Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a dispute over the currency-exchange method used to calculate child-support arrears. The parties, previously married and living in Canada, separated in 2010. The Canadian court awarded the mother sole custody of their child and ordered the father to pay monthly child support and spousal support in Canadian dollars. The mother and child moved to Vermont, and the father to New Mexico. In 2013, the Office of Child Support (OCS) began collecting support from the father, converting the Canadian dollar obligation to U.S. dollars using the exchange rate in effect on the date of the Canadian order.The OCS filed a motion with the Vermont family division in 2020 to register the Canadian order and modify the father's child-support obligation to zero, as the child was no longer living with the mother. The father argued that the OCS should have applied the exchange rate in effect at the time he made each payment, as the value of the Canadian dollar had declined significantly since 2010. The magistrate agreed with the father's argument and directed the OCS to recalculate the arrears using the exchange rate in effect on the first day of each year.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the family division’s ruling that the magistrate had discretion to use a different conversion method. However, it reversed the portion of its order upholding the magistrate’s determination that the mother owed the father as a result of the recalculated currency conversion and vacated the magistrate’s order directing the mother to pay the father. The court concluded that it was inequitable to require the mother to repay the father for overpayments resulting from the recalculation, as the father had never objected to the administrative collection of the amounts determined by the OCS. View "Stone v. Henneke" on Justia Law

In 2010, Jason Meade was convicted of attempted second-degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years to life, with all but fourteen-to-twenty years suspended. As part of his probation conditions, he was required to complete the Cognitive Self Change (CSC) Program. However, the CSC program was discontinued and replaced with the Risk Reduction Programming (RRP). In 2022, Meade's probation officer moved to modify his probation condition to require him to undergo screening for RRP and complete the program if directed by his probation officer. Meade did not agree to the requested modification.The trial court heard evidence on the motion and subsequently issued an order granting the motion and modifying the probation condition. The court concluded that RRP was consistent with the sentencing goals articulated by the sentencing court and that the modification did not impose harsher or more restrictive conditions on Meade. It therefore modified the condition to require “Risk Reduction Programming as deemed appropriate by PO.”Meade appealed the trial court’s decision, arguing that the plain language of the original condition did not require him to participate in RRP and there was no change in circumstances sufficient to justify modifying the condition. He further claimed that the modified condition violated his right to due process because it was vague and placed compliance outside his control.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision. The court concluded that the original probation condition could not be construed to require Meade to participate in RRP. Furthermore, the court found that the trial court erred in modifying the condition over Meade’s objection because the State failed to demonstrate that there had been a change in Meade’s circumstances or that RRP was not harsher or more restrictive than CSC. View "State v. Meade" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the interplay between the requirements of the Vermont Sex Offender Registry and the merger provision of the concurrent-sentence statute. The plaintiff, Andrew Wood, was sentenced concurrently for murder and sexual assault. He served the maximum sentence for his sexual assault conviction but remained on parole. Wood filed a grievance with the Department of Public Safety (DPS) requesting removal from the sex offender registry, arguing that he had served his maximum sentence for the sexual assault conviction. The DPS denied his request, stating that the registry statute continued to apply because Wood had not yet been discharged from parole.The civil division of the Superior Court granted summary judgment to the State, ruling that the registry statute continued to apply because Wood had not yet been discharged from parole, regardless of the connection between the parole and the registrable sex offense. Wood appealed this decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment, stating that there were unresolved factual and legal questions regarding whether Wood's parole was linked to his sex offense. The court found that the plain language of the statute was insufficient to determine the impact of Wood's concurrent sentence on the registration requirements. The court remanded the case for further factual development to resolve whether the Department of Corrections considered Wood's parole to be connected to his sex offense. View "Wood v. Wallin" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between the Town of Ferrisburgh and 2078 Jersey Street, LLC, the latter of which had purchased a parcel of land in the town and began