Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Kayla Eaton's lawsuit against her former employer and supervisor for sexual assault was dismissed for failure to prosecute. She claimed that her ability to prosecute the case was thwarted by a licensed polygraph examiner, Leroy Prior, who determined that she did not tell the truth in responding to questions about the alleged assault. Ms. Eaton and her father Robert Eaton filed this action against Prior, claiming negligent administration of the polygraph examination, and against the Vermont State Police and Lt. Matthew Belmay, alleging that they improperly disclosed the examination results and conspired to cover up Prior's misconduct. The trial court entered judgment for defendants on the ground that the suit was barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to actions for "injuries to the person," under 12 V.S.A. 512(4), and the Eatons appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly concluded the statute of limitations applied to this case, however, the court mistakenly failed to consider the applicability of 12 V.S.A. 511's general six-year limitation period to the claims for economic harm resulting from dismissal of the underlying lawsuit and other alleged economic costs.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Eaton v. Prior" on Justia Law

Wife Maura Breslin appealed a family court order that required her to sign a waiver to correct a previously filed Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) which erroneously gave her survivorship benefits in her former husband's pension. The divorce order, fully incorporating the terms of the separation agreement, awarded wife “one half of the pension, as of the date of separation and the [husband] is awarded the remainder." A QDRO signed by wife’s attorney was filed in 2009 to implement the terms of the order. The QDRO mistakenly awarded wife survivorship benefits in husband’s pension, contrary to the divorce order which merely provided wife with one-half of the pension, with remainder to husband. The family division approved the QDRO, and the plan administrator implemented it, which resulted in payments being made to wife. Husband did not object to the submission of the 2009 QDRO, and did not appeal its approval. In 2010, wife and husband jointly filed a new QDRO, which omitted the erroneous section regarding survivorship benefits. The family division approved the QDRO. In January 2011, the plan administrator rejected the QDRO because payments had already begun under the 2009 QDRO. The plan administrator noted that wife could fix this problem by “waiv[ing] away her right” to the survivorship benefits. Husband’s attorney contacted wife’s attorney numerous times between January and March, inquiring as to her position on the waiver issue. Having not heard anything, husband filed a motion to enforce in March 2011. The court held a chambers conference in August 2011, and issued an entry order the same month concluding that wife is not entitled to the survivorship benefits. The court found that the divorce order merely granted wife “a defined, independent right to one half the pension,” while husband was granted his own separate pension rights. The court ordered wife to execute the waiver to restore to husband and his family the sole right to any survivorship benefits. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because the 2009 QDRO purported to modify the underlying property division, it was invalid and not entitled to preclusive effect. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the family court order. View "Breslin v. Synnott" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned whether a truck idling in the middle of the night in the parking lot of an auto repair shop that had previously been burglarized was sufficient to give police reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Defendant Nicole Paro did not challenge the facts as found by the trial court; she challenged only the trial court's legal conclusion that, given the particular facts of this case, the police had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop her vehicle. Police passed by Northeast Foreign Cars and noticed a Chevrolet pickup truck idling in the parking lot. The police officer thought this was suspicious, as the shop was not open for business, and he knew that this area had experienced previous break-ins, with the most recent being about nine months earlier. In fact, the police officer had personally investigated thefts from vehicles at Northeast Foreign Cars a year earlier in August 2009. As he started to turn around, the Chevy truck pulled out of the parking lot and headed east towards the police officer.The officer made a motor vehicle stop based solely on his suspicion of criminal activity at Northeast Foreign Cars. Defendant was charged with driving under the influence and moved to suppress all evidence obtained through the traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed: "We recognize that police officers are trained to be suspicious and it is their job to investigate suspicious situations. But we must also be mindful of our right to wander where we please, when we please, without fear of a police seizure." View "Vermont v. Paro" on Justia Law

