Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jerald Hawkins appealed his conditional guilty plea to criminal refusal of an evidentiary breath test and the civil suspension of his driver's license, claiming that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. On appeal, Defendant argued: (1) he was arrested without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution; (2) alternatively, the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment and Article 11 due to excessive force; (3) statements he made to police were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment and "Miranda" rights; (4) he was entitled to judgment in the civil license suspension proceeding because the final hearing did not take place within the mandatory timeframe. Defendant was stopped when an deputy sheriff "clocked" him driving over the speed limit. Defendant's car "bottomed out" on a washed-out part of a gravel driveway. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed in part, and remanded the case: the determination of probable cause to arrest for negligent operation for "bottoming out" on the washed out portion of the driveway was reversed. "Guided by common experience, we agree with defendant that, as a matter of law, driving over the washout as described was not negligent, so there was no probable cause to arrest him for negligent operation. . . Viewed another way, the court's decision would mean that every time a public highway in this condition is so used a crime could be charged, and any driver operating on a back road in March would risk prosecution. Such an application of the statute is too broad, and no reasonable jury could find negligence on these facts." The trial court has not considered if the State met its burden to show that whatever physical evidence, including Defendant's refusal to submit to a breath test, was not acquired by the deputy in exploitation of the unlawful arrest. Accordingly, the Court remanded for findings and a determination, based on the existing record evidence, on defendant's motion to suppress all physical evidence obtained following his arrest. View "Vermont v. Hawkins" on Justia Law

Defendant Damon Dubuque was convicted for refusing a reasonable request for an evidentiary test after being convicted of DUI. He appealed the denial of a motion to suppress evidence of his refusal to give a blood sample, arguing that he should have been offered a breath test instead. Police were dispatched to a rollover accident; the vehicle was operated by Defendant. After speaking with defendant, the officer arrested him on suspicion of driving under the influence and accompanied him in an ambulance to the hospital. Approximately one hour and forty-five minutes after the accident, the officer began processing defendant for the offense of driving under the influence. He asked defendant to provide a blood sample, and defendant refused, stating that he would give only a breath sample. After defendant was released from the hospital, the officer transported him to a residential and detoxification facility. The facility refused to admit him. The officer then took him to a detox facility at the Chittenden Regional Correctional Center. At no point did defendant give either a blood or breath sample, nor did the officer ask defendant to take a test after leaving the hospital. Defendant was arraigned on charges of "DUI #3 or Subsequent – Test Refusal" and one other charge, which was subsequently dropped. Defendant moved to suppress evidence of the refusal to give a blood sample. The sole issue at the hearing on the motion to suppress was whether breath-testing equipment was reasonably available when the officer processed defendant, given the unknown amount of time that defendant could be expected to remain in the hospital. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that in this case, the time at which the officer began processing and made the request for the test was close to when the permissive-inference window would close. At that point, the officer could not determine when defendant's medical evaluation and treatment would end. It was not reasonable for the officer to prematurely remove defendant from the hospital in order to obtain a breath test. The Court held therefore that the breath-testing equipment was not reasonably available and affirmed the trial court. View "Vermont v. Dubuque" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the constitutional rights of a putative biological father who seeks an order of parentage when a court has already issued a parentage order determining the minor child's parents. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Vermont's parentage statute does not authorize a court to allow a second parentage action involving a particular child brought by or against a different putative parent unless constitutional considerations require the court to entertain the second parentage case. In this case, even if plaintiff was the genetic parent of the minor child, he did not have constitutionally-protected parental rights. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision denying plaintiff's motion for genetic testing and dismissed his complaint for establishment of parentage. View "Columbia v. Lawton" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from litigation involving developer Stowe Highlands and its Resort Planned Unit Development (PUD) in the Town of Stowe. The Stowe Development Review Board (DRB) denied Stowe Highlands' application to amend the PUD by subdividing and then merging certain lots, including one designated for a hotel. The DRB concluded that the amendment amounted to a change in the permit conditions and that such amendment was not warranted because Stowe Highlands had not demonstrated an unanticipated change in factual circumstances beyond its control. Stowe Highlands appealed this denial to the Environmental Division of the Superior Court, which reversed, concluding that the application required no permit condition change and that denial on that basis was therefore unfounded. One of the PUD lot owners and the Town appealed that decision, arguing that the original DRB decision was correct. Finding no error in the superior court decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Stowe Highlands Merger/Subdivision Application" on Justia Law

Defendant Donna Mae Peck appealed a superior court judgment that granted plaintiff Victor Shattuck a writ of possession for the parties' former residence in Cavendish and that denied her counterclaim for an equitable interest in the Cavendish property and another former residence in Springfield. Between December 1997 and June 1999, plaintiff purchased two adjoining parcels of land in Cavendish. He made most of the payments for the first parcel, but defendant made a significant financial contribution toward payment of the second parcel. In 2001, plaintiff conveyed the Cavendish properties to himself and defendant as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, and defendant conveyed the Springfield property to herself and plaintiff as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. The parties lived together in Cavendish until June 2010, when plaintiff decided to end their relationship. Following an angry confrontation, defendant obtained a relief-from-abuse order against plaintiff and was awarded sole possession of the Cavendish property. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in superior court seeking to evict defendant from the Cavendish property. Defendant answered and counterclaimed, alleging that the Cavendish and Springfield properties were the subject of a partnership agreement between the parties. Alleging that she had been induced to convey the Springfield properties by plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentations, she also sought equitable relief through imposition of a resulting or constructive trust. She later claimed that the Cavendish property was also held in a constructive trust for her benefit. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court: "pursuant to the principles of equity, not every unmarried cohabitant who confers an economic benefit on his or her partner is entitled to payback if the relationship ends. In this case, defendant may or may not ultimately be entitled to restitution, whether in the form of a constructive trust or a money judgment, for her substantial investments in the Cavendish and Springfield properties, and any such judgment could well be subject to offsets for benefits received." View "Shattuck v. Peck" on Justia Law

