Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a police officer's visual estimate of defendant's speed can support a reasonable suspicion to warrant a traffic stop. Defendants Todd Dunham and Heidi Tatham argued that a visual estimate amounts to nothing more than a mere hunch or guess, and fails to provide objective grounds for a traffic stop. The Court disagreed and affirmed the denial of defendants' motions to suppress. View "Vermont v. Dunham" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the interplay between rulings and requirements relating to zoning in connection with a planned development and enforcement of restrictive covenants and deed restrictions applicable to property within the development. Plaintiff obtained municipal zoning approval to reconfigure the lot lines in her two-lot farmstead parcel within the Quechee Lakes subdivision, as well as to construct a dwelling on the second, yet-to-be-developed lot. The Environmental Division affirmed the zoning board's award of the latter permit. Notwithstanding that order, in a declaratory judgment action also initiated by plaintiff, the civil division concluded that plaintiff's proposed construction violated the applicable restrictive covenants and deed restrictions. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the Environmental Division's decision resolved the dispute, that the civil division improperly considered extrinsic evidence when the disputed deed restrictions were clear on their face, that defendants' challenge to plaintiff's right to build the proposed dwelling was time-barred, and that the character of the development had changed so much that the disputed deed restrictions are no longer valid. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff's theory of the case was that the deed language was ambiguous; plaintiff was instrumental in framing the trial court's task as one of construing ambiguous deed language; and plaintiff led the way in introducing extrinsic evidence in support of plaintiff's own interpretation. "Given this record, plaintiff cannot now challenge the trial court's consideration of extrinsic evidence to interpret the documents." The Court concluded that plaintiff suffered no prejudice from the trial court's decision to consider the testimony about the context surrounding the disputed deed language - both that offered by plaintiff and by defendants. Finding no error in the trial court's decision to deny the motion for declaratory judgment, the Court reached no other issues plaintiff raised in her appeal and affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Marsh Inter Vivos Trust v. McGillvray, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffrey Gentes, who entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of driving while intoxicated (DWI), argued on appeal that the superior court’s criminal division erred by denying his motion to dismiss both the criminal charge and the civil suspension of his license. Defendant argued for dismissal based his claim that the Vermont Department of Health's negligence deprived him of his statutory right to obtain an independent blood test result. Having weighed the "Bailey" factors, the Supreme Court found no constitutional violation and agreed with the trial court that dismissal of the charge against defendant was not an appropriate remedy for mistakenly destroyed evidence in the context of this particular case. View "Vermont v. Gentes" on Justia Law

In 2005, defendant Thomas Bogert, Jr. pled guilty to two counts of possession of child pornography and no contest to one count of aggravated sexual assault and one count of sexual assault. He was sentenced to a total of three to twenty-three years, eight years to serve, with the balance suspended. Defendant signed a probation order that included thirty-five conditions. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was the permissibility, under the Vermont Constitution, of a warrantless and suspicionless search of a convicted offender furloughed to his home and subject to a standard condition of a conditional reentry agreement that provides for such searches. Upon review, the Court concluded that the search in this case satisfied the requirements of the Vermont Constitution applicable to offenders on a conditional reentry status and, accordingly, affirmed. View "Vermont v. Bogert" on Justia Law

The parties in this case entered into a real estate agreement thirteen years ago. The trial court concluded that the agreement constituted a contract for deed and that the purchasers had therefore acquired an equitable interest in the property in question. The court initiated a foreclosure on that interest, even though it had not been pled. Plaintiffs, the purchasers as found by the superior court, David and Barbara Prue, appealed the foreclosure. Defendant, the seller as found by the court, Larry Royer, appealed the court’s conclusions that the contract was an enforceable contract for deed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the court’s conclusion that the parties entered into a contract for deed and that it was enforceable, but reversed the foreclosure decree as premature. View "Prue v. Royer, Sr." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the hypothetical question "What are the chances?" could be considered a valid legal inference. Defendant Mark Vuley was convicted of arson after several unexplained fires at his rented house took place within an eight-week period. The trial court relied upon the fact that fires are rare occurrences in order to infer that defendant willfully started the fires, and so instructed the jury to rely upon the same inference. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that there ware potentially valid inferences that could be drawn from multiple fires within a relatively short time frame, the Court could not approve of the trial court's instruction to the jury. However, because the error did not rise to the level of plain error, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's convictions. View "Vermont v. Vuley" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, plaintiff appealed the trial court's entry of judgment in defendants' favor following the court's discovery sanction, which precluded plaintiff from offering expert testimony or evidence regarding defendants' negligence due to plaintiff's repeated failure to adequately reply to interrogatories. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the discovery response was sufficient and the court abused its discretion in concluding that more detailed factual information was required. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the sanctions were within the trial court's power and were not "untenable" or "unreasonable," and that the sanctions precluded plaintiff from offering certain evidence "but was not a dismissal." As such, no special findings were required. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Stella v. Spaulding" on Justia Law