constructing an access road to an existing rock quarry on the property. The town's Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) issued a notice of violation to the company, stating that the construction required a permit. After the ZBA rejected the company's appeal of the notice of violation, the company filed for a conditional-use permit. The ZBA denied the permit, concluding that the construction of the road would substantially expand a nonconforming use of the property, in violation of local land use regulations.After the ZBA denied the permit, the company mailed a request for reconsideration to the ZBA. However, the company did not file an appeal to the environmental court within the thirty-day appeal period under Rule 5(b)(1) of the Vermont Rules of Environmental Court Proceedings. The ZBA did not take any action on the reconsideration request prior to the expiration of the time to appeal to the environmental court. After the expiration of the appeal period, the ZBA denied the request for reconsideration.The company then filed a notice of appeal with the environmental court. The town moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the company had failed to timely appeal. The court denied the motion, finding that, under Appellate Rule 4(b)(5), a request for reconsideration tolls the appeal deadline. The town then requested an interlocutory appeal, which was granted.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the environmental court's decision. The Supreme Court concluded that Appellate Rule 4(b)(5) is inapplicable in this context and that tolling does not otherwise apply under these circumstances. Therefore, the company's appeal to the environmental court was untimely and the court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. The case was remanded with orders that the company's appeal be dismissed. View "In re 2078 Jersey Street" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Jennifer Zeno-Ethridge and Dennis Ethridge, appealed from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Comcast Corporation, Eustis Cable, and Green Mountain Flagging. The suit arose from an incident in which Jennifer witnessed a fatal accident involving a utility truck and a flagger while she was driving. Following the incident, she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression.Jennifer sued the defendants for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) and negligence, while Dennis filed a loss-of-consortium claim. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, determining that Jennifer's contact with the flagger’s blood and brain matter did not constitute a "physical impact from external force" necessary for a NIED claim. It also concluded that Jennifer's PTSD diagnosis did not satisfy the "actual injury" requirement for a negligence claim.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the act of Jennifer stepping in the flagger's blood and brain matter was not a physical impact from an external force. Furthermore, the court clarified that a PTSD diagnosis alone is insufficient to satisfy the “actual injury” requirement of a negligence claim, as it is a mental or emotional harm, rather than a physical one. Consequently, Jennifer's NIED and negligence claims failed as a matter of law. Therefore, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Dennis's loss-of-consortium claim, which was dependent upon the success of Jennifer's claims. View "Zeno-Ethridge v. Comcast Corporation" on Justia Law

In this case, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's decision that the defendants, R.L. Vallee, Inc., and Crystal Clear Hospitality, LLC (CCH), accepted and used payments issued by the Vermont Agency of Transportation (the Agency) in connection with a condemnation order and are therefore barred from contesting the necessity of the taking or the public purpose of the Agency’s highway project under 19 V.S.A. § 506(c).The Agency sought to acquire certain property rights for a highway project. After a judgment of condemnation was issued, the Agency tendered payments to the defendants. The defendants deposited these payments into their respective accounts but maintained that they had not "used" the funds. They appealed the judgment, intending to challenge the necessity and public purpose of the project.The court held that depositing a check constitutes both "acceptance" and "use" of a payment under 19 V.S.A. § 506(c). It rejected the defendants' argument that they had not used the "funds" because the issue was whether they used the Agency’s payments when they deposited its checks into their accounts. The court also rejected the defendants' argument that the Agency was required to show that they knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived their rights under § 506(c), noting that defendants are charged with knowledge of the law and were represented by counsel. Finally, the court did not address the defendants' argument that § 506(c) is unconstitutional, as the defendants failed to assign error to the lower court's decision not to address that argument. View "Agency of Transportation v. Timberlake Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a zoning enforcement action initiated by the Town of Pawlet against landowner Daniel Banyai. Banyai launched a firearms training facility on his property in 2017, which was found to be in violation of the town's Uniform Zoning Bylaws. The Environmental