issues on appeal. View "In re The Estates of Herbert Allen, Edward Allen and Edna Allen " on Justia Law

This appeal represented "the latest skirmish" in a long-running dispute over plans to develop a Wal-Mart discount retail store on an undeveloped 100-acre parcel of land in the Town of St. Albans. Appellants were interested individuals and groups opposed to the project. They appealed an Environmental Court decision that granted the site plan, conditional use, subdivision, and Act 250 permits for the development. They contended the trial court erred in: (1) approving site plan and conditional use permits despite the alleged conflict of interest of several members of the Town's development review board; (2) finding that the subdivision was compatible with adjacent land uses; and (3) concluding that the developer could reapply for an Act 250 permit despite an earlier denial.  Upon review of the lower court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.   View "In re JLD Properties of St. Albans, LLC" on Justia Law

This case was an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of Appellant RBS Citizens, N.A.'s motion for a writ of attachment to Appellee Jan Ouhrabka's property, which Appellee owned jointly with his wife as tenants by entirety.  The trial court held that a creditor like RBS cannot attach property owned jointly by a debtor and a nondebtor when they hold that property as tenants by entirety.  RBS contended on appeal that the estate of tenancy by entirety is an anachronism whose continuing utility should be reconsidered.  In the alternative, RBS argued that Vermont law did not explicitly preclude granting a creditor prejudgment attachment where the property is held jointly by the debtor and a nondebtor in a tenancy by entirety.  Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court disagreed with RBS' argument and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "RBS Citizens, N.A. v. Ouhrabka" on Justia Law

In this dispute between neighboring landowners, Defendants-Neighbors Demetrios and Alexandria Michaelides and Erwin and Ramona Waibel appealed a superior court order that rejected their claim that Plaintiff Jonathan Tibbetts violated a deed restriction limiting the number of houses to be constructed on his property.  Among other claims, Defendants contended the trial court erred in concluding that they lacked standing to enforce the restriction. When Plaintiff attempted to sell the property in question in 2005, the potential buyers discovered a five-house restriction in the deed between the previous original grantor and grantee and required consent of the owners of the five other houses as a condition of the sale.  Defendants refused to consent, and Plaintiff thereupon filed the underlying declaratory judgment action to clear the property of the restriction and obtain marketable title. Defendants answered and counterclaimed for a declaration that Plaintiff's residence violated the deed restriction and an injunction requiring its removal. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  In March 2010, the trial court issued a written ruling in favor of Plaintiff.  The court concluded that the five-house restriction in the original grantor-grantee deed was intended to benefit the land retained by the previous grantee-owner, and that Neighbors therefore lacked standing to enforce it.  The court issued a final judgment order in May 2010 and denied a motion for reconsideration the following July.  Upon review of the deed and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and affirmed its decision.  View "Tibbetts v. Michaelides" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Lisa and Thomas Ketchum as trustees for the Saddlebrook Farm and North Farm Trusts appealed the Town of Dorset's decision to reclassify a town road from a class 3 to a class 4 highway.  Plaintiffs argued that the court erred in reviewing the selectboard's reclassification using a deferential standard instead of a de novo procedure involving appointment of a panel of commissioners.  In the alternative, Plaintiffs contended that, even under a deferential standard, the court's decision was erroneous because the findings were not supported by the evidence and they were denied an opportunity to supplement the record on appeal.  Plaintiffs own property that is serviced by a town highway known as Upper Kirby Hollow Road.  There is one residence on the road, and the remaining properties are undeveloped.  Some of the property is under a conservation easement and open to the public for recreational activities.  In October 2008, the Town provided notice that it intended to consider altering the classification of certain town highways, including a 0.55 mile section of Kirby Hollow Road.  The selectboard made a site visit to the property.  The Town also held a public meeting and heard from interested parties.  Plaintiffs attended and spoke against reclassification.  Other members of the public also opposed reclassification and questioned whether it would have an impact on the public's ability to use the conserved property.  The Town road foreman supported reclassification and testified that the road is dangerous to maintain and snow plow because it is narrow and steep.  In December 2008, the Town issued a written decision, finding, among other things, that: the road's width is too narrow to allow two vehicles to safely pass one another or for access for emergency vehicles; Town snow removal vehicles have slid off the road causing danger to the vehicles and impairing snow removal of other roads; and the cost to improve the road is prohibitive.  The Town also found that the road services only one seasonal residence with limited winter usage.  The Town concluded that continuing summer maintenance and winter plowing did not serve the public good of the Town and reclassified the road. The trial court concluded that there was no statutory authority providing for review of the reclassification and therefore the only jurisdiction for the appeal was pursuant to Rule 75 in the nature of certiorari.  Upon review, the Supreme Court found that while Plaintiffs argued that their opinions and evidence should have been weighed more heavily, the selectboard did not err in resolving the competing considerations in the manner that it did.  The decision was within the Town's authority and not erroneous. The Court affirmed the lower court's decisions. View "Ketchum v. Town of Dorset" on Justia Law

Landlord Downtown Barre Development appealed a trial court's denial of its request for declaratory relief. Landlord argued that Tenant GU Markets of Barre, LLC established a corporate structure that entitled it to terminate the parties' commercial lease.  Landlord claimed the trial court erred by not considering Tenant's conduct when deciding whether tenancy under the terms of their agreement could be terminated.  Upon review of the lease and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that the essence of Landlord's claim was for "anticipatory repudiation." Even assuming Landlord could rely on this common law principle, Tenant had not indicated to Landlord an intent to breach, nor did Tenant commit an act to render it "unable to perform." Accordingly, because the language of the lease was clear and unambiguous and Tenant's conduct did not constitute notice as required by the plain language of the lease, the Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that landlord was not entitled to terminate the agreement on this ground. View "Downtown Barre Development v. GU Markets of Barre, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Linda Nordlund appealed a grant of summary judgment by the Superior Court, Environmental Division (Environmental Court) in favor of Defendants Elizabeth Van Nostrand, and Mark and Nancy Van Nostrand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff owned property that abuts the Van Nostrand property. The Van Nostrand property runs behind and is contiguous with both the Nordlund and front parcels. The back parcel does not border a public road. These parcels have been the subject of numerous proceedings. In a 2006 quiet title action, the superior court determined that the Nordlund parcel was burdened by an existing eighteen-foot right-of-way benefiting the back parcel. In 2004, Defendants applied for a zoning permit to build a house on the back parcel. The zoning administrator originally granted the permit, but Plaintiff appealed the decision to the local review board. The Board reversed, finding that the Nordlund right-of-way did not meet locality's rule that requires a fifty-foot-wide right-of-way in order to develop landlocked property. Defendants appealed that decision to the Environmental Court. In the course of the proceedings, Defendant Elizabeth Van Nostrand granted defendants Mark and Nancy Van Nostrand a fifty-foot-wide right-of-way across her property (the front parcel) that connected the back parcel to the closest road without crossing onto the Nordlund parcel. Defendants applied for a new zoning permit citing the Van Nostrand right-of-way as the means of complying. The Board approved the permit and Defendants subsequently constructed a house on the back parcel. This case stems from what Plaintiff claimed is a misuse of the Nordlund right-of-way to access the now completed home on the back parcel. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that this use violated the prior zoning decisions that originally disallowed the right-of-way as a basis for development of the back parcel. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Environmental Court had no jurisdiction because there was no violation of a zoning decision respecting Defendants' property or use of the rights-of-way in question. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff's case. View "Nordlund v. Van Nostrand" on Justia Law