Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Celeste Puppolo, executor of the Estate of Eva Puppolo, appealed a jury verdict in favor of Defendant Donovan & O'Connor, LLC stemming from a legal malpractice action. Plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in denying a motion to withdraw her counsel, that she was denied a fair trial when the court allowed Defendant’s attorney to testify to the merits of the underlying medical malpractice action, and that the trial court improperly admitted expert testimony that exceeded the scope of the defendant’s expert disclosure. Plaintiff's was unpersuaded by the results of investigations into the death of her aunt Eva, and consulted with Defendant about bringing a wrongful death and survivorship claim against the aunt's nursing home and attending physicians. In light of the autopsy report, and the conclusions of the police, Defendant declined to take the case. Defendant told Plaintiff that the limitations period for the survival action began to accrue when she was appointed executor of the estate. Defendant conceded that this statement was incorrect and that the limitations period had actually begun to accrue two months earlier, when the original executor was appointed. Defendant also conceded that it failed to specifically notify Plaintiff of the two year limitations period for the wrongful death action. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the home and physicians through another attorney. Both claims were dismissed on summary judgment as time-barred. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against Defendant, claiming that her reliance on its legal advice deprived her of the opportunity to pursue the wrongful death and survivorship claims for her aunt's death. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its decisions in Plaintiff's case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the jury verdict against Plaintiff. View "Puppolo v. Donovan & O'Connor, LLC" on Justia Law

The parties in this case separately appealed the trial court order that awarded damages in excess of $78,000 to Plaintiff SEC America (SEC). Defendant Marine Electric Systems, Inc. (MES) contended the court erred in: (1) failing to reduce the damage award for partial payment; (2) granting an award for lost profits; and (3) relying on inadmissible evidence. SEC asserts the court erred in concluding that it acted unreasonably in failing to mitigate damages. This case arose out of a transaction to supply an electrical component for installation in jamming devices to be used by NATO forces in Afghanistan to disrupt the remote detonation of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). MES placed an order for power converters for its devices. SEC made a partial shipment of the converters, and continued working on the remaining units. MES' contract with NATO had collapsed, and MES' customer who promised to purchase the completed jammers reneged on its promise. MES sued its client and ultimately reached a settlement. None of the proceeds from the settlement went to SEC. Subsequently SEC filed suit against MES for breach of contract. Following a bench trial, the court found in SEC's favor. MES appealed, and SEC filed a cross-appeal. MES argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in arriving at the proper amount of damages owed to SEC. Finding "no clear error to compel reversal of the judgment," the Court affirmed the trial court. View "SEC America, LLC v. Marine Electric Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant William Therrien Jr. appealed the civil suspension of his driver’s license and his conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI). Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress all evidence obtained after administration of a preliminary breath test (PBT) because the State failed to prove that defendant voluntarily consented to take the PBT. The record reflected that the arresting trooper put the machine in front of Defendant and told Defendant to take the test. He also provided Defendant with instructions on how to proceed. The trooper did not ask Defendant if he consented to take the test or advise defendant that he had a right to refuse. The court found that Defendant did not think he had a choice and therefore provided a sample of his breath. The PBT indicated that defendant’s blood alcohol was above the legal limit. The Supreme Court "look[ed] no further than the plain language of the statute to conclude that when an officer has a reasonable suspicion of DUI, he may 'request' that the suspect provide a breath sample, but not order such participation." The Court concluded that the trooper omitting the formal "request" was harmless error and affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Therrien" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Kenvin appealed a district court's judgment that required him to pay restitution and sentenced him to a twelve month term in jail. Following a car accident that resulted in a fatality, a jury convicted defendant of negligent operation of a motor vehicle. On appeal, he contended the trial court erred in ordering him to pay restitution where: (1) the State failed to establish the amount of loss by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) the State failed to show that the loss was the direct result of the crime committed or that the decedent’s family members were the direct victims of the crime; and (3) the court failed to make findings regarding his ability to pay. Defendant also contended the trial court erred in sentencing him to eleven to twelve months to serve because a sentence with a gap of thirty days between the minimum and maximum term is a fixed sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court "recognize[d] that the decedent’s family members have suffered greatly. The decedent, however, was the sole victim of defendant’s crime for consideration of restitution. Under statute, any restitution award must be limited to the material losses that the decedent incurred as a direct result of defendant’s crime." Here, the only loss included in the restitution orders, according to the State’s description, was the medical bill not covered by insurance. The Court reversed the district court's order pertaining to the calculation of restitution. On all other matters, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Kenvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs James and Heidi Glassford, who brought suit to obtain compensation for an allegedly negligent home inspection, appealed a superior court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of home inspector Defendants The BrickKicker and GDM Home Services, Inc. (a franchisee of BrickKicker) based on the terms of a binding arbitration agreement in the parties' contract. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the superior court erred in rejecting Plaintiffs' contention that the terms of the home inspection contract were unconscionable under the common law and unfair and deceptive under Vermont’s Consumer Fraud Act (CFA). Upon review of the contract in question, as well as the superior court record, the Supreme Court found the contractual provisions limiting liability to the cost of the inspection and yet requiring arbitration that would necessarily cost more than the amount of the liability limit unconscionable. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court’s decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Glassford v. BrickKicker" on Justia Law

