Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Armand Brisson was the owner of a two-story brick structure built around 1850 and located in the Town of Milton. He had lived in that building for most of his life. At the time of the events in question, he was living on the second floor of the building and utilizing the large attic for storage, while renting the first floor for use as a small bar/restaurant. In 2012, the Milton Police Department notified the Town’s deputy health officer that bricks were falling off the western exterior of the building onto the street and sidewalk below. After confirming this and observing that a part of the western brick wall was bulging out, the health officer issued an emergency health order later that same day condemning the building and declaring it unfit for any use or occupancy. Defendant did not contest either the civil penalty or the compensatory costs for engineering fees assessed against him by the court, but contended that the court’s award of attorney’s fees was neither authorized under the applicable statute nor warranted under an equitable exception to the American Rule requiring each party to bear the cost of its own attorney’s fees. After review, the Supreme Court agreed and therefore vacated the attorney’s fee award. View "Town of Milton Board of Health v. Brisson" on Justia Law

The Town of Rutland and five adjoining landowners (“neighbors”) appealed the Vermont Public Service Board’s grant of a certificate of public good (“CPG”) to Rutland Renewable Energy, LLC (“RRE”) for construction of the Cold River Solar Project (“Project”), a 2.3 megawatt (Mw) solar photovoltaic electric generation facility. The Town and neighbors argued that the Board incorrectly held that the project will not unduly interfere with the orderly development of the region, would not have an undue adverse effect on aesthetics, and would not have an undue adverse impact on historic sites. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Petition of Rutland Renewable Energy, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1990, the City of Burlington obtained a land-use permit for the Waterfront Park (the Park). The City hosted a number of events at the Park in the summer of 1993 and may have hosted others prior to that time. In December 1993, the City applied for an amendment to its permit to allow for hosting of festivals and public events at the Park. During the amendment process, the City argued against any express permit condition regarding the timing, duration, and frequency of events and sound levels, taking the position that the City Parks and Recreation Commission should regulate these matters. In February 1994, after considering the impact on neighboring residents caused by noise and traffic from events, the district commission granted the amendment and imposed twenty-six conditions, some of which related to the maximum sound levels associated with events at the Park, when and where to measure those sound levels, and the timing and number of events that could be held at the Park. In August 2008, Allison Lockwood purchased her property located at 200 Lake Street, adjacent to the Park. Prior to purchasing the property, she researched and read the 1994 Permit, and specifically relied on the permit conditions governing the timing and frequency of events at the Park and the maximum allowed sound levels. At the time of her purchase, the neighbor was aware that festivals and events would take place at the Park, but she understood these events would be limited by the conditions in the permit. Neighbor was nevertheless significantly impacted by the events and festivals, experiencing loud noise for extended periods of time, significant vehicular and pedestrian traffic congestion, and limits on her ability to sleep, spend time outdoors, open her windows, and enjoy her property. This case began in November of 2012 when the City filed an application with the district environmental commission to amend a number of conditions in the 1994 permit. Lockwood appealed the amended land-use permit to the Environmental Division, then appealed when the Environmental Division awarded summary judgment to the City of Burlington. The Environmental Division ruled that the City is entitled to seek an amendment to its Act 250 permit covering the Waterfront Park located on the shores of Lake Champlain. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Waterfront Park Act 250 Amendment (Alison Lockwood, Appellant)" on Justia Law

Applicants Allen Brisson, Michael Brisson, and Brisson Stone, LLC, claimed that their application for a commercial gravel extraction permit was allowed under the Town of Monkton’s zoning regulations. The Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division’s denial of the application on the merits and held that, even if the application was deemed approved, the deemed approval remedy would not have stopped an interested party’s timely appeal to the Environmental Division on the permit’s merits. View "Brisson Stone LLC v. Town of Monkton" on Justia Law

At issue in this dispute between the Treetop at Stratton Condominium Association, Inc. and the Stratton Corporation, Treetop Development Company, LLC, Treetop Three Development Company, LLC, and Intrawest Stratton Development Corporation (collectively, Stratton) was an improperly constructed stormwater management system. The Association appealed District 2 Environmental Commission’s refusal to impose additional conditions on Stratton’s Act 250 permit, which the Environmental Division of the Superior Court determined to be invalid and unenforceable. Finding no reversible error after review of the arguments presented on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. View "In re Treetop Development Company Act 250 Development" on Justia Law

The Willowell Foundation received a conditional-use permit to build a community center and related improvements on a large plot of land in the Town of Monkton. Neighbors challenged the permit, arguing the project violated a subdivision condition mandating agricultural use, claimed additional failings of Willowell’s application, and contended the Superior Court, Environmental Division, erred in several ways in upholding the permit approval. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Willowell Foundation Conditional Use Certificate of Occupancy" on Justia Law

