Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Vito Russo appealed a civil division order dismissing his post-conviction relief (PCR) petition for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner sought to attack convictions for which his sentences had been completed, and the court concluded that petitioner was not "in custody under sentence" as required by 13 V.S.A. 7131. Petitioner argued that he satisfied the custody requirement because although his sentences were completed they were used by the criminal division to hold him without bail pending trial on a different charge. Because petitioner failed to allege that his pretrial incarceration was sufficiently linked to the convictions he seeks to attack, the Supreme Court concluded that petitioner failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements of the PCR statute, and affirmed. View "In re Russo" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a jury award of emotional distress and economic damages in a legal malpractice action. Defendant challenged the damages award on the grounds that emotional distress damages were not available in a legal malpractice case and that the award of economic damages equal to the amount plaintiff paid to settle the underlying case was improper because plaintiff failed to establish that the underlying settlement was reasonable. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed as to the award of emotional distress damages and affirmed as to the economic damages award. View "Vincent v. DeVries" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Patrick and Terese Ayer appealed a trial court's order granting summary judgment to Frances Harris and Louis Hemmingway, III. The dispute arose over plaintiffs' attempts to collect a debt from defendant Hemmingway individually, and doing business as Hemmingway Construction. Plaintiffs obtained a default judgment against Hemingway in February 2001. Plaintiffs subsequently secured a nonpossessory writ of attachment against Hemingway's nonexempt goods and estate. In 2010, Frances Harris brought an unrelated action against Hemingway for damages. The trial court issued a stipulated judgment order that, among other things, awarded Harris judgment against Hemingway plus interest from September 8, 2005 until the release of the lien in favor of plaintiffs, required Hemingway to keep current on payments to plaintiffs pursuant to a written payment agreement signed by Hemingway and plaintiff Terese Ayer, and provided that if Hemingway defaulted on the lien, he would be liable to Harris for any costs, including attorney's fees, to obtain a release of the lien. In May 2011, plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to foreclose on their judgment lien. Plaintiffs cited a 2006 trial court order as controlling and asked the court to renew or revive it. Hemingway filed an unverified answer to plaintiffs' complaint, acknowledging his debt to plaintiffs and offering to make immediate payments pursuant to the 2010 agreement. Plaintiffs moved for a default judgment, but the court denied their request. Harris responded to this order; Hemingway did not. Harris later moved for summary judgment, and plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and default.  In January 2011, the trial court granted Harris's motion, and found that plaintiffs' judgment lien was no longer effective because more than eight years had elapsed from the issuance of the original final judgment on which it was based. In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected plaintiffs' assertion that the 2001 judgment had been renewed or revived by the 2006 stipulated amended order. This appeal followed. Agreeing with the trial court's reason to dismiss plaintiffs' motion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ayer v. Hemingway" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kelley O'Brien sued defendants Fletcher Allen Health Care (FAHC) and FAHC nurse Catherine Synnott for drawing his blood at the request of law enforcement officers and without his consent, and for injuries he suffered when allegedly assaulted by police officers after defendants negligently allowed those officers unrestricted access to him in the hospital while he was recovering from surgery. The trial court granted defendants summary judgment, concluding that it was not reasonably foreseeable that the police officers would harm plaintiff if allowed unsupervised access, and that nurse had plaintiff's apparent consent to draw the blood. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court agreed with the trial court that plaintiff has not identified any evidence that defendants should have anticipated that the police officers would attack plaintiff if left unsupervised. As the trial court noted, plaintiff was in police custody at the time, so some police presence around him was to be expected. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that defendants could not be held liable for negligence on account of nurse's alleged conduct in leaving plaintiff alone with law enforcement officers even viewing the evidence most favorably to plaintiff. Given that the Legislature has not indicated an intent to limit the liability of medical personnel who draw blood at the request of law enforcement, the Court concluded that, at least in a situation as alleged by plaintiff here in which a patient is conscious and the authority to draw blood depends upon actual, as opposed to statutorily implied, consent the police officers’ request did not protect defendants from liability for drawing the blood without plaintiff’s consent. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court in part (as to granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's negligence claim), and reversed in part (as to granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's battery claim). View "O'Brien v. Synnott" on Justia Law