Appellant landlord appealed the grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the tenant. The trial court concluded that the landlord's eviction of the tenant from a property was wrongful. The landlord also appealed the court's denial of a post-trial motion that tenant was not liable to landlord for rent that accrued post-eviction. Because landlord's notice of default was defective, and because a wrongful eviction releases a tenant from liability for rent accrued post-eviction, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment. View "Vermont Small Business Development Corp. v. Fifth Son Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant Jerald Hawkins appealed his conditional guilty plea to criminal refusal of an evidentiary breath test and the civil suspension of his driver's license, claiming that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. On appeal, Defendant argued: (1) he was arrested without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution; (2) alternatively, the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment and Article 11 due to excessive force; (3) statements he made to police were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment and "Miranda" rights; (4) he was entitled to judgment in the civil license suspension proceeding because the final hearing did not take place within the mandatory timeframe. Defendant was stopped when an deputy sheriff "clocked" him driving over the speed limit. Defendant's car "bottomed out" on a washed-out part of a gravel driveway. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed in part, and remanded the case: the determination of probable cause to arrest for negligent operation for "bottoming out" on the washed out portion of the driveway was reversed. "Guided by common experience, we agree with defendant that, as a matter of law, driving over the washout as described was not negligent, so there was no probable cause to arrest him for negligent operation. . . Viewed another way, the court's decision would mean that every time a public highway in this condition is so used a crime could be charged, and any driver operating on a back road in March would risk prosecution. Such an application of the statute is too broad, and no reasonable jury could find negligence on these facts." The trial court has not considered if the State met its burden to show that whatever physical evidence, including Defendant's refusal to submit to a breath test, was not acquired by the deputy in exploitation of the unlawful arrest. Accordingly, the Court remanded for findings and a determination, based on the existing record evidence, on defendant's motion to suppress all physical evidence obtained following his arrest. View "Vermont v. Hawkins" on Justia Law

Defendant Damon Dubuque was convicted for refusing a reasonable request for an evidentiary test after being convicted of DUI. He appealed the denial of a motion to suppress evidence of his refusal to give a blood sample, arguing that he should have been offered a breath test instead. Police were dispatched to a rollover accident; the vehicle was operated by Defendant. After speaking with defendant, the officer arrested him on suspicion of driving under the influence and accompanied him in an ambulance to the hospital. Approximately one hour and forty-five minutes after the accident, the officer began processing defendant for the offense of driving under the influence. He asked defendant to provide a blood sample, and defendant refused, stating that he would give only a breath sample. After defendant was released from the hospital, the officer transported him to a residential and detoxification facility. The facility refused to admit him. The officer then took him to a detox facility at the Chittenden Regional Correctional Center. At no point did defendant give either a blood or breath sample, nor did the officer ask defendant to take a test after leaving the hospital. Defendant was arraigned on charges of "DUI #3 or Subsequent – Test Refusal" and one other charge, which was subsequently dropped. Defendant moved to suppress evidence of the refusal to give a blood sample. The sole issue at the hearing on the motion to suppress was whether breath-testing equipment was reasonably available when the officer processed defendant, given the unknown amount of time that defendant could be expected to remain in the hospital. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that in this case, the time at which the officer began processing and made the request for the test was close to when the permissive-inference window would close. At that point, the officer could not determine when defendant's medical evaluation and treatment would end. It was not reasonable for the officer to prematurely remove defendant from the hospital in order to obtain a breath test. The Court held therefore that the breath-testing equipment was not reasonably available and affirmed the trial court. View "Vermont v. Dubuque" on Justia Law