Margaret Chickansoky (Mother) appealed a family court order that modified her parent-child contact rights. The parties originally agreed to share parental rights and responsibilities as part of a December 2005 divorce order. In 2009, the family court granted, in part, father’s motion to modify the original divorce order by awarding him sole legal parental rights and responsibilities. In July 2010, the family court granted father's second motion to modify based on his planned move to Missouri. The court awarded him legal and physical parental rights and responsibilities, with mother having summertime and vacation parent-child contact. The parties then got into a dispute over mother's unplanned or short-notice visits to Missouri. Following a hearing in July 2011, the court entered a twenty-five page order which clarified and modified parent-child contact. The court found that mother placed her needs ahead of the best interests of daughter, engaged in selfish and unreasonable behavior, has been patently unreasonable, has had "no insight whatsoever" as to why her behavior has caused daughter stress, and has failed to gain insight "as to the devastating impact of her behavior." The court also found that father attempted to relieve daughter's stress and that his "good basic parenting" has allowed daughter to have a "consistent, stable routine." Turning to the best-interests analysis, the court found that daughter's emotional development would be harmed if she spent the whole summer with mother. Thus, the court set forth a specific contact schedule and limited mother’s summertime contact to approximately one month. Mother appealed, arguing that: (1) the court exceeded its jurisdiction and violated her right to due process by issuing an order limiting her summertime contact with daughter insofar as she was never notified that summertime contact would be at issue; (2) father failed to make an adequate showing that there was a real, substantial, and unanticipated change in material circumstances to modify the previous custody order; and (3) the court failed to consider the best-interests factors in further limiting her contact with daughter. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the evidence presented before the family court supported the court’s findings about mother’s unreasonableness and lack of insight, and father’s efforts to minimize daughter's stress, which in turn supported the conclusion that daughter's best interests would be served by limiting mother's summertime contact. View "Chickanosky v. Chickanosky" on Justia Law

Defendant Chase Tetrault and friends broke into a remote camp owned by A.C. (camp owner), damaging appliances and personal items. Defendant pled guilty to one count of unlawful trespass and the State requested restitution. At the restitution hearing, Defendant argued that the camp owner should be able to recover only the actual value of the damaged items at the time of the trespass, not their replacement cost. He also argued restitution could not be had for items that were not damaged, but "merely used." The trial judge disagreed, and awarded the camp owner the full amount of claimed damages. On appeal, Defendant raised the same two arguments, along with a new argument that restitution was not appropriate at all in this case, because the crime of unlawful trespass did not include an element of destruction of property. "While the value of a used microwave or toaster would be lower than the value of the identical appliances in new condition, Defendant’s suggestion that the replacement cost can be estimated by what the items might fetch at a yard sale is pettifoggery. . . .[a] victim of a home invasion should not have to visit local thrift stores or pore through the classifieds to determine the value of a used blender." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court was well within its discretion in awarding the camp owner restitution in the amount sought. View "Vermont v. Tetrault" on Justia Law

The trial court dismissed Wife's post-divorce motion for relief from judgment based on Husband's alleged fraudulent concealment of assets without requiring completion of the discovery sought by wife, and without a hearing. Wife and Husband entered into a stipulated final divorce agreement, approved and incorporated into a final order by the family court. Several months after the parties' divorce became final, Wife filed a motion to set aside the final divorce decree on several grounds, including that husband had not disclosed a bank account. The family court denied the motion, noting that both parties had personal checking accounts opened post-separation from which they paid their bills and neither party had included those accounts in their financial disclosures. The court also concluded that the post-judgment questions raised by Wife's motion were relatively minor in the context of the overall case. Several years later Husband filed a motion to modify spousal maintenance due to an unanticipated decline in his income. In connection with that motion, he produced copies of his bank statements that included for the first time, an account that had his and his sister's names on it--an account he opened and used prior to the divorce stipulation. Wife subsequently filed a motion for contempt and enforcement, arguing that Husband indeed had hidden some accounts from her that were to be used in creating the stipulated divorce agreement. The trial court dismissed her motion. On appeal, Wife challenged the trial court's refusal to hold further hearings several outstanding issues pertaining to the accounts issue. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err in declining to hear Wife's motion on the Husband's concealment of the last bank account. The Court found that the motion was time-barred. Therefore, if the motion was time barred, it was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion in refusing to hold another hearing on the issues raised in that motion. View "Olio v. Olio" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffory Hammond appealed his convictions for sexual assault and lewd and lascivious conduct. Defendant argued that: (1) he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal based on the complainant's contradictory and otherwise incredible testimony; (2) alternatively, he was entitled to a new trial for the same reasons; (3) the court's jury instructions were erroneous; (4) the court erred under Vermont's Rape Shield by allowing the State to present testimony from the complainant about her lack of sexual experience; and (5) the court erred by allowing non-expert and expert "anecdotal" testimony about the manner in which teenage victims sometimes report sexual assault. Finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Hammond" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Moira Lamay, a former Vermont state trooper, appealed the grant of summary judgmet in favor of the State on her claim of employment discrimination. On appeal, Plaintiff contended the trial court erred in: (1) finding that she had presented insufficient evidence of gender bias as a motivating factor in her discharge; and (2) declining to consider the allegations in her complaint to the Vermont Human Rights Commission. "Plaintiff's difficulty here is that her evidence, whether characterized as direct or circumstantial, was insufficient to support a finding that gender or gender stereotyping was a motivating factor in her termination." The Supreme Court, after its review, upheld the grant of summary judgment in favor of the State. View "Lamay v. Vermont" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the trial court's dismissal of his medical malpractice action for failing to satisfy the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Allan Eisemann, M.D., practicing through a medical practice which bore his name, negligently failed to advise Plaintiff or his dentist of the known risks associated with a tooth extraction while Plaintiff was taking intervenous doses of a medication called "Zometa," prescribed for multiple myleoma. Defendant allegedly approved the procedure; Plaintiff's dentist pulled the tooth. Following the procedure, Plaintiff developed osteonecrosis of the jaw. All parties agreed that the statute of limitations period for Plaintiff's malpractice claims would expire October 9, 2009. By a letter dated in September, Plaintiff's counsel proposed to Dr. Eisemann's counsel and other potential defendants a "time out" agreement to toll the statute of limitations for ninety days so that the parties could pursue settlement. Although Dr. Eisemann signed off on the agreement, not all defendants did. As a result of Plaintiff's failure to reach an agreement with all defendants, Plaintiff filed suit on October 7, 2009. Counsel for Dr. Eisemann returned the acceptance of service to Plaintiff's counsel in January, 2010. Plaintiff did not filed the acceptance with the court at that time. The trial court dismissed the case on its own motion on April 15, 2011 based on Plaintiff's failure to prosecute his claim. Three days later, Plaintiff filed the signed acceptances of service. Dr. Eisemann moved to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the Eisemann defendants are equitably estopped from invoking the statute of limitations. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiff could not rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel because his own "omissions or inadvertences" contributed to the problem. Accordingly, the Court affirmed dismissal of his case. View "Beebe v. Eisemann" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Frank Hall, a longtime employee of the Agency of Transportation (AOT), sued the agency in 2007, alleging discrimination on the basis of a physical disability and retaliation for his having filed a workers' compensation claim. The jury found no disability discrimination, but awarded Plaintiff damages based upon its finding that the State had retaliated against him as alleged. On appeal, the State argued that: (1) Plaintiff's retaliation claim was precluded by a September 2003 Stipulation and Agreement signed by Plaintiff and AOT releasing the State from liability for any and all claims associated in any way with Plaintiff's reclassification and transfer stemming from hostile work environment allegations against him; (2) Plaintiff's retaliation claim was not supported by any causal connection linking his employment reclassification and transfer with his having filed a workers' compensation claim; (3) evidence of a video surveillance of Plaintiff connected with a second workers' compensation claim was insufficient as a matter of law to support his retaliation claim and the resulting damages award; and (4) even if the record supported his retaliation claim, the State's liability is limited to $250,000, as set forth in Vermont's Tort Claims Act during the relevant time period. Plaintiff cross-appealed, challenging the trial court's denial of his request for post-judgment interest and attorney's fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment against the State and remanded the matter for the trial court to rule on the potentially determinative issue of the scope of the September 2003 release. View "Hall v. Vermont" on Justia Law