Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Craig Wilson appealed a family division order that dismissed his motion to modify part of his 2005 final divorce decree. The court concluded that the provision at issue pertained to property division and he did not demonstrate a sufficient reason to modify its terms. On appeal, Mr. Wilson argued that the court abused its discretion in dismissing the motion as a matter of law and not considering the merits of his request for relief from judgment. The order explained that when the parties' youngest child turned eighteen or graduated from high school (in 2014) the house would be sold and the parties would share in the proceeds. The order specifically delineated that neither party was entitled to maintenance. In August 2010, husband filed a motion to modify the divorce decree, claiming that after being laid off in January 2009, he remained unemployed and did not have the financial means to continue sharing the costs of taxes, insurance and maintenance on the house. He asked to be relieved of his obligation of paying for one-half of the taxes and future maintenance. He also asked that the house be placed on the market immediately instead of in 2014. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the family division did not abuse its discretion in determining that Mr. Wilson's claims of financial hardship were insufficient to warrant relief. Furthermore, the Court found that the provisions of the decree relating to the house were "aspects of property division and not maintenance." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the family divisions' decision to dismiss Mr. Wilson's requests. View "Wilson v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Joshua Handverger, the former city manager of Winooski, appealed a trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Winooski city attorney. Plaintiff sued the city attorney, individually, for breach of fiduciary duty in the course of municipal infighting over Plaintiff's performance as manager and the city's decision to dismiss him. Plaintiff argued that contrary to the fealty owed him by the city attorney, the attorney embarrassed and humiliated him by threatening cross-examination at a municipal hearing concerning his suspension of the city's police chief, and by signing a disparaging letter and press release calling for his resignation. Plaintiff claimed compensation for personal anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, and nightmares resulting from the city attorney's actions. The trial court determined that the city attorney owed plaintiff no fiduciary duty beyond the attorney's duty to the city. The Supreme Court held that trial court was correct in construing the city charter as obligating the city attorney to represent the city's interests only. The "essential" question on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the city attorney was obligated "to act for or give advice for the benefit" of Plaintiff personally either as an ally, or a neutral, in the Plaintiff's employment dispute with the city. "Absent any language to that effect in the charter, or some evidence that the attorney otherwise entered upon such a role on behalf of Plaintiff, the answer remains no." View "Handverger v. City of Winooski and O'Brien" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeremy Robitaille appealed his conditional guilty plea to assault and robbery, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Defendant maintained that statements he made to police were taken in violation of his rights under the Public Defender Act (PDA) and the Vermont Constitution. He also asserted that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. Defendant was arrested in Burlington following an assault and robbery at the Enosburg Pharmacy. An officer met Defendant at the police station and informed him of his Miranda rights. Defendant invoked his right to remain silent and his right to counsel, and all conversation between the officer and defendant ceased. The officer did not contact a public defender immediately thereafter, and Defendant did not ask for an attorney by name. While arrangements were being made to transfer Defendant to a correctional facility, the advising officer conversed with another police officer about a third officer's pregnancy. Defendant was a few feet away, but none of the conversation was directed at or concerned him. Defendant asked if anyone else was going to be arrested and a few other questions before offering to talk to the officers about the incident at the pharmacy. The officer again informed Defendant of his Miranda rights and asked if he wanted a lawyer present. Defendant stated that he did not. The officer provided Defendant with a written waiver form. Based on these and other findings, the court denied Defendant's motion to suppress. The trial court specifically rejected the notion that the officer had induced defendant to speak. Finding that the record supported the trial court's finding that defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision to deny the motion to suppress. View "Vermont v. Robitaille" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Joshua Handverger, the former city manager of the City of Winooski, appealed a trial court's dismissal of his claim for extraordinary relief against the City under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 and a related wage claim for double damages under 21 V.S.A. 347. Plaintiff argued that the Winooski City Council improperly terminated his employment by failing to give him a public hearing between fifteen and thirty days after the city council voted to dismiss him, as provided in the Winooski City Charter. The trial court ruled that since the charter explicitly bars judicial review of any action suspending or removing the city manager, Plaintiff was not entitled to review of the City’s action under Rule 75. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and therefore affirmed its decision. View "Handverger v. City of Winooski and O'Brien" on Justia Law

