Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Trevor Herrick was convicted by a jury on second-degree murder charges and sentenced to twenty-two years to life.  Defendant was romantically involved with the victim's wife, and fatally stabbed the victim following a verbal and physical altercation. As the jury entered the courtroom to be sworn, three people walked in wearing t-shirts memorializing the victim.  Following voir dire, Defendant moved for mistrial, which the trial court denied.  On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury to consider his individual characteristics in connection with its "adequate provocation" charge for the mitigating defense of "passion-provocation manslaughter," and that the court erred in denying Defendant's motion for mistrial when the jury was exposed to potentially prejudicial extraneous influence by the t-shirts. Upon review of the trial court's record, the Supreme Court found that the trial court effectively concluded that the potential jurors did not demonstrate a state of mind inconsistent with deciding the case fairly: "[i]t made this decision based on its individual voir dire of the prospective jurors, none of whom stated that he or she would be unable to remain impartial.  The trial court is in a unique position to evaluate juror bias, and we defer to its conclusions." With regard to the trial court's ruling to the "adequate provocation" defense, the Court found the jury instructions "track[ed] our case law…and are not plain error." The Court affirmed the lower court's decisions and Defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Herrick" on Justia Law

This appeal represented "the latest skirmish" in a long-running dispute over plans to develop a Wal-Mart discount retail store on an undeveloped 100-acre parcel of land in the Town of St. Albans. Appellants were interested individuals and groups opposed to the project. They appealed an Environmental Court decision that granted the site plan, conditional use, subdivision, and Act 250 permits for the development. They contended the trial court erred in: (1) approving site plan and conditional use permits despite the alleged conflict of interest of several members of the Town's development review board; (2) finding that the subdivision was compatible with adjacent land uses; and (3) concluding that the developer could reapply for an Act 250 permit despite an earlier denial.  Upon review of the lower court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.   View "In re JLD Properties of St. Albans, LLC" on Justia Law

This case was an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of Appellant RBS Citizens, N.A.'s motion for a writ of attachment to Appellee Jan Ouhrabka's property, which Appellee owned jointly with his wife as tenants by entirety.  The trial court held that a creditor like RBS cannot attach property owned jointly by a debtor and a nondebtor when they hold that property as tenants by entirety.  RBS contended on appeal that the estate of tenancy by entirety is an anachronism whose continuing utility should be reconsidered.  In the alternative, RBS argued that Vermont law did not explicitly preclude granting a creditor prejudgment attachment where the property is held jointly by the debtor and a nondebtor in a tenancy by entirety.  Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court disagreed with RBS' argument and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "RBS Citizens, N.A. v. Ouhrabka" on Justia Law

The question before the Court in this case was what style of civil discourse may constitute "threatening behavior."  Defendant Jason Sanville appealed a trial court's revocation of his probation for violating a condition that read, "Violent or threatening behavior is not allowed at any time."  He contended that he could not have violated the condition because his only action was speaking with no accompanying physical conduct.  In December 2008, while Defendant was on probation, his mother entered into a rental agreement for the lease of a mobile home. Defendant, with the landlord's knowledge, lived in the trailer with his mother and performed some repairs on the property in lieu of a portion of the rent.  In March 2009, the landlord claimed that some rent was past due and that Defendant had failed to complete some of the agreed-upon repairs.  Defendant disputed those claims, at times suggesting he would destroy the mobile home, undo the repairs he had made, and, on at least one occasion, saying he was going "to kick [landlord and her husband's] butts."  At no time, however, did he approach or make a physical gesture towards the landlord.  Upon review of the revocation record and applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court did not question "the trial court's findings that defendant had a testy relationship with his landlord and made disrespectful comments to her and her husband on several occasions.  But the conclusion that his choice of words to express his anger and frustration violated his conditions of probation was erroneous.  Defendant's comments to his landlord push the boundaries of appropriate behavior for someone in the process of criminal rehabilitation, but it cannot be said that he was fairly informed that such bluster would result in his loss of freedom the condition is simply too vague." The Court reversed the revocation of Defendant's parole because its conditions failed to thoroughly apprise Defendant of the conduct prohibited. View "Vermont v. Sanville" on Justia Law

