Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Portland Street Solar LLC appealed a Public Utility Commission order denying Portland Street’s petition for a certificate of public good (CPG) to install and operate a 500-kW solar group net-metering system adjacent to a previously permitted solar array owned by Golden Solar, LLC. Interpreting the definition of “plant” set forth in 30 V.S.A. 8002(18), the Commission determined that the proposed Portland Street project would be part of a single plant along with the already-approved adjacent Golden Solar project and thus would exceed the 500-kw energy-generating-capacity limit applicable in the net-metering program. On appeal, Portland Street argued the Commission’s decision was inconsistent with the Vermont Supreme Court’s controlling precedent, as well as prior Commission decisions involving similar cases, and that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by expansively construing the component parts of section 8002(18) that defined the characteristics of a single plant. Applying the appropriate deferential standard of review, the Supreme Court concluded the Commission’s self-described expanded and refined interpretation of what constituted a single plant under section 8002(18) was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory and did not amount to compelling error that would require the Court to intervene in matters the Legislature has delegated to the Commission’s expertise. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commission’s decision denying Portland Street’s petition for a CPG to install and operate its proposed facility under the net-metering program. View "In re Petition of Portland Street Solar LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner TruConnect Communications, Inc., sought designation from the Vermont Public Utility Commission as an eligible telecommunications carrier (ETC) to provide affordable telecommunications service to qualifying Vermonters under the Federal Lifeline program. The Commission granted TruConnect’s application subject to certain conditions, including a condition that required TruConnect to provide a free cellular handset to its customers. TruConnect appealed, arguing that the condition was imposed on clearly erroneous grounds. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed and reversed and remanded for the Commission to revise its order. View "In re Petition of TruConnect Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

Neighbors of a proposed solar electric-generation facility challenged the Public Utility Commission's (PUC) issuance of a certificate of public good for the project. At the heart of their appeal was a challenge to the PUC’s conclusions that the Apple Hill project would not unduly interfere with the orderly development of the region and would not have an undue adverse effect on aesthetics. Both of these conclusions rested in substantial part on the PUC’s conclusions that the selectboard of the Town of Bennington took the position that the Apple Hill project complied with the applicable Town Plan, and that the 2010 Town Plan did not establish a clear, written standard. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court determined the evidence and the PUC’s findings did not support these conclusions, so it reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Petition of Apple Hill Solar LLC" on Justia Law

Allco Renewable Energy Limited (Allco) appealed the Vermont Public Utility Commission’s (PUC) denial of Allco’s motion to intervene as a party in proceedings concerning whether Green Mountain Power Corporation (GMP) could purchase power generation facilities outside of Vermont. Allco argued that it should have been allowed to intervene because it meets the criteria for intervention set out in the PUC’s own rules. In particular, Allco argued it had a substantial interest in the proceedings both as a ratepayer and as a competing supplier of power. Allco also appealed the PUC’s eventual decision to allow the purchases. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the PUC’s denial of Allco’s motion to intervene and accordingly dismissed Allco’s second appeal. View "In re Petition of Green Mountain Power Corp. for Approval to Invest in Hydroelectric Generation Facilities Located Outside Vermont (Allco Renewable Energy Limited, Appellant)" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kathleen Langlois owned a building with commercial space on the first floor and an apartment on the second. She failed to pay the water bill for the property. Plaintiff alleged that she arranged with a representative of the Town of Proctor to disconnect the water service so she would not incur further water expenses, but that the Town failed to do so. In reliance on the Town's promised undertaking, plaintiff discontinued heating the building, causing the pipes containing water to freeze and split under the first floor of the building, which, in turn, flooded the first floor and basement, causing extensive damage to the building. Plaintiff brought this action with four counts: negligence, breach of contract, consumer fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. With respect to the negligence count, the Town argued that it had no duty to disconnect the water service or to disconnect the service with reasonable care or, alternatively, that any duty was based on its contractual obligations and could not give rise to tort liability. With respect to the contract claim, the Town argued that it had no contractual obligation to disconnect the water service and that it was exercising its right under a statutory delinquency collection procedure. It further argued that the contractual relationship between plaintiff and the Town was terminated when plaintiff failed to pay her water bill. The case was then tried before a jury, which rendered a verdict for plaintiff. In answering the special interrogatories, the jury found that there was a contract between plaintiff and the Town "regarding the turning off of her water service," but that the Town had not breached that contract. It found that the Town was negligent, that its negligence was a proximate cause of harm to plaintiff, and that plaintiff's damages were $64,918.44. Among the things the Town argued on appeal, it argued that the court should have instructed the jury to apply comparative negligence, and that the instructions on damages were erroneous because the proper measure of damages was the diminution in value of the building and, in any event, there was no evidence of that diminution. Plaintiff cross-appealed, arguing that the jury instructions improperly failed to allow the jury to find that the Town breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Supreme Court rejected the Town's argument on appeal that it had no tort duty to properly turn off plaintiff's water. However, the Court found that the trial court erred in instructing the jury: "the instructions as a whole did not contain the spirit of the law. If we could determine from the damages award or the interrogatories that the jury found that plaintiff was not negligent and was not obligated to mitigate damages, we could find an absence of prejudice. We cannot do so here; the damages awarded by the jury were less than plaintiff claimed." On remand, the trial court was ordered to instruct the jury on comparative negligence. Because of the defect in the jury instructions, the Court did not address the remaining issues on appeal. The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Langlois v. Town of Proctor" on Justia Law