Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed a superior court order that denied his motion to dismiss a two-count information alleging kidnapping and aggravated domestic assault. Defendant contended on appeal that the Orleans County State's Attorney who filed the information was invalidly appointed, and that his prosecutions were therefore unlawful and violated due process. The trial court disagreed, concluding the appointment was consistent with the Vermont Constitution and statute; and that, even if the appointment was infirm, the de facto officer doctrine validated the State's attorney authority to prosecute. The Supreme Court concluded the State's attorney was acting as a de facto officer and affirmed. View "Vermont v. Cuomo" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Kenvin appealed the sentence he received upon reconsideration by the superior court, which reduced the time to serve on his conviction for careless and negligent driving from eleven-to-twelve months to nine-to-twelve months. Defendant contended the trial court erred: (1) by finding him "very negligent" in causing the death of a collision victim, despite the jury's acquittal on the underlying charge of grossly negligent operation, death resulting; and (2) by ruling that defendant was not entitled to credit for time served while on restrictive conditions of pretrial release. Upon review of the superior court record, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's sentence but remanded the case back to the trial court to provide credit to defendant for the period between March 10, 2010 and March 22, 2010 during which defendant was subject to a twenty-four hour curfew. View "Vermont v. Kenvin" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his jury conviction for negligent operation of a motor vehicle and the sentence he received. He contended the trial court impermissibly allowed the State's crash reconstruction expert to testify about defendant's speed at the time of the collision. Defendant also contended that, at sentencing, the trial court erred in considering the death that resulted from the accident as a factor in sentencing. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Vermont v. Scott" on Justia Law

The City of Rutland appealed a trial court's order, on remand, directing it to disclose certain records under the Vermont Public Records Act. The records concerned several Rutland Police Department employees who were investigated and disciplined for viewing and sending pornography on work computers while on duty. The City argued on appeal that the trial court erred in evaluating the privacy interests at stake and concluding that the "personal records" exemption did not apply. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rutland Herald v. City of Rutland " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Daniel Inman appealed a superior court judgment granting the State of Vermont's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denying judicial review of the Department of Corrections (DOC)'s decision to terminate his participation in the Incarcerative Domestic Abuse Treatment Program (InDAP). Plaintiff was serving a twenty-six-month to eight-year sentence for aggravated assault and escape. Plaintiff began participating in the InDAP program in December 2010, and continued to participate even after he had finished the minimum one-year program requirement. As his anticipated release date approached, plaintiff sought a telephone hearing in the superior court to seek visitation with his children upon his release. The Superior Court held such a hearing. According to plaintiff, he was polite and well-behaved throughout the hearing, despite multiple interruptions from his wife, who was the complainant in his domestic assault case. Upon conclusion of the hearing, plaintiff's caseworker informed his InDAP coordinator that plaintiff had asked his wife several times to "be quiet so I can tell my side of the story" and accused her of lying. Plaintiff vehemently contested this characterization of his behavior during the telephone hearing, claiming that the transcript "altogether refuted" the caseworker's representation. InDAP staff placed plaintiff on 90-day probation from the InDAP program and gave him specific requirements to return to good standing. InDAP staff also suspended his phone privileges. Six days later, plaintiff was terminated from the InDAP program. The termination notice indicated that plaintiff "continuously justifies abuse towards his partner and blames others for his actions," he "is just going through the motions to get through the program," and he had "another person call his victim of record after being placed on probation for abuse towards her during the court call." Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed the termination within the DOC. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the termination of his participation in InDAP to the superior court, claiming that the decision was appealable under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 and that his termination was grounded in false accusations. The State filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case, which was granted. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Inman v. Pallito" on Justia Law