This case concerns a construction contract dispute between contractor Trombly Plumbing & Heating and homeowners Edward Quinn, Thomas Quinn, and Regina Gority ("Homeowners"). In the summer of 2007, Trombly and the Homeowners agreed that Trombly would perform services relating to the heating and hot water systems of Homeowners' residential vacation property. Between November 2007 and February 2008, Homeowners experienced a number of problems with the home that they attributed to Trombly's work, such as pipes freezing and furnaces shutting down and leaking.  Trombly brought an initial action for breach of contract and violation of the Prompt Payment Act (9 V.S.A. 4001-4009) seeking the balance due plus the cost of collection.  The Homeowners counterclaimed for breach of contract, negligence, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, and consumer fraud.  They sought actual and punitive damages, as well as litigation costs. The trial court ultimately decided that Trombly could not recover from the Homeowners and the Homeowners could not recover from Trombly, and each party would bear its own costs and fees.  The court found that the Homeowners were not liable to Trombly for anything beyond what they had already paid because the work "was not well done," there were many problems with the work, and the problems were not resolved until another plumber came to fix them.  The court thus found the Homeowners to be the prevailing parties on Trombly's claims because Trombly did not prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence.  As Trombly did not prevail on the merits of the case, the court found there could be no award of attorney's fees.  The court also dismissed all of the Homeowners' counterclaims.  It found that the evidence submitted was insufficient, given that there was no testimony from anyone who did repair work about the problems that had to be corrected or whether the amounts paid for corrective work were fair and reasonable. On appeal, Trombly argued the trial court erred by: (1) improperly placing the burden of proof on contractor with respect to homeowners' defenses and making insufficient findings to support its decision, and (2) improperly applying the "substantially prevailing party" standard under the Prompt Payment Act.  Homeowners cross-appealed, arguing the trial court erred in finding that homeowners were not qualified to offer testimony as to damages for the corrective work performed.  Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision with regard to all issues brought on appeal. View "Trombly Plumbing & Heating v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Defendant Isaac Faham appealed his conviction of attempted sexual assault after a jury trial. On appeal, Defendant made two arguments: (1) the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of attempted sexual assault; and (2) the trial court unconstitutionally denied him the opportunity to present a complete and adequate defense by precluding him from introducing evidence of complainant’s prior drug use.  Upon review of the briefs submitted by the parties and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that at no point in his post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal did Defendant argue that the State presented insufficient evidence on the element of attempting to engage in a sexual act.  Because this issue was unpreserved, the Court did not reach it. With regard to his second issue on appeal, Defendant maintained that the excluded evidence was relevant to his defense that complainant fabricated the sexual assault complaint in retaliation for Defendant denying her access to drugs and then abandoning her in Charlotte.  Defendant asserted that the trial court’s exclusion of this evidence violated the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution by denying him the right to present a complete defense and to confront witnesses against him.  The Supreme Court concluded that Defendant’s proffers were insufficient to sustain his challenge to the trial court’s ruling. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Faham" on Justia Law

In this dispute between neighboring landowners, Defendants-Neighbors Demetrios and Alexandria Michaelides and Erwin and Ramona Waibel appealed a superior court order that rejected their claim that Plaintiff Jonathan Tibbetts violated a deed restriction limiting the number of houses to be constructed on his property.  Among other claims, Defendants contended the trial court erred in concluding that they lacked standing to enforce the restriction. When Plaintiff attempted to sell the property in question in 2005, the potential buyers discovered a five-house restriction in the deed between the previous original grantor and grantee and required consent of the owners of the five other houses as a condition of the sale.  Defendants refused to consent, and Plaintiff thereupon filed the underlying declaratory judgment action to clear the property of the restriction and obtain marketable title. Defendants answered and counterclaimed for a declaration that Plaintiff's residence violated the deed restriction and an injunction requiring its removal. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  In March 2010, the trial court issued a written ruling in favor of Plaintiff.  The court concluded that the five-house restriction in the original grantor-grantee deed was intended to benefit the land retained by the previous grantee-owner, and that Neighbors therefore lacked standing to enforce it.  The court issued a final judgment order in May 2010 and denied a motion for reconsideration the following July.  Upon review of the deed and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and affirmed its decision.  View "Tibbetts v. Michaelides" on Justia Law

This case arose out of relationships among three women: the victim, "Amy", and Defendant Lisa Lampman.  Amy and the victim were romantically involved for two and a half years.  After that relationship ended, Amy moved in with Defendant.  In January 2009, the three women encountered each other in a gas station parking lot where a fight ensued.  Four individuals were criminally charged as a result of the fight: Defendant, Amy, Nathan (Amy's son), and Anthony.  The proprietor of the gas station witnessed the victim being beaten and trying to defend herself.  Amy stated that she observed Defendant deliver a "football style kick" to the victim's face.  Throughout trial, Defendant maintained that the victim was the instigator, starting the fight by pushing Amy and that Defendant had merely acted in self defense.  Defense counsel objected a question posed to one of the witnesses, to which the trial court responded, "I'm finding independently that there was a conspiracy, at least an implicit conspiracy to beat up [the victim]," thus overruling defendant's objection. Defendant made no objection to this ruling at trial, nor did she request a limiting instruction or move for a mistrial.  Further, she did not raise any issue with the court's statement in her motion for a new trial.  However, on appeal, Defendant argued that by finding a conspiracy, the judge usurped the jury's role as fact finder on the ultimate issue of self-defense and deprived her of the right to a trial by jury.  Upon review of the trial record and briefs submitted in this case, the Supreme Court found that because this claim was argued for the first time in this appeal, Defendant failed to preserve her claim of error. With regard to other issues Defendant raised on appeal, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and that Defendant's conviction was supported by the evidence presented at trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Vermont v. Lampman" on Justia Law

