Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

by
This case was the second appeal in this partition action, which involved a parcel of property jointly owned by plaintiff Simeon Bruner and defendant Bradford Gee. Plaintiff argued the court erred in assigning the property to defendant and ordering defendant to pay plaintiff for his share. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that the trial court applied the correct legal standard and that its findings were supported by the evidence presented, and therefore affirmed. View "Bruner v. Gee, et al." on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs appealed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant on their legal-malpractice and Vermont Consumer Protection Act (VCPA) claims. Mongeon Bay Properties, LLC (MBP) owned property abutting Lake Champlain in Colchester, Vermont, and leased the property to Malletts Bay Homeowner’s Association, Inc. Under the lease, the Association had the obligation to keep the property in good condition. In 2011, following major erosion damage on a portion of the embankment on the lakefront, MBP’s manager notified the Association it was in default for failing to maintain the property and gave the Association forty-five days to make specified, substantial repairs. After the Association failed to make the repairs, MBP filed a complaint against the Association seeking damages and to void the lease for the Association’s violation of its terms. The Association retained defendant Heilmann, Ekman, Cooley & Gagnon, Inc. In the following months, the Association took steps to address MBP’s complaints. However, following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the Association breached the lease and was in default but declined to grant MBP’s request for lease forfeiture. Instead, it awarded MBP damages for remediation and attorney’s fees and costs. Both parties appealed. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision, concluding that the Association breached the lease and that MBP was entitled to termination of the lease. Ultimately, the lease was terminated, and the Association’s members were evicted. Members then sued the Association, alleging that it was negligent in its administration of the provisions of the lease requiring it to keep the property in good condition. Members and the Association settled in 2018. As part of the settlement, the Association assigned members its right to sue defendant for legal malpractice. The Association and members filed a complaint against defendant in the instant case in December 2019, alleging legal malpractice and a violation of the VCPA. The crux of their legal-malpractice claim is a lost opportunity to settle. They proposed that, had defendant tried to settle, the Association and MBP would have likely agreed to terms involving repairs and payment of MBP’s attorney’s fees thus avoiding lease termination and eviction of the Association’s members. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded summary judgment was appropriate on the legal-malpractice claim but not on the VCPA claim, and thus reversed and remanded. View "Mansfield, et al. v. Heilmann, Ekman, Cooley & Gagnon, Inc." on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff Energy Policy Advocates challenged a trial court’s conclusion that certain communications between different state attorney general offices were protected from disclosure under a public-records request, and further, that the trial court erred in declining to grant in-camera review of these documents. Additionally, plaintiff argued the trial court improperly granted only half of its fees despite substantially prevailing. The Vermont Attorney General’s Office (AGO) cross-appealed the trial court decision granting plaintiff any fees, arguing plaintiff was not entitled to fees as it did not substantially prevail. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court decision with respect to the withheld documents and reversed regarding the award of attorney’s fees. View "Energy Policy Advocates v. Attorney General’s Office" on Justia Law

by
Defendant Joshua Boyer challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence gathered in a consented-to search of his residence. In April 2018, M.B. complained to police that defendant had sexually assaulted her multiple times, including the previous day. M.B. resided in the house where the alleged assaults occurred with defendant, his wife, and other children. Defendant was arrested and released on conditions, including that he should not return to the family home where M.B. was then residing. Several days later, a police detective and an investigator from the Department for Children and Families (DCF) met with M.B. at a friend’s home where she was temporarily staying and asked if there might be DNA evidence present in M.B.’s family home. M.B. said that defendant might have disposed of a condom in her bedroom wastebasket and used a pair of her underwear to wipe himself off after the assault. Knowing that defendant and his wife would likely be away from their home to attend defendant’s arraignment, the detective asked M.B. if she would be comfortable returning to the house to locate this potential evidence. M.B., the detective, and the DCF investigator then went to the home. M.B. went outside and opened a trashcan by the exterior of the house, which she noted “had been gone through.” The detective seized the trashcan. The police later searched the trashcan pursuant to a warrant, which revealed a condom wrapper, stained paper towels, pharmacy receipts, and a rug. M.B. identified the rug as from her bedroom, and a subsequent forensic analysis confirmed the presence of defendant’s semen on the rug. Appealing the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence found at the house, defendant argued fourteen-year-old M.B. lacked authority to consent to the search. Defendant also argued his constitutional speedy-trial rights were violated. Because the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the search was lawful and that defendant’s speedy-trial rights were not violated, it affirmed the trial court’s decision. View "Vermont v. Boyer" on Justia Law

