Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Neighbors of a proposed affordable housing development appealed an Environmental Division decision affirming a decision of the Town of Woodstock Development Review Board (DRB) granting appellee-applicants Woodstock Community Trust and Housing Vermont (WCT) a zoning permit and a decision of the District 3 Environmental Commission, granting an Act 250 Land Use Permit. The Environmental Division had reversed an earlier decision of the DRB granting a permit, but upon WCT’s reapplication, and another favorable decision from the DRB, the Environmental Division affirmed, finding that the deficiencies of the first application had been corrected. Following the second DRB decision, WCT went to the Environmental Commission and obtained an Act 250 permit; the Environmental Division also affirmed the grant of this permit. Neighbors argued that: (1) the successive-application doctrine should have barred the submission of the second zoning permit application; (2) the second application failed to correct the problems of the first application; (3) certain of the Environmental Division’s findings with respect to the Act 250 permit were clearly erroneous; (4) the court erred by denying a motion to stay this proceeding; and (5) the Environmental Division erred by conditioning approval on a water easement’s location being drawn on the plan. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. "It is entirely within the jurisdiction of the Environmental Division to impose conditions on permits. . . .the Environmental Division was sensitive to the concurrent litigation when it imposed the condition, requiring that the pending litigation be noted on the plan. The condition was based on the requirements of the Woodstock zoning ordinance, and it was within the court’s jurisdiction and discretion to require it." View "In re Woodstock Community Trust and Housing Vermont PRD" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a workers' compensation insurer was entitled to reimbursement of death benefits it paid when a claimant's beneficiary also received proceeds from a life-insurance policy. Upon review, the Court held that under 21 V.S.A. 624(e) a workers' compensation carrier cannot seek reimbursement from life-insurance payments because such proceeds are not "damages," as contemplated by the statute and paid because of a third party's tortious actions. The Court therefore affirmed the Commissioner of Labor's grant of summary judgment to the estate of the claimant. View "Estate of Dunn v. Windham Northeast Supervisory Union" on Justia Law

Appellant Charles Crannell appealed the decision of the Rutland Civil Division that he was no longer entitled to an appointed attorney to handle his post-conviction relief (PCR) proceedings.  Appellant’s previously assigned counsel filed a notice of withdrawal based on lack of legal merit in the PCR. Appellant argued that, having filed his PCR petition before the Legislature enacted the amended version of the applicable statutory authority, he had a vested right to counsel under the pre-amendment version. Alternatively, Appellant argued that the Defender General’s Office waived its right to withdraw because it represented him in his PCR proceedings for nine years before seeking to do so. In addition, Appellant asserted that because counsel is necessary for effective advocacy in PCR proceedings at the trial court level, the Supreme Court should read the applicable statute to provide a right to assigned representation in such proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that Appellant was correct that the old version of the statute still governed his right to assigned PCR counsel and granted him a statutory right to representation at his own, rather than the Defender General’s, discretion. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Crannell" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the Lowell Mountains Group, Inc. (LMG), and the Towns of Albany and Craftsbury, challenged several Public Service Board orders related to the construction of a wind-electric-generation facility and associated facilities on Lowell Mountain in Lowell, Vermont. In May 2010, petitioners Green Mountain Power Corporation (GMP), Vermont Electric Cooperative, Inc. (VEC), and Vermont Electric Power Company, Inc. and Vermont Transco LLC (VELCO) requested a certificate of public good (CPG) to construct a wind-electric-generation facility on Lowell Mountain. On May 31, 2011, following testimony, site visits, a public hearing, and hearings, the Board issued a final order granting a CPG subject to forty-five conditions. Appellants and several other parties moved for reconsideration. On July 12, 2011, the Board modified its final order in certain respects. The Towns and LMG appealed that final order with modifications. The parties also raised compliance issues with the final order that the Board ultimately overruled. Upon review of the Board's orders, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion, and deferred to the Board's decisions with regard to the final order. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Board. View "In re Green Mountain Power Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sally J. Taylor sued Fletcher Allen Health Care (FAHC) for medical negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress in connection with her medical care following a surgery performed on her lumbar spine. After plaintiff failed to disclose any expert witness in response to discovery requests, FAHC moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff’s claims failed as a matter of law without an expert witness. The trial court granted FAHC’s motion. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that this case was sufficiently complex that plaintiff could not prove her claims without expert testimony. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Taylor v. Fletcher Allen Health Care" on Justia Law

The State of Vermont appealed a trial court's dismissal of a civil driver's license suspension complaint.  The trial court found that the statutory requirements for civil suspension had not been met. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding that indeed, the statutory requirements for civil suspension had not been met. View "Vermont v. Spooner" on Justia Law

Petitioner Timothy Wiley appealed the Windham Civil Division's denial of his request for DNA testing pursuant to Vermont's Innocence Protection Act. Following an unsuccessful appeal of convictions for aggravated sexual assault and lewd and lascivious conduct stemming from charges that he raped his girlfriend's daughter, and for obstruction of justice in connection with threatening and encouraging the mother to commit perjury, petitioner claimed innocence and filed for relief under the Innocence Protection Act. Petitioner claimed the trial court erred in reaching its conclusion that his anticipated test results would not have created a reasonable probability of a different result had they been available at trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of petitioner's request on the ground that the testing he sought was not of any evidence "obtained during the investigation or prosecution of the crime" for which innocence is claimed, as required by the Act, rendering his request outside of the Act's relief. View "In re Wiley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Doctors Eitan and Vered Sobel, owners of a medical office building in Rutland, appealed the superior court's grant of summary judgment for defendant, City of Rutland. Plaintiffs sued the City for damages, claiming the City Tax Assessor (the Assessor) was negligent in providing allegedly inaccurate property tax estimates on the proposed, but not yet built, office. Plaintiffs also sought to enjoin the City from enforcing the tax assessment on the office building ultimately constructed. On appeal, they argued that the court erred in concluding that their negligence claim was barred by municipal immunity and that they failed to establish equitable estoppel against the City. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the City Assessor was immune from suit, and that plaintiffs could no establish estoppel with the facts of this case. Finding no error with the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, the Supreme Court affirmed that decision. View "Sobel v. City of Rutland" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal, defendants Paul Edmonds and Francis Cobb appeared their conditional pleas to driving with a suspended license, claiming that the Windsor Criminal Division erred in denying their motions to suppress evidence. Defendants argued that they were subject to investigative stops unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. They alternatively argued that Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution affords greater protection against such detentions than does the Fourth Amendment, and that, even if lawful under the Fourth Amendment, the investigative stops in each case violated Article 11. The trial court, treating the reasonable suspicion standard as the same under the Fourth Amendment and Article 11, held that defendants' detentions were supported by reasonable suspicion that they were driving with suspended drivers licenses. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Edmonds" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder following a jury trial.  He appeals that conviction on three grounds: (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion for a new trial based on a newly discovered witness corroborating defendant’s self-defense claim; (2) the trial court erred by failing to dismiss two jurors for cause; and (3) the jury instructions on diminished capacity failed to inform the jury it must acquit defendant of second-degree murder if defendant could not form the specific intent for that offense due to diminished capacity. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Defendant's contentions on appeal to be without merit and affirmed his conviction. View "Vermont v. Bruno" on Justia Law