Defendant Elliott Russell appealed his jury conviction for aggravated assault, arguing: (1) it was an error to admit certain correspondence he sent while incarcerated because its content was irrelevant and prejudicial; (2) the evidence presented was not sufficient to support a jury verdict of guilty; and (3) the court's denial of his request for a jury charge on the lesser offense of simple assault was in error.  This case arose from a 2007 incident at bar in Bennington where Defendant was drinking with a group of companions, including Henry Dummeyer.  The victim and his friend, Felix Rivera, were also drinking in the pub.  Defendant and Dummeyer were smoking outside the pub when Dummeyer's girlfriend told them that the victim had made an upsetting comment directed at her. When Dummeyer and Defendant confronted the men, Dummeyer began yelling about the victim's behavior toward his girlfriend.  As they exchanged angry words back and forth, Defendant and the victim became engaged in a physical altercation. The two men separated, and Rivera saw the victim holding his stomach and defendant with a knife in his hand.  The victim came to Rivera's aid, kicking Defendant out of the way, at which point defendant left the scene.  Dummeyer began physically attacking the victim who tried to fight back while exclaiming "I've been stabbed."  At some point Dummeyer too left the scene.  Rivera contacted emergency services while driving the victim to the hospital and indicated the victim had started the fight.  At the hospital, doctors treated the victim for injuries to the head, chest, and abdomen, consistent with stab wounds. Aggravated assault requires specific intent to harm.  To that end, the State sought to introduce certain letters defendant wrote before the altercation in which he threatened another victim. Over defendant's objections, the court allowed portions of the letters to be read at trial.  The jury found Defendant guilty of aggravated assault, and Defendant appealed. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found the admission of the letters probative with regard to Defendant's intent to harm. Further, the Court was "unconvinced that the evidence reasonably supported an instruction" for the lesser offense of simple assault. Under these circumstances, the evidence did not reasonably support an instruction on simple assault.  The Court found trial court's determination was therefore proper. View "Vermont v. Russell" on Justia Law

Defendant Applejack Art Partners, Inc., appealed a trial court enforcing an arbitration award and entered judgment in Plaintiff Albert Stephens, III's favor for $1,538,164.50 plus interest. Plaintiff began working with the company in September 2006 and subsequently invested $1,125,000 in the company in exchange for stock shares.  In April 2008, Applejack terminated plaintiff's employment.  Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants Applejack, Jack P. Appelman, Aaron S. Young, and William Colvin (collectively, Applejack) and Applejack counterclaimed.  Applejack also sought an order enforcing its right to repurchase Plaintiff's stock.  The parties engaged in binding arbitration and following four days of evidentiary hearings, the arbitrator issued his decision.  He found that in October 2006, plaintiff executed an employment contract, stock purchase agreement, and shareholders' agreement.  Pursuant to the stockholder's agreement, the executive stockholders had the right to buy out plaintiff's shares in the event that plaintiff's employment was terminated.  The agreement identified a specific formula for valuing the stock shares and allowed for Applejack to either pay for the stock in full or provide a 10% down payment and a promissory note for payment of the balance in three equal annual installments, plus interest. Plaintiff refused to sell his stock, in part because he misunderstood the terms of the stock purchase agreement.  An arbitrator concluded that Applejack had the right to buy the shares, and it ordered Plaintiff to transfer his stock into an escrow account, pending full performance of all payment obligations. Applejack did not meet its obligation on the first payment and Plaintiff brought an enforcement action.  Plaintiff sought both a judgment confirming the arbitration award as well as an immediate judgment for all amounts awarded by the arbitrator due to Applejack's default.  The court granted Plaintiff's request.  It found that Applejack's default went to the essence of the arbitrator's award and that Applejack could not now resort to the terms of the promissory note to delay its payments. Applejack argued on appeal that the court should have remanded this case to the arbitrator for clarification, although it was not clear what part of the award Applejack believed was ambiguous.  Applejack also suggested (apparently for the first time on appeal) that notwithstanding the arbitrator's decision Plaintiff should simply keep the stock shares because Applejack was unable to pay for them.  Finally, Applejack asserted that the court erred in ordering full payment of the award suggesting that by doing so, the court modified the arbitration award under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) without authority to do so.  It also argued that there was no clear basis for accelerating the payments due. Upon review of the arbitration record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court nor from the arbitration proceedings and affirmed the decision against Applejack: [t]he court imposed an appropriate remedy for Applejack's default, and there was no error." View "Stephens III v. Applejack Art Partners, Inc." on Justia Law