Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Janet Knutsen appealed a superior court decision to deny her motion for summary judgment and and for granting defendant Vermont Association of Realtors, Inc.'s (VAR) motion for summary judgment on her consumer fraud claim arising out of her purchase of a home in Moretown. Plaintiff argued that VAR's form purchase and sale agreement, which was used in her real estate purchase (to which VAR was not a party) violated the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) in that two provisions of the form were unfair and deceptive, and that she was therefore entitled to damages under section 2461(b) of the CFA. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly held that 'VAR's sole connection to this case was its drafting of the template clauses that [plaintiff] and her buyer's broker used for the purchase of the house, and that could not support a consumer fraud claim. View "Knutsen v. Dion" on Justia Law

Father appealed the family court’s denial of his motion to modify a final order terminating his parental rights to his children, A.W. and J.W., born in November 2000 and October 2006, respectively. On appeal, he argued that there were changed circumstances sufficient to modify or set aside the termination decision and that the court’s basis for denial in this case lacked evidentiary support. Finding no abuse of discretion by the family court, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re A.W. and J.W." on Justia Law

The issue before the court in this case arose from a proposed housing development in West Woodstock. In a prior case involving this development, the Supreme Court affirmed permits for the project granted by the town development review board and the district environmental commission and affirmed by the environmental division of the superior court. In this appeal, brought by the owners of abutting properties to the land in question, more narrow questions related to easements and other property rights were brought before the court. After review of the trial court record and the arguments presented by the parties, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Roy v. Woodstock Community Trust, Inc." on Justia Law

Taxpayer Brownington Center Church of Brownington, Vermont (now known as New Hope Bible Church and Ministries, Inc.) (the Church)), appealed a Superior Court determination that certain land and buildings owned by the Church were not exempt from real estate taxes for the tax year commencing April 1, 2009 under 32 V.S.A. 3832(2). The parties did not dispute that the property was dedicated for pious use and that it is owned and operated by the Church as a nonprofit organization. The issue was whether the property was excluded from the pious-use exemption of section 3802(4) by the language in section 3832(2). The Church argued that the property qualified for exemption, primarily because everything that occurred on the property facilitated its religious ministry and that “worship and service of the Believer in Christ” takes place everywhere on the premises. Under this belief, the Church maintains that the steel equipment building, the cabins, kitchen and the tent, are all church edifices. It defines “church edifice” to be a “structure or facility that is used exclusively or primarily to propagate a religious message to persons who receive that message for a worshipful purpose.” It contended that an overnight summer camp for religious purposes transformed the entire property into a place of worship and education. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the Superior Court. View "Brownington Center Church v. Town of Irasburg" on Justia Law