by
Defendant Theodore Colehamer appealed two convictions by jury: (1) felony driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense; and (2) misdemeanor eluding a police officer. He contended the trial court abused its discretion in denying defense counsel the opportunity to ask a question of potential jurors at voir dire, that it made multiple errors on evidentiary rulings, and that it improperly selected a jury foreperson. He also argued the eluding conviction should have been vacated because he did not violate the statute’s plain terms. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the court did not abuse its discretion on any of the evidentiary or jury issues but agreed with defendant that he did not elude law enforcement as charged. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the DUI conviction and vacated the eluding conviction. View "Vermont v. Colehamer" on Justia Law

by
In 2018, the State charged defendant Larry Labrecque with multiple counts of sexual assault, including the aggravated sexual assault of a child. He remained held without bail through his trial, which commenced on May 9, 2022. A total of approximately 45.5 months passed between charging and trial. In that time, the parties engaged in ample motion practice, "and a global pandemic occurred." At a May 12, 2020 status conference, defense counsel argued that due process required defendant’s release, citing to his nearly 2-year detention pending trial and “the judiciary’s inability to honor [his] speedy-trial rights.” On October 20, 2020, defendant moved to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, which was denied on December 7. The criminal division determined that the length of delay, approximately 28 months at the time, was sufficient to trigger full consideration of the balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), but that the factors together did not weigh in favor of finding a speedy-trial violation. Defendant would file multiple motions for bail review in 2021; no due-process violations were found, and his pretrial detention continued. In November 2021, the criminal division scheduled a jury draw for January 10, 2022. On January 4, 2022, the criminal division granted defendant’s unopposed motion to continue the trial and rescheduled the trial to start on February 8, 2022. On February 8, the criminal division continued the trial because a necessary State witness was unavailable. Defendant declined to waive his Confrontation Clause rights to allow the witness to testify remotely. A jury was drawn on May 5, 2022 and the trial was held from May 9 to May 13. The jury returned a guilty verdict on the lesser-included charge of sexual assault. On August 5, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal in which his sole argument was that his speedy-trial right had been violated. The criminal division concluded that defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated and dismissed the case against him with prejudice. Considering all the Barker factors, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that defendant was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial and reversed the criminal division's dismissal. View "Vermont v. Labrecque" on Justia Law

by
Defendant Austin White appealed the suspension of his driver’s license. He argued that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the results of an evidentiary blood-alcohol test because the State did not offer sufficient evidence to demonstrate that defendant’s blood sample was collected and analyzed in compliance with Department of Public Safety (DPS) rules. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded there was indeed an insufficient foundation to allow admission of the test result. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for entry of judgment for defendant. View "Vermont v. White" on Justia Law

by
Claimant Semir Mahmutovic appealed a Vermont Department of Labor decision concluding that claimant’s prior employer was not obligated to reimburse claimant for lost wages under 21 V.S.A. § 640(c), and that the statute was not unconstitutional as applied to claimant. The Vermont Supreme Court determined that claimant conceded that the Commissioner properly interpreted § 640(c), and further concluded that claimant did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of § 640(c). View "Mahmutovic v. Washington County Mental Health Services, Inc." on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff Gregg Beldock contracted to purchase four solar assets in development from VWSD, LLC. Following allegations of breach, VWSD sold three of the solar assets to a third party, Green Lantern. Beldock filed a complaint against VWSD alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment, and against Green Lantern and its president alleging tortious interference with contract and unjust enrichment. VWSD counterclaimed for breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all three defendants on Beldock’s claims and in part in favor of VWSD on its counterclaim. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s grant of summary judgment regarding all claims against Green Lantern and its president and the implied-covenant claim against VWSD. However, because portions of the contract were ambiguous and a genuine dispute of material facts remained, the Court concluded summary judgment was inappropriate for Beldock’s breach-of-contract and unjust-enrichment claims against VWSD and VWSD’s counterclaim for breach of contract. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Beldock v. VWSD, LLC et al." on Justia Law

by
J.N. was born in August 2013. On the eve of J.N.’s eighth birthday in August 2021, the State filed a petition alleging that J.N. was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS) due to lack of proper parental care (CHINS- B) after an incident during which mother had dragged J.N. by her arms, causing bruises. The court transferred temporary custody to the Department for Children and Families (DCF). After a series of subsequent incidents at school and home, a trial court issued a disposition order that continued custody of J.N. with DCF, with a goal of reunification with her mother by June 2023. Mother appealed the CHINS disposition, Mother argued the State essentially used a CHINS petition to advance a claim of abuse, and that by accepting that framing, the trial court deprived her of notice and interpreted the statute in a manner that was unconstitutionally over broad. The Vermont Supreme Court determine the trial court’s findings did not fit the theory charged by the State. To the extent the State asked the Supreme Court to affirm the CHINS determination based on a theory of abuse, the Court agreed with Mother that this would create a problem of notice. Accordingly, the disposition was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "In re J.N." on Justia Law