In 2005, petitioner lived with his girlfriend (witness) and their two young children. Their infant daughter was hospitalized for symptoms and injuries consistent with head trauma. A year later, petitioner was charged with two counts of first-degree aggravated domestic assault for allegedly causing the child's injuries. Petitioner appealed the superior court's order granting summary judgment to the State and dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Petitioner was assigned counsel; trial was scheduled for February 2007. As a defense strategy, counsel wanted to highlight that other people had access to the child and could have injured her. In particular, counsel contemplated that if the witness claimed her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when called to testify at trial, the jury might infer that she was involved in the crime and therefore reasonably doubt petitioner's participation. Counsel's affidavit acknowledges that the strategy was his idea, stating that it "came to [him]" during a meeting with witness and petitioner. Petitioner's counsel discussed the strategy at that meeting with both the witness and petitioner. Petitioner's counsel also advised witness to discuss the proposed tactic with her own counsel. The witness did consult with an attorney and ultimately decided not to claim her Fifth Amendment privilege at trial. Instead, she testified as a prosecution witness that petitioner had encouraged her to invoke the Fifth Amendment when testifying. Petitioner's counsel objected to this testimony based on attorney-client privilege. After his objection was denied, Petitioner's counsel failed to address the matter on cross-examination or in his closing argument. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the PCR court disregarded material disputed facts on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and prematurely concluded that, as a matter of law, counsel's performance was professionally reasonable and did not prejudice the outcome of petitioner's trial. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court found that the trial court record was inadequate to determine on summary judgment whether counsel reasonably anticipated the consequences of suggesting the risky defense strategy, including sufficiently informing petitioner about its risks; and, if he did not, whether petitioner's defense was therefore prejudiced. The Court reversed the PCR court's grant of summary judgment to the State and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. View "In re Lowry" on Justia Law

Petitioner Edwin Towne appealed the trial court's denial of his request for post-conviction DNA testing under Vermont's Innocence Protection Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial because the court correctly concluded that the results of the requested test would not have created a "reasonable probability" of a different outcome at trial. View "In re Towne" on Justia Law

Defendant was driving along a gravel country road at night in a scarcely populated area. A state trooper was traveling in the opposite direction and saw defendant's approaching vehicle. Defendant was not speeding or driving erratically, and his vehicle did not display any equipment defects or violations. The trooper decided to turn his cruiser around and follow defendant for a while. Eventually, defendant pulled his car to the right side of the road and stopped with the engine and lights on. There were no businesses, homes, or other structures in the area that would explain why defendant stopped his car there.  The trooper, who had been following at a distance of two or three car-lengths behind the car, also pulled over and stopped. The trooper then waited to see what the car or its driver would do next, but nothing immediate happened. After about thirty seconds, the trooper decided to turn on his blue lights. He testified that he thought it was "unusual" for the car to stop where it did, and decided that he should approach defendant's car to make sure defendant was "alright." While speaking with defendant, the trooper made observations that eventually led to defendant's arrest for suspected driving under the influence. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the motor-vehicle stop was justified by the community caretaking doctrine. Defendant contended that it was not and argued that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the evidentiary fruits of the stop. The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's decision and reversed. View "Vermont v. Button" on Justia Law

Defendant Douglas Tuthill, Administrator of the Estate of Paul Oakes, appealed a jury's award of $150,000 in punitive damages to plaintiff Doreen Carpentier and the trial court's denial of his motion for remittitur. Defendant also challenged the trial court's denial of his post-judgment motion to vacate a writ of attachment. Paul Oakes was charged with numerous crimes based on acts alleged to have occurred at plaintiff's home. Oakes killed himself shortly before his arraignment on these charges. Following Oakes's death, plaintiff sued his estate, raising claims of assault and battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She sought compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiff also requested a writ of attachment against certain real property owned by Oakes. Finding none of defendant's arguments persuasive, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Carpentier v. Tuthill" on Justia Law

The Probate Court appointed Theodore Ballard's niece, Leala Bell, as Ballard's guardian. Bell signed a promissory note to a mortgage as a "borrower"; she did not expressly indicate that she was signing as Ballard's guardian or that her signature indicated only her "approval" of Ballard's action. The loan was secured by a mortgage on Ballard's real property. The mortgage deed granted and conveyed Ballard's property to CitiFinancial, including the power to sell the property. Ballard signed the mortgage deed but Bell did not. There was no showing that the probate court licensed the mortgage. CitiFinancial alleged that Ballard had failed to make the payments called for under the note and mortgage, and therefore breached these agreements. Ballard moved for summary judgment, arguing in relevant part that he lacked the legal capacity to execute a mortgage deed and promissory note while he was under guardianship. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Ballard's argument relied on the notion that Bell participated in the transaction with CitiFinancial, subjected herself to personal liability as a cosigner of the note, signed the settlement statement as well as the promissory note, but did not actually approve Ballard's signing of the note. Although the mortgage deed purportedly executed by Ballard and the promissory note secured by that deed were executed as part of the same overall transaction, the two documents created distinct legal obligations. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in analyzing the note and mortgage as if they were one and the same, both subject to the requirement of probate court approval. Therefore the Court reversed the award of summary judgment to Ballard on CitiFinancial's claim on the promissory note and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings on that claim. View "CitiFinancial, Inc. v. Balch" on Justia Law