Respondent Leslie Anne Whittington appealed an Office of Professional Regulation (OPR) order that concluded she committed several acts of unprofessional conduct and sanctioning her to a five-year license suspension. Respondent worked as a Nursing Home Administrator (NHA) from October 2006 until 2010. In its Amended Specification of Charges, the State alleged that respondent committed a host of specified acts that amounted to unprofessional conduct. In particular, the State alleged that respondent engaged in unprofessional conduct by failing to keep the home’s supplies adequately stocked; failing to keep the home adequately staffed; creating an erratic and hostile environment for staff and residents, possibly due to mental or psychological instability; allowing regulatory deficiencies to occur and responding poorly to two routine regulatory by the Vermont Division of Licensing and Protection; failing to ensure that residents’ records were properly kept; improperly interfering with nurses’ delivery of medication to residents and other nursing duties or medical decisions; falsely representing that she was a licensed nursing assistant and was close to earning a nursing degree; and improperly physically removing the ombudsman responsible for the home from the premises. Upon review of the OPR record, the Supreme Court reversed the Administrative Law Officer’s determinations that respondent engaged in unprofessional conduct by questioning a doctor’s withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and on account of the Division of Licensing and Protection survey deficiencies, but affirmed the ALO’s other findings of unprofessional conduct. The case was remanded to the trial court for remand to the ALO for redetermination of the applicable sanction. View "Whittington v. Office of Professional Regulation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Peter and Nicole Dernier appealed the dismissal of their action for: (1) a declaratory judgment that defendant U.S. Bank National Association could not enforce the mortgage and promissory note for the debt associated with plaintiffs' purchase of their house based on irregularities and fraud in the transfer of both instruments; (2) a declaration that U.S. Bank has violated Vermont's Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) by asserting its right to enforce the mortgage and note; and (3) attorney's fees and costs under the CFA. They also appealed the trial court's failure to enter a default judgment against defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS). Plaintiffs fell behind on their mortgage, and brought suit against two parties: Mortgage Network, Inc. (MNI), which is in the chain of title for both the note and the mortgage, and MERS, which is in the chain of title for the mortgage as a "nominee" for MNI. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the mortgage was void, asserting that: (1) MERS, as a nominee, never had any beneficial interest in the mortgage; (2) MNI had assigned its interest in both instruments to others without notifying plaintiffs; and (3) no party with the right to foreclose the mortgage had recorded its interest. MNI responded that plaintiffs had named MNI as a party in error, because MNI did "not own the right to the mortgage in question." MERS did not respond. Around this time, plaintiffs received a letter in which U.S. Bank represented that it possessed the original promissory note and mortgage and that it had the right to institute foreclosure proceedings on the property. The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion to amend and dismissed plaintiffs' case for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs appealed. After careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in dismissing Counts 1 and 2 of plaintiffs' amended complaint for lack of standing, to the extent that these counts alleged irregularities in the transfer of the note and mortgage unconnected to the pooling and servicing agreement. The Court affirmed as to dismissal of Counts 3 and 4 of plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Dernier v. Mortgage Network, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Joanne Fitzsimmons Balkam appealed the superior court's partial summary judgment decision that reversed a probate court decision that had granted her permission, as executor of her mother's estate, to physically partition and sell parts of a real estate property to make a division between the heirs of her mother's residual estate. The appellees were two of her brothers, Dennis and James Fitzsimmons. The issues raised in executor's appeal were whether the probate court had the power to allow the heirs to choose which property they received and whether the executor had the power to contract for a survey. Dennis and James raised five issues on appeal: the first two contested the probate court's ruling on their claim of waste and their claim that the accounting was flawed; the last three addressed the power of the executor and the probate court with respect to the distribution of the property: (1) whether executor had the power to subdivide the estate, (2) whether executor's proposed division met the requirement of the will that the estate be distributed into "as nearly equal shares as possible", and (3) whether the probate court's division was proper under its power to partition in 14 V.S.A. 1729. The superior court, in granting appellees' motion for partial summary judgment, and denying the motion for the license to sell real estate, disagreed with the probate court, and found that because legal title to real property passes to beneficiaries immediately upon the death of a testator, the executor had "limited ability to affect the beneficiaries' ownership of the real property" and could not partition the property. Whether or not by mistake, however, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not take up all the issues before it. Dennis and James filed a motion to reconsider the remand to the probate court, asking the superior court to deal with the remaining issues. Executor did not respond to that motion, but instead filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court requesting that it reverse the superior court's summary judgment order regarding executor's power to partition the property. While the Supreme Court held that the executor has the power to partition or sell the property to distribute to testator's children, it did not suggest that the power was unlimited. "The executor is bound by the requirement that the distribution shares be as equal as possible." The Court found the superior court erred in its reasoning on whether the executor had the power to subdivide. On remand, the Supreme Court mandated the trial court must move on to the fourth and fifth questions in light of executor's action pursuant to her distribution power. It must also answer the first and second questions. View "In re Estate of Fitzsimmons" on Justia Law

Applicant Charles Ferrera and property owners Ronald and Susan Fenn appealed a Superior Court, Environmental Division order that affirmed the Town of Middlebury's denial of their application to operate a gravel pit. Applicants contended: (1) several key findings and conclusions were unsupported by the evidence; and (2) provisions of the Town's zoning regulations are unconstitutionally vague. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Ferrera & Fenn Gravel Pit" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Vermont resident and voter, filed a complaint seeking declarations that Barack Obama is not a "natural born Citizen" as required for eligibility to be President in Article II, Clause 4, of the Federal Constitution and was thus unqualified to be on the ballot for the Office of President, and that Mr. Obama's Petition for Nomination for the primary election and filings for the general election were "null and void" because of his ineligibility to hold office. In addition, plaintiff sought an injunction against the Vermont Secretary of State to bar the Secretary from including Mr. Obama's name on the election ballot in Vermont. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to bring the suit because the claim was "an impermissible generalized grievance." Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal, and subsequently filed a motion in late 2012 for an expedited hearing before this Court in advance of the Joint Session of Congress that would take place on January 6. This Vermont Supreme Court denied the motion. Plaintiff argued this case was not moot because the Court could provide relief by declaring that Barack Obama was not a natural-born citizen, and asserted that a controversy continues through plaintiff's efforts to safeguard his life, liberty and property. The Vermont Court held this case was moot. View "Paige v. Vermont" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Michelle Straw appealed a superior court judgment that dismissed her case for breach of an implied employment contract against defendant Visiting Nurse Association and Hospice of Vermont and New Hampshire (VNA). She argued the jury instructions in her case were erroneous and prejudicial because they failed to instruct on the standard for "just cause" termination. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Straw v. Visiting Nurse Association and Hospice of VT/NH" on Justia Law