Both the State and Defendant Wallace Nolan appealed a trial court's revocation of Defendant's probation, though for different reasons. Specifically, both defendant and the State disputed the trial court’s authority to summarily terminate probation without a hearing. Defendant equated an "unsatisfactory" discharge with findings of a probation violation, or as otherwise reflecting adversely on his conduct as a probationer. Defendant claimed he was denied an opportunity to contest the grounds for such an appellation. The State, on the other hand, argued that when, as in this case, a motion's predicate facts were in dispute, Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 47(b)(2) calls for a hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that a probationer is entitled to a hearing on disputed material facts before the trial court can order a less-than-satisfactory discharge from probation. The trial court's order was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Nolen" on Justia Law

Mother appealed a CHINS decision by the superior court based on a finding that she repeatedly induced the child to make false allegations of abuse against father. On appeal, Mother contended the judgment was unsupported because there was no evidence or finding that the allegations of abuse were the product of intentional coaching or mental illness. Finding the evidence sufficient to support the superior court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re M.A." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the trial court’s admission of a videotaped deposition of a key state witness who was out of the country but willing to travel to the trial violated defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation where defendant personally objected to admission of the testimony on the record, but his counsel stipulated to the videotape’s admission. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant’s rights were violated by the admission of the hearsay testimony and, accordingly, reversed.  Because the issue was "very likely" to arise on remand, the Court also considered defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in permitting defense counsel to raise a diminished capacity defense over defendant’s objection, concluding that the decision should have been left to defendant.  For similar reasons the Court concluded that defendant, having been found competent to assist in his own defense, retained final authority over the decision to present a diminished capacity case. "Plainly, as other courts have recognized, the fundamental right to maintain a plea of complete innocence would be impaired, if not eviscerated, if counsel were allowed, over defendant’s objection, to assert a defense seeking a less serious conviction. . . .The basic right to contend for outright acquittal that bars defense counsel from overriding a defendant’s objection to instructing the jury as to lesser-included offenses applies with equal force to preclude the assertion of a theory, such as diminished capacity, that supports conviction on a lesser-included charge contrary to a defendant’s express wishes." Accordingly, the Court concluded that the trial court erred in authorizing defense counsel to assert the defense contrary to defendant’s wishes. View "Vermont v. Tribble" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this interlocutory appeal was the question of whether defendant Hieu Tran was in police custody when two detectives questioned him in a police cruiser for one hour as part of an investigation into an assault and attempted robbery. The trial court concluded that the interview was a custodial interrogation conducted without the warnings guaranteed by "Miranda v. Arizona," (384 U.S. 436 (1966)), and granted defendant’s motion to suppress. On appeal, the State argued that no warnings were necessary because defendant voluntarily spoke with detectives and was not in custody during the interview. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant was in custody and entitled to Miranda warnings, and because such warnings were not provided, defendant’s statements made during the March interview should have been suppressed. View "Vermont v. Tran" on Justia Law

A Mother appealed a superior court's decision that terminated her parental rights to her son, D.C. D.C. spent the first years of his life with both parents, who at the time were not married. When his parents separated, the father took D.C. to stay with him. Although a child-custody order granted mother parental rights, she allowed father to take the child because she had difficulty finding a residence, and she knew that father had the support of his mother in caring for D.C. This arrangement lasted for a few years longer when mother obtained police help to assert her custodial rights to D.C. Mother moved into a motel with D.C., and the Department for Children and Families (DCF) petitioned that D.C. was a child in need of care due to a lack of proper parental care. The affidavit in support of the petition stated that: (1) five years earlier mother’s parental rights had been terminated with respect to an older child because of unsafe and unsanitary living conditions and the child’s exposure to the risk of being sexually abused; (2) mother had a relationship with a known, untreated sex offender who had been seen frequently with mother at her motel room; (3) the motel room was filthy and unsanitary; (4) D.C. was suffering from an untreated respiratory illness; and (5) school officials had reported D.C. arriving at school hungry and not dressed properly for the cold. On appeal, mother argued that the termination order is invalid because the court failed to: (1) consider whether the State had met its burden of showing changed circumstances, which was required because the State’s termination petition sought modification of the initial disposition order; (2) determine by clear and convincing evidence that mother was presently unfit to care for D.C.; and (3) find that DCF had made reasonable efforts to prevent the unnecessary removal of D.C. from his home. Finding that the record supported the family court’s undisputed findings that during the lengthy period when mother played a limited role in D.C.’s life and agreed to other family members assuming custody of the child, she made no progress in reaching a point where she could care for the child.  The Court concluded that Mother could not challenge the TPR order through a belated claim that DCF failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent D.C.’s removal from his home. Accordingly, the Court affirmed termination of Mother's rights. View "In re D.C." on Justia Law