Taxpayer-Petitioner Michael Garbitelli appealed a superior court judgment that affirmed the Town of Brookfield Board of Abatement's denial of his request for a tax abatement. During a townwide reappraisal in 2007, Petitioner refused to allow the listers to inspect his property, other than the foyer and the basement. His property was assessed at $1.6 million. Petitioner then appealed this assessment, and the Supreme Court affirmed, noting that Petitioner had refused entry to the tax assessor and therefore failed to provide an adequate basis to demonstrate that the assessment was erroneous. Taxpayer later allowed entry to the listers for 2009, which resulted in an assessment of $957,000. Taxpayer then moved for a tax abatement for the years 2007 and 2008. The Board denied the request, finding that there was no mistake attributable to the listers since they were denied entry and were forced to use the best information available to them. Although the Supreme Court agreed with Petitioner's interpretation of the abatement statute’s meaning, it reached the same result as the superior court: "[Petitioner] argues principally that the 'extreme disparity' between $1.6 million and $957,000 is an 'obvious mistake' amounting to manifest error." The Court disagreed with that premise and affirmed the superior court. View "Garbitelli v. Town of Brookfield" on Justia Law

Plaintiff ProSelect Insurance Company filed this declaratory relief action to determine its duty to indemnify its insured in a lawsuit alleging medical malpractice and sexual assault. The trial court construed a policy exclusion to bar coverage and entered judgment in favor of ProSelect. Plaintiff Robyn Levy appealed that judgment, asserting that: (1) the malpractice claims are covered under the concurrent causation doctrine; and (2) the policy exclusion as interpreted by the trial court contravenes public policy. Plaintiff alleged she began psychiatric counseling with Defendant's insured, Dr. Peter McKenna from 2003-2005. In that time, Plaintiff alleged Dr. McKenna negligently failed to properly diagnose her psychological disorder, prescribed harmful medications, encouraged her to pursue "unhealthy lifestyle choices," failed to refer her to a community-based mental health program, and engaged in treatment "at variance with accepted professional protocols." In a separate count, Levy alleged that, "[i]n the course of . . . treatment," Dr. McKenna had committed sexual assault and battery. ProSelect filed suit seeking a declaration that its professional liability policy excluded coverage of Plaintiff's suit. The trial court reasoned that the underlying action was indisputably a "suit" that contains an allegation of sexual assault. Therefore, by its plain terms the policy barred coverage of the complaint in its entirety, "[e]ven assuming" that the medical malpractice count was—as Plaintiff claimed—"totally unrelated" to the sexual assault and therefore otherwise covered. The trial court thus granted ProSelect’s motion and entered judgment in its favor. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff's malpractice and assault claims could not be viewed as separate or independent causes, and coverage can not be grounded on the "concurrent causation doctrine." Furthermore, without a basis in the concurrent causation doctrine, there was no violation of public policy Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "ProSelect Insurance Co. v. Levy" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case raised the question of the meaning of "expungement" within the Vermont judicial system. Defendant F.M. sought the removal of references to a dismissed count from docket entries regarding his case. In December 2008, Defendant was charged with four counts. In June 2009, under a plea agreement with the State, Defendant pled guilty to Count 2, reckless endangerment; the State dismissed the other three counts; and Defendant received a deferred sentence and the promise that Count 2 would be dismissed if Defendant successfully completed mental health court proceedings. In February 2010, the court, upon request, Recognized that Defendant had successfully completed mental health court requirements and, per the plea agreement, dismissed Count 2 and ordered expungement of the record pursuant to 13 V.S.A. 7041(e). Following this order, however, the docket sheet for Defendant’s case still referred to Count 2, labeling it "expunged" in the list of disputes and referring in the descriptive docket entries to "disputes 1-4." The following month, Defendant moved to correct the clerical record to remove all references in the docket entries to the expunged count. The court denied the motion "[i]n light of the problems outlined in the emails" among count clerks, administrators, and information services personnel describing the complexities involved in deleting docket entries from the electronic system. Defendant challenges the trial court’s refusal to enforce its expungement order because of the difficulty of compliance, noting that the docket entries concerning his case continue to refer to "disputes 1-4," rather than "disputes 1, 3-4," a direct violation of the expungement required by statute. The State filed a letter with the Court explaining its decision not to file a brief "given that the sole issue concerns how the judiciary carries out expungements rather than whether or not the record in this particular case should be expunged." Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and ordered the expungement: "[t]he difficulties inherent in deleting docket entries from our current docket entry system-while real-do not justify a violation of the statute on the part of the judiciary." View "Vermont v. F.M." on Justia Law

Defendant Tina Marie Lamonda entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of a narcotic drug. She challenged the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress and dismiss. Defendant was charged following a traffic stop. She moved to suppress the evidence against her, arguing that there were no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search of her purse. Following a hearing, the court denied her motion. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction. The Court affirmed the trial court's ruling. View "Vermont v. Lamonda" on Justia Law

Defendant AT&T Mobility, LLC appealed a trial court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration. AT&T claimed the trial court erred by ruling that AT&T had not been assigned Plaintiff Pike Porter’s cell phone contract before sending him unsolicited text messages and erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on this issue. AT&T also argued that even if Plaintiff's claims arose before AT&T purchased his contract, the trial court erred as a matter of law in holding that AT&T cannot enforce the binding arbitration agreement in Plaintiff's original cell phone contract. The court also noted that the arbitration agreement could not bind Plaintiff "with regard to events between him and AT&T that took place at a time when his only contract was with Unicel, not AT&T." AT&T highlighted four pieces of evidence it submitted along with its motion to amend and reconsider as "undisputed" proof that it purchased Plaintiff's contract in December 2008. Upon review of AT&T's evidence, the Supreme Court concluded the document did not establish that Plaintiff's contract was one of the 100,000 to 150,000 contracts sold, nor did it suggest that "certain Unicel assets" included all of the wireless contracts Unicel held in Vermont. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision in favor of Plaintiff. View "Porter v. AT&T Mobility, LLC" on Justia Law