The State appealed a superior court's interlocutory order that granted Defendant Bruce Carrolton's motion to merge two counts of lewd-and-lascivious conduct into one. Relying on "State v. Perillo," (649 A.2d 566 (1994)), which involved facts very similar to this case, the trial court ruled that because the alleged offensive touching occurred continuously without any intervening act over a short period of time, the State could not charge defendant with multiple counts of lewd-and-lascivious conduct. Recognizing that the Supreme Court's holding in "Perillo" governed this case, the State on appeal asks the Court to overrule "Perillo" and hold that the touching of two distinct intimate parts of the body are two separate offenses as a matter of law. The Court declined to overrule "Perillo" and accordingly, affirmed the trial court’s decision. View "Vermont v. Carrolton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff David Lay appealed a superior court’s order that granted summary judgment to Defendants William J. Pettengill, Elizabeth F. Novotny, and Daniel K. Troidl on his complaint. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from an internal investigation into his behavior as a state trooper and his subsequent resignation from the Vermont State Police (VSP). Plaintiff argued that the superior court erred in granting judgment to Defendants on his claims of fraudulent nondisclosure, retaliatory prosecution, malicious prosecution, and negligent referral. He also challenged several discovery rulings made by the court. Plaintiff was suspended from duty due to an ongoing investigation by the Internal Affairs Unit. He would later hire a lawyer and settle charges against him which included falsification and misuse of property and evidence; making a false statement; failing to follow-up or make reports in numerous cases; and abuse of authority for conducting a warrantless search. The Windham County State Attorney's office became involved in commencing a criminal prosecution against Plaintiff. A judge found probable cause to issue a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest. At the time the second investigation was pending, Plaintiff had found new work by a private company. He was terminated from his job as a result of the arrest warrant. Upon returning to Vermont, he was charged with numerous crimes. He reached a plea agreement. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed suit against defendants raising numerous claims, including fraudulent nondisclosure, violation of his civil rights, and malicious process. In April 2010, the court issued the summary judgment decision from which Plaintiff appealed. Finding no legal basis for Plaintiff's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court and dismissed his case. View "Lay v. Pettengill" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Andrew Kennery, on behalf of the estate of Gladys Kennery, appealed the decision of the Windham Superior Court that granted the State's motion for summary judgment on his complaint alleging negligence, gross negligence, and civil rights violations against the State, two state troopers, and the Vermont Department of Public Safety (VDPS). Plaintiff's lawsuit stemmed from a "welfare check" the troopers performed on Plaintiff's decedent, Gladys Kennery. Gladys's daughter had requested that the troopers check on her elderly mother, but the troopers searched the wrong residence. Meanwhile, Gladys had collapsed in her backyard and was unable to get back up and reach shelter. Gladys was found the next morning and died twelve days later from hypothermia caused by prolonged exposure to the cold. The superior court held that the State owed no duty of reasonable care in performing the welfare check, thereby defeating Plaintiff's claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants. Genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether a duty of care was created under the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A based upon the State's undertaking to perform the welfare check and whether the troopers breached that duty such that the State was liable under the Vermont Tort Claims Act (VTCA). The Court also held that the court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's claim of gross negligence against the troopers. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kennery v. Vermont" on Justia Law

"This is a case of avoidable error and its consequences." The Vermont League of Cities and Towns (VLCT), the workers' compensation insurance carrier for the Town of Randolph, settled a compensation claim of Claimant Stacey Colson and paid the settlement amount to the Office of Child Support pursuant to an earlier order that OCS issued to collect Claimant's back child support payments. VLCT failed to deduct the amount of an attorney's fee lien granted by the Commissioner of the Department of Labor (DOL) to claimant’s lawyer. VLCT acted with the understanding that the lawyer would not seek the fee if, as occurred, claimant was awarded a lump-sum compensation amount. The lawyer sought her fee, but VLCT resisted double paying that amount, and the dispute has ended up before the Supreme Court after two decisions from the Commissioner and one from Superior Court. Claimant appealed the Commissioner’s grant of summary judgment to VLCT, in which the Commissioner concluded that VLCT acted appropriately in paying over the entire proceeds of claimant’s workers’ compensation award to OCS. Claimant argued that his attorney's lien had priority over OCS's claim for child support arrearages. He claimed that the Commissioner's findings were incomplete and contradictory, that the Commissioner erred when she determined his attorney’s lien did not have priority, and that DOL should be compelled to enforce his attorney’s lien for fees. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the OCS lien was first in time and therefore took priority, and affirmed the Commissioner's holding that VLCT could not be required to pay the attorney's fee amount to Claimant's attorney. View "Colson v. Vermont League of Cities & Towns" on Justia Law

Mother Karen Cegalis appealed a family court's order that awarded primary custody of her five-year-old son to Father Raymond Knutsen. On appeal, Mother argued the family court made numerous errors in its decision, that the evidence could have only lead to the conclusion that she should have been awarded primary custody. Even if this was a close case, and even if inclined to reach a different result on the same facts, "[the Supreme Court] repeatedly stated . . . that [its] review of custody matters is limited, and that [the Court] must defer to the judgment of the trial court applying its own common sense and experience." Accordingly, the Court found that the evidence presented to the family court was sufficient to support the court's judgment awarding custody to the Father. View "Knutsen v. Cegalis" on Justia Law

In this termination of parental rights case, the Supreme Court considered two separate appeals pertaining to a mother’s and father’s respective rights to their two daughters, seventeen-year-old R.W. and thirteen-year-old N.W. The case presented novel jurisdictional questions because the parents and children are citizens of Sri Lanka and, although mother and the children have been residents of Vermont for a number of years, father resided in Sri Lanka and has never been to Vermont. The Department for Children and Families (DCF) petitioned to terminate both mother’s and father’s residual parental rights. The family division granted the request as to mother, but concluded it lacked personal jurisdiction over father. Mother appealed termination of her parental rights, arguing that the superior court applied the incorrect standard of proof with respect to changed circumstances and engaged in a faulty best-interests analysis. DCF filed a separate appeal as to father, arguing that even though father lacked minimum contacts with Vermont, the court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the status of his children, who were within the court’s jurisdiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the termination of parental rights was a determination of status and could be adjudicated when the forum state has a sufficient connection to the children, even absent minimum contact jurisdiction over a parent. Further, in this case, the Court held that exercise of jurisdiction was authorized by the UCCJA and was reasonable given the strong interests of the state and the children in resolution of father’s rights as well as the lack of any conflicting jurisdictional claims by another state or country. The Court affirmed the termination of the mother's parental rights. View "In re R.W. and N.W." on Justia Law