Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Defendant of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child. On appeal, he asserted that the trial court erred in: (1) prohibiting cross-examination of complainant about certain statements she allegedly made; (2) denying his motion for a new trial upon the discovery of an exculpatory post on complainant's MySpace page; and (3) permitting the State to introduce uncharged, prior bad act evidence. Finding that the introduction of defendant's prior contact with the complainant was admitted in error, the Supreme Court concluded the error was harmless. Finding no other error or abuse of the trial court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Lawrence, Sr." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a final relief-from-abuse order in which the family division of the superior court concluded that plaintiff was a vulnerable adult and that defendant abused and exploited her. The Supreme Court found there was ample evidence in the record for the trial court to have found that defendant engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with plaintiff, who was a vulnerable adult. View "Smith v. Wright" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Cahill appealed his convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and reckless endangerment following an incident where he pointed a loaded firearm at a farmhand. He argued that the court erred: (1) in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) by improperly instructing the jury on the elements of aggravated assault; and (3) by convicting him of both aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. The Supreme Court found that the trial court record contained sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion to acquit. Further, the Court found no error in the jury's instructions, "defendant continues to conflate or confuse the State's obligation to prove intent with a purported, but unnecessary, burden to overcome defendant's evidence of benign motive does not mean the instruction ruined his defense." Because the greater aggravated assault offense was upheld, and the State's concession that the felony convictions were mutually exclusive in this case, the Court did not address defendant's third argument.  On remand, the State was ordered to move to vacate one of the convictions at its election. View "Vermont v. Cahill" on Justia Law

Defendant Loren Senna appealed a superior court decision to deny his motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the charges against him. Defendant was convicted of the cultivation of more than twenty-five marijuana plants and for possession. Police had been called to defendant's residence when neighbors heard a screaming child inside. The officers sent to investigate detected the strong odor of marijuana as they moved closer to the front door. The officers saw that the children inside did not appear to be in distress. But after speaking with neighbors, the officers obtained a warrant to search defendant's residence. The trial court found that the State had not established that the police's initial entry into defendant's home was consensual, and excluded the evidence the State gathered during that entry. However, the court denied defendant's suppression motion, concluding that the smell of fresh marijuana just outside the front door and the neighbor's statements provided probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrant. The issues on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether, in light of Vermont's law exempting qualifying registered patients from prosecution for possession and cultivation of marijuana, the smell of fresh marijuana outside a home, without determination of whether any occupants are registered patients, could support a finding of probable cause; and (2) whether the hearsay statements of an identified neighbor were sufficiently credible to meet the requirements of Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c) and the underlying constitutional requirements that Rule embodies. The Supreme Court concluded that both the marijuana odor and the neighbor's statements were properly considered in the probable-cause analysis, and accordingly affirm. View "Vermont v. Senna" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, defendant challenged his conviction for unlawful trespass and his obligation (as condition of probation) to complete a Domestic Abuse Education Program (DAEP). Defendant was charged with entering or remaining in a place where notice of trespass was given. The "place" at issue here was his ex-girlfriend's car when, in the course of an argument, she repeatedly demanded he leave. At sentencing, the State asked the court to order defendant to complete DAEP as a special condition of probation. The court recognized that DAEP was a unique recommendation for this type of offense but found the State's request warranted. Defendant's probation officer later filed a probation violation complaint alleging defendant violated the DAEP condition of his probation. The probation officer averred that when defendant attended his intake meeting to determine his eligibility for DAEP, he refused to admit to the information, which was a condition of enrollment. The probation officer asked the court to revoke probation and impose the underlying sentence. Defendant asserted that because he had been convicted of unlawful trespass after trial and did not plead guilty, he should not have been ordered to complete DAEP because the DAEP condition "set him up to fail" because he never agreed with the State's information and affidavit. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court recognized defendant's perception that he was not guilty and therefore could not admit his guilt. At that point, the court told defendant DAEP became obligatory in order to avoid incarceration, regardless of his disagreement with the conviction or sentence, or both. Upon review of defendant's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court denied his challenge to his conviction. "An unpleasant choice is not synonymous with no choice and, in any event, probation was imposed as a condition to the suspension of the jail term otherwise deemed fitting by the trial court in response to defendant's conviction for unlawful trespass . . . it is not unreasonable for the court to require acknowledgment of those facts by the defendant as a condition of probation.  The evidence amply support[ed] the court's conclusion that defendant violated probation by failing to complete DAEP as ordered." View "Vermont v. Stokes" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea, arguing that he was not sufficiently advised of the potential immigration consequences of his conviction. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the language employed during defendant's plea colloquy adequately advised him that a guilty plea could result in deportation or denial of U.S. citizenship. Therefore the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Vermont v. Mutwale" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a probationer could be charged with violating probation for threatening his probation officer without evidence that he intended the officer hear or learn of the statements. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State did not make a prima facie case of a probation violation, and accordingly, reversed. View "Vermont v. Johnstone" on Justia Law

Defendant Asim Betts was charged with felony possession of crack cocaine after a vehicle in which he was riding was stopped, and he was transported to the police station. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence and dismiss the charges against him, defendant entered a conditional plea agreement reserving to appeal the suppression decision. Defendant argued that all evidence should have been suppressed under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution because his consent to be taken to the police barracks for a strip search was invalid. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant's consent was obtained only in response to the threat of an unlawful warrantless arrest under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 11. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Betts" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Gilbert and Shelagh McCormack appealed a superior court's denial of their motion for a new trial on the grounds of alleged juror bias. The issues on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether plaintiffs' motion was timely; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion under "In re Nash," (614 A.2d 367 (1991)); and (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion under "implied bias." Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "McCormack v. Rutland Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

Father appealed a superior court's judgment terminating his parental rights with respect to B.C. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred in: (1) denying parent-child contact in violation of his fundamental rights; (2) denying his request for an independent mental examination of B.C.; (3) making unsupported findings; and (4) applying the statutory best-interests criteria. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re B.C." on Justia Law