"J.H." appealed an adjudication that she was a child in need of care and supervision (CHINS) for being "habitually and without justification truant from compulsory school attendance." J.H. contended: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the findings; and (2) the court improperly shifted the burden of proof on the question of whether she was habitually truant "without justification." The only witness was a Bennington County deputy sheriff who testified that he served as the County's truancy officer. The officer testified that he ended up transporting J.H. to school on two subsequent days in January. On the third occasion, the officer served a "truancy notice," the purpose of which was to warn a parent or guardian that a truancy case could be brought if their child is continually absent. The officer went to the home twice more in January (the fourth and fifth visits that month) but there was no response from anyone at the residence. At the conclusion of the officer's testimony, J.H.'s counsel moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to establish that J.H. was habitually truant. The trial court denied the motion, finding that five truancy reports within "a matter of weeks . . . meet[s] the definition of being habitually not at school."  The court also observed it had "no evidence . . . of justification for [J.H.] not being in school." Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the record evidence was fundamentally insufficient to establish that J.H. was truant on the days alleged. "Inasmuch as the evidence here was plainly insufficient under [33 V.S.A. 5102(3)(D)], we are compelled to conclude that the adjudication of CHINS based on truancy must be reversed." View "In re J. H." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed a superior court order affirming the University of Vermont's denial of his application for in-state tuition status. He raised a host of challenges to the court's ruling, arguing primarily that it was inconsistent with the court's finding that plaintiff was domiciled in Vermont. Plaintiff moved to Vermont in 2007 to enroll as an undergraduate at the University of Vermont ("University" or "UVM"). He paid the out-of-state tuition rate through the first three years of his undergraduate studies, and first applied for in-state tuition status in June 2010. In his application he stated that, although he first came to Vermont to attend UVM, he chose to permanently relocate to Vermont because he loved the area and intended to reside in Burlington after graduating. UVM denied the application, citing several pertinent provisions of UVM's In-State Status Regulations. In his administrative appeal, plaintiff reiterated that he came to UVM because of the reputation of its pre-medical program and medical school, and he explained that during his freshman year he was accepted into a premedical program that leads to automatic acceptance to UVM medical school for students who complete the program. Plaintiff also explained that, although he needed only one more course to complete his graduation requirements, he was seeking in-state tuition status to enable him to take additional electives in the fall of 2010 and spring of 2011 to become "a more diversified medical school applicant." UVM denied his administrative appeal. In light of the review standards the University used in denying Plaintiff's appeal, the Supreme Court concluded Plaintiff's reliance on the superior court's "finding" was misplaced: "[f]or our purposes here, the critical findings are those of the University, not the trial court. UVM was the adjudicator of the facts in this matter, and the record is clear that it employed the original version of Regulation 3, which both parties agree governed plaintiff's application." Moreover, UVM made no finding as to plaintiff's common-law domicile, but rather concluded on the basis of its review of the record that plaintiff did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was eligible for in-state tuition. The Court concluded that the record contained ample competent evidence to support the University's determination, and affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Roberts v. University of Vermont" on Justia Law

Appellant-defendant Elizabeth Hanson-Metayer [wife] appealed a superior court decision regarding the divorce between her and appellee-plaintiff Michael Hanson-Metayer [husband]. She claimed that the court erred by: (1) making findings not supported by evidence; (2) questioning the parties without swearing them in; (3) changing its findings of fact from those announced in an oral decision on the record; (4) weighing the statutory factors in making its custody decision; (5) awarding the marital home to husband; (6) inequitably dividing the personal property; and (7) awarding attorney's fees to husband. Because the superior court's custody decision was supported by the evidence and the irregularities were harmless, the Supreme Court affirmed that part of the decision. However, the Court reversed and remanded as to the division of the marital property and the attorney's fees. View "Hanson-Metayer v. Hanson-Metayer" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Carpenter appealed his sentence of five to fourteen years imprisonment under Vermont's Habitual Offender Act after pleading guilty to one felony count of violating an abuse-prevention order (VAPO) and five misdemeanors. Defendant contends that his five-year-minimum sentence was unlawful because the trial court was not authorized under section 11 to impose a minimum sentence greater than the maximum sentence of "not more than three years" for the underlying felony VAPO. The State argued that: (1) the plain language of the Habitual Offender Act permits a minimum sentence greater than the statutory maximum of the underlying offense; (2) a contrary interpretation of section 11 would produce irrational and absurd results; and (3) defendant failed to contest the enhancement below and cannot demonstrate plain error to overcome his waiver of objection. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed on the last point. "Defendant points to no compromise to the criminal justice system resulting from the claimed error, and none is discerned. As outlined above, defendant's plea agreement contemplated that the court could impose an aggregate minimum term close, but not identical, to eight years according to the underlying statutes proscribing the offenses. . . . Defendant's sentence of five to fourteen years is neither contrary to his agreement, nor inconsistent with the minimum authorized by statutes other than section 11, nor beyond the enhanced maximum allowed by the Habitual Offender Act. The sentence imposed was nothing defendant did not bargain for." View "Vermont v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

In 2008, defendant John Turner was arraigned on one count of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child and one count of unlawful restraint of a victim less than sixteen years of age. His first trial occurred in March 2010, and resulted in a hung jury. His second trial occurred in July 2010, and he was convicted of unlawful restraint and acquitted of lewd or lascivious conduct. He appealed, claiming his conviction must be reversed because he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Finding no violation of his Constitutional rights, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "Vermont v. Turner" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal concerned whether the Vermont Public Service Board had jurisdiction to regulate interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services provided in Vermont. The Board concluded that fixed VoIP was a "telecommunications service" under Vermont law and Vermont regulation of VoIP was not preempted by federal law because intrastate calls could be separately identified. The Board deferred consideration of what type of regulation to impose to a separate phase of the proceeding. On appeal, Comcast Phone of Vermont, LLC argued that the Board erred in not addressing whether interconnected fixed VoIP was an information service or telecommunications service under federal law because, according to Comcast, VoIP is an information service and therefore any regulation is preempted by federal law. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the Board must reach this question and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Investigation into Regulation of Voice Over Internet Protocol" on Justia Law