The Town of Underhill appealed a trial court order that affirmed a decision of the County Road Commissioners requiring the Town to maintain a segment of Town Highway 26 (TH 26), a Class 4 highway. TH 26 has existed, in some form, for nearly 150 years. In 2001, the Town sought to reclassify a segment of TH 26 between Irish Settlement Road and Pleasant Valley Road as a legal trail, and the remainder of the roadway as a Class 4 highway. Following protracted litigation, these changes became effective in June 2010, and TH 26 became part of the Town’s six miles of Class 4 highways. Prior to the reclassification of TH 26, the Town performed periodic maintenance and repair work to both the roadway and the twenty-two culverts that were installed along and under TH 26 over the past thirty years. Although the ditches along TH 26 do not appear to have been maintained since 2010, the Town has continued to do some work, primarily the addition of base material to the roadway. Appellees David Demarest, Jeffrey Moulton, and Jonathan Fuller owned property on TH 26 in the Town of Underhill. Appellees Fuller and Demarest resided at their properties full time, while two additional residents along the road were part-time residents. In 2012, appellees filed a notice of insufficiency pursuant to 19 V.S.A. 971 requesting maintenance of TH 26, which had been largely deferred following the roadway reclassification. The Town denied appellees’ allegations, asserting that TH 26 was being maintained to the extent required by the necessity of the Town, the public good, and the convenience of the inhabitants of the Town. Appellees then brought an action for the appointment of County Road Commissioners pursuant to 19 V.S.A. 971 et seq. to compel the Town to undertake repairs of TH 26. Specifically, appellees sought repairs and maintenance to drainage, culverts, and the road surface, so as to make it reasonably safe and accessible for appellees’ use as residents of the Town. The Town contended on appeal that the trial court misconstrued and incorrectly applied the statutory provisions for the maintenance of Class 4 roads and erroneously established its own maintenance standard. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Town and reversed. View "Demarest v. Town of Underhill" on Justia Law

The City of Burlington and the Vermont Agency of Transportation (AOT) applied for an Act 250 permit amendment to complete a project known as the "Champlain Parkway," a roadway designed to route traffic more efficiently from Interstate 89 in South Burlington to the City of Burlington’s downtown area. The environmental court concluded that the application complied with Act 250’s transportation criterion subject to conditions requiring that applicants monitor and report on the project’s traffic-congestion and safety impacts, and work with the opposing party in this proceeding, Fortieth Burlington, LLC, to resolve any remaining issues. Fortieth appealed, arguing that: (1) the conditions imposed by the court were not supported by the evidence and findings, exceeded the court’s authority, and were insufficient to mitigate the project’s adverse impacts; (2) the court misapplied the burdens of production and proof; and (3) the court erred in rejecting Fortieth’s proposed conditions. After review, the Supreme court "discern[ed] no basis to disturb the trial court’s finding that Fortieth failed to provide sufficient “details of [the alleged] improvement or the corresponding impacts on traffic,” and no ground to disturb the judgment." View "In re Champlain Parkway Act 250 Permit (Fortieth Burlington LLC, Appellant)" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a decision by the Town of Middlebury Development Review Board (DRB) to approve appellee Jolley Associates, LLC's application for a Planned Unit Development (PUD) to add a car wash to an existing gas station and convenience store within the Town limits. Appellant MDY Taxes, Inc. operated an H&R Block tax franchise in property rented in a shopping center adjacent to the Jolley lot. Appellant Village Car Wash, Inc. operated a car wash located approximately one-quarter of a mile from the Jolley lot. Appellants did not participate in the DRB proceeding, but sought to challenge the approval of the PUD through an appeal to the Environmental Division of the Superior Court. The environmental court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that appellants did not have standing, to appeal the DRB decision because they had not participated in the proceedings before the DRB as required by statute, and because they did not meet any of the exceptions to that statutory requirement. On appeal, appellants argued that a procedural defect prevented them from appearing before the DRB, and that it would be manifestly unjust if they are not afforded party status to appeal. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Appeal of MDY Taxes, Inc., & Village Car Wash, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a decision of the Superior Court, Environmental Division in three consolidated dockets, "all of which carved a very long and circuitous path through the lower tribunals" before presented for the Supreme Court's review. At issue was the proposal of Lathrop Limited Partnership ("Lathrop") to establish a sand and gravel extraction operation on a parcel of land in Bristol. Neighbors of the project appealed the environmental court's decision to approve Lathrop's conditional use and Act 250 permit applications, and raised six claims of error: (1) the trial court erred in holding that sand and gravel extraction was permitted as a conditional use in the Town's Rural Agricultural (RA-2) and Mixed Use (MIX) zoning districts; (2) the trial court erred in holding that the operation would not create a pit within the meaning of section 526(2) of the Town's zoning bylaws; (3) erred in concluding that the court could review Lathrop's 2012 permit application de novo, without regard to the 2004 permit, and that the successive-application doctrine did not apply; (4) the court erred in relying on one-hour average noise levels and ignoring uncontested evidence of large increases in the number of high-decibel noise events in determining impact of traffic on neighbors; (5) erred in admitting and relying on acoustical-modeling software for predicting noise levels emitted by the project; and (6) erred in concluding that it had jurisdiction to review Lathrop's amended Act 250 permit application without a remand. The Supreme Court affirmed the environmental court's holdings that sand and gravel extraction was permitted as a conditional use in the RA-2 and MIX districts and that the acoustical-modeling testimony was admissible. The Supreme Court reversed holdings with respect to the creation of a pit under section 526(2), the successive-application doctrine, the impact of traffic noise on neighbors, and its jurisdiction to review Lathrop's amended Act 250 permit application. View "In re Application of Lathrop Limited Partnership I, II and III" on Justia Law