Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case stems from a dispute over the 1973 William C. Alden Trust (the Trust) benefiting the Grantor's second wife Nancy Alden, his two children by Nancy, and his three children from his first marriage. Todd Alden and Julia Alden Dee, two of Grantor's children by his first marriage, alleged that Nancy in her capacity as trustee, acted fraudulently and in violation of her fiduciary duties in her administration of the Trust and invaded trust principal through self-dealing, concealment, and misrepresentations. They sought to hold Nancy and her two children liable for damages resulting from the alleged improprieties. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted that of the Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant, Estate of Nancy B. Alden. Julia Dee and Todd Alden appealed. The sum of Defendants' arguments to the Supreme Court contended that there were multiple disputed issues of material fact that should have precluded summary judgment. Upon review of the lengthy history of the Trust and the parties' litigation pertaining to the Trust, the Court found that Defendants' simply failed to prove their case: "[a] lack of sufficient evidence on one side does not mean a disputed issue of fact remains." The Court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Trust. View "In re Estate of Alden" on Justia Law

Appellants Shenandoah, LLC, David Shlansky, Ting Chang, and other entities and individuals, appealed the Environmental Court's summary judgment decision upholding an "Act 250" jurisdictional opinion. Appellants have a variety of overlapping interests. Mr. Shlansky created an irrevocable trust (Trust) to benefit his and his wife Chang's children. As settler of the Trust, Mr. Shlansky contributed the property that is the subject of the underlying jurisdictional opinion. The Trust has an ownership stake in various companies that have engaged in land-development activities in the relevant jurisdictional area. Shenandoah, LLC, one such created entity, sought to build a ten-unit residential housing project. In August 2008, Shenandoah requested a jurisdictional opinion to determine if the project required an "Act 250" permit. In a September 2008 decision, the district coordinator found that the project required an Act 250 permit because it involved the construction of a housing project with ten or more units. Appellants appealed portions of this decision to the Environmental Court. The court upheld the district coordinator's jurisdictional opinion. The court concluded that Mr. Shlansky and Ms. Chang benefited from the Trust's land-development activities so the Trust's development activities were attributable to them personally. Appellants challenged this conclusion on appeal. As support for their position, they pointed to the affidavits filed by Mr. Shlansky, Ms. Chang and "the legal existence of the Trust, which is irrevocable." Upon review of the lower court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Court's decision. As the Environmental Court concluded, benefit to the parents rendered them "persons" affiliated with subdivisions and development previously undertaken by entities owned or affiliated with the Trust as defined by Act 250. View "In re Shenandoah LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants Charles and Hubert Lovell appealed a grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff Duane Amsden. In 1997, Phillip Lovell, father of Charles and Hubert, executed a will appointing Charles and his stepson Duane as co-executors. He also executed a power of attorney naming Charles as his attorney-in-fact. The principal asset of the senior Lovell's estate was a farm. In 2003, Philip Lovell's wife Zada quitclaimed her interest in the farm to her husband. Then, Charles, acting as attorney-in-fact, executed a quitclaim deed conveying the farm from his father to Hubert and himself for no consideration. Several of the Lovell's other children and stepchildren, including Plaintiff, signed a consent statement dated May 31, 2003, approving the transfer. In 2008, following the death of Zada Lovell, Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action in the probate court claiming the transfer of the farm to defendants was invalid under state law, and sought to establish the estate of Phillip Lovell as the farm's rightful owner. The probate court issued a declaratory judgment order in favor of Defendants, finding that the quitclaim transfer was valid because the language of the POA failed to restrict defendant Charles Lovell's power to gift the property to himself or others. The superior court reversed, granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The court found that the amended POA statute prohibited an attorney-in-fact from making gifts of the principal's property to himself or others unless the POA "explicitly" granted such authority. Defendants appealed. Upon review of the POA and records of the Lovell estate, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court order. The Court found that Charles Lovell could not, pursuant to his powers as his father's attorney-in-fact, transfer title of his father's farm to himself and his brother, Hubert Lovell, where the power of attorney failed to explicitly grant the power to make such a gift. View "In re Estate of Lovell" on Justia Law