Division issued a judgment in 2021, ordering Banyai to remove unpermitted structures and have his property surveyed within 30 days. Banyai failed to comply with these orders, leading to the imposition of contempt sanctions.The contempt sanctions included fines of $200 per day until all violations were rectified, and the potential for Banyai's arrest. The court also granted the town permission to enter Banyai's property to remove the unpermitted structures if he continued to ignore the orders.Banyai appealed, arguing that the sanctions were punitive and violated the excessive fines clause of the U.S. Constitution. However, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision, deeming Banyai’s arguments an impermissible collateral attack on a final order. The court stated that Banyai had failed to challenge the February 2023 contempt order or denial of reconsideration by a timely direct appeal, which would have been the appropriate channel for his grievances. As a result, his attempt to challenge the determinations now were considered an impermissible collateral attack on the February 2023 contempt order. View "Town of Pawlet v. Banyai" on Justia Law

A Vermont-based non-profit organization and an LLC challenged a superior court's dismissal of their complaint over a grant they did not receive. The plaintiffs, Housing Our Seniors in Vermont Inc. and Lakemont Retirement Community LLC, argued that the grant provided by the Newport Development Fund Grant Committee to another organization was wrongly awarded. The plaintiffs also alleged a conflict of interest in the committee.However, the Vermont Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision, reasoning that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the grant award. The court clarified that the plaintiffs had no legal right to receive the grant or to have any specific procedure in the allocation of the grant. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' argument of specific rules governing the grant process asserting that the grant process was discretionary, and the eligibility criteria did not guarantee any particular process.Consequently, the court affirmed the superior court's dismissal for lack of standing, reinforcing that a legal entitlement or right is essential to establish an injury-in-fact for standing. View "Housing Our Seniors in Vermont Inc. v. Agency of Commerce & Community Development" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs, Stowe Aviation, LLC and Stowe Airport Investment, LP, appealed from a denial of their motion to reopen a breach-of-contract case with the Vermont Agency of Commerce and Community Development. The plaintiffs had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Agency in 2014, outlining their intention to develop and expand the Morrisville-Stowe State Airport using funds secured through the EB-5 program. However, the Agency later transferred its obligations under the MOU to the Department of Financial Regulation (DFR) without informing the plaintiffs, leading to the failure of the airport project.The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Agency, alleging that the Agency breached its contract by failing to perform under the MOU and by transferring its obligations to the DFR without notice. The trial court dismissed the claims, and the case was closed. The plaintiffs then moved to reopen the case and amend their complaint, but the trial court denied their motion. The plaintiffs appealed this order.The Supreme Court of Vermont reversed the order and remanded the case, holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion to reopen the case. The Supreme Court reasoned that plaintiffs could potentially obtain relief to cure a pleading deficiency under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), and it was inappropriate for the trial court to deny relief simply because plaintiffs did not request leave to amend in their opposition papers before the court entered judgment. On remand, the plaintiffs must demonstrate a valid basis to vacate the previously entered judgment to prevent manifest injustice before they can file their amended complaint. View "Stowe Aviation, LLC et al. v. Agency of Commerce & Community Development" on Justia Law

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the civil division's decision to invalidate a portion of Donald Crofut's will that granted Sean Hammond an option to purchase Crofut's residence for $40,000. The court found that Crofut and Hammond had a relationship of trust and confidence. Hammond lived with Crofut, cared for him during his illness, and had access to Crofut's debit card. Evidence showed that Hammond made unauthorized purchases with Crofut's debit card and withdrew money from Crofut's bank account without permission. The court found that, had Crofut known about the theft, he would not have included the option provision in his will. As such, the option bequeathed to Hammond was found to be the result of undue influence. The court also held that partial voidance of a will is an acceptable remedy when undue influence is found, as it best preserves the testator’s intent and effectuates their desires. Here, the option provision was a small part of a much larger will, and the evidence of undue influence was unrelated to the other bequests and individuals. Therefore, invalidating the entire will would have contravened Crofut's intent. View "In re Estate of Crofut" on Justia Law