Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The trial court dismissed Wife's post-divorce motion for relief from judgment based on Husband's alleged fraudulent concealment of assets without requiring completion of the discovery sought by wife, and without a hearing. Wife and Husband entered into a stipulated final divorce agreement, approved and incorporated into a final order by the family court. Several months after the parties' divorce became final, Wife filed a motion to set aside the final divorce decree on several grounds, including that husband had not disclosed a bank account. The family court denied the motion, noting that both parties had personal checking accounts opened post-separation from which they paid their bills and neither party had included those accounts in their financial disclosures. The court also concluded that the post-judgment questions raised by Wife's motion were relatively minor in the context of the overall case. Several years later Husband filed a motion to modify spousal maintenance due to an unanticipated decline in his income. In connection with that motion, he produced copies of his bank statements that included for the first time, an account that had his and his sister's names on it--an account he opened and used prior to the divorce stipulation. Wife subsequently filed a motion for contempt and enforcement, arguing that Husband indeed had hidden some accounts from her that were to be used in creating the stipulated divorce agreement. The trial court dismissed her motion. On appeal, Wife challenged the trial court's refusal to hold further hearings several outstanding issues pertaining to the accounts issue. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err in declining to hear Wife's motion on the Husband's concealment of the last bank account. The Court found that the motion was time-barred. Therefore, if the motion was time barred, it was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion in refusing to hold another hearing on the issues raised in that motion. View "Olio v. Olio" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffory Hammond appealed his convictions for sexual assault and lewd and lascivious conduct. Defendant argued that: (1) he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal based on the complainant's contradictory and otherwise incredible testimony; (2) alternatively, he was entitled to a new trial for the same reasons; (3) the court's jury instructions were erroneous; (4) the court erred under Vermont's Rape Shield by allowing the State to present testimony from the complainant about her lack of sexual experience; and (5) the court erred by allowing non-expert and expert "anecdotal" testimony about the manner in which teenage victims sometimes report sexual assault. Finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Hammond" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Moira Lamay, a former Vermont state trooper, appealed the grant of summary judgmet in favor of the State on her claim of employment discrimination. On appeal, Plaintiff contended the trial court erred in: (1) finding that she had presented insufficient evidence of gender bias as a motivating factor in her discharge; and (2) declining to consider the allegations in her complaint to the Vermont Human Rights Commission. "Plaintiff's difficulty here is that her evidence, whether characterized as direct or circumstantial, was insufficient to support a finding that gender or gender stereotyping was a motivating factor in her termination." The Supreme Court, after its review, upheld the grant of summary judgment in favor of the State. View "Lamay v. Vermont" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the trial court's dismissal of his medical malpractice action for failing to satisfy the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Allan Eisemann, M.D., practicing through a medical practice which bore his name, negligently failed to advise Plaintiff or his dentist of the known risks associated with a tooth extraction while Plaintiff was taking intervenous doses of a medication called "Zometa," prescribed for multiple myleoma. Defendant allegedly approved the procedure; Plaintiff's dentist pulled the tooth. Following the procedure, Plaintiff developed osteonecrosis of the jaw. All parties agreed that the statute of limitations period for Plaintiff's malpractice claims would expire October 9, 2009. By a letter dated in September, Plaintiff's counsel proposed to Dr. Eisemann's counsel and other potential defendants a "time out" agreement to toll the statute of limitations for ninety days so that the parties could pursue settlement. Although Dr. Eisemann signed off on the agreement, not all defendants did. As a result of Plaintiff's failure to reach an agreement with all defendants, Plaintiff filed suit on October 7, 2009. Counsel for Dr. Eisemann returned the acceptance of service to Plaintiff's counsel in January, 2010. Plaintiff did not filed the acceptance with the court at that time. The trial court dismissed the case on its own motion on April 15, 2011 based on Plaintiff's failure to prosecute his claim. Three days later, Plaintiff filed the signed acceptances of service. Dr. Eisemann moved to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the Eisemann defendants are equitably estopped from invoking the statute of limitations. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiff could not rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel because his own "omissions or inadvertences" contributed to the problem. Accordingly, the Court affirmed dismissal of his case. View "Beebe v. Eisemann" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Frank Hall, a longtime employee of the Agency of Transportation (AOT), sued the agency in 2007, alleging discrimination on the basis of a physical disability and retaliation for his having filed a workers' compensation claim. The jury found no disability discrimination, but awarded Plaintiff damages based upon its finding that the State had retaliated against him as alleged. On appeal, the State argued that: (1) Plaintiff's retaliation claim was precluded by a September 2003 Stipulation and Agreement signed by Plaintiff and AOT releasing the State from liability for any and all claims associated in any way with Plaintiff's reclassification and transfer stemming from hostile work environment allegations against him; (2) Plaintiff's retaliation claim was not supported by any causal connection linking his employment reclassification and transfer with his having filed a workers' compensation claim; (3) evidence of a video surveillance of Plaintiff connected with a second workers' compensation claim was insufficient as a matter of law to support his retaliation claim and the resulting damages award; and (4) even if the record supported his retaliation claim, the State's liability is limited to $250,000, as set forth in Vermont's Tort Claims Act during the relevant time period. Plaintiff cross-appealed, challenging the trial court's denial of his request for post-judgment interest and attorney's fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment against the State and remanded the matter for the trial court to rule on the potentially determinative issue of the scope of the September 2003 release. View "Hall v. Vermont" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason Mead was convicted of attempted second-degree murder following a jury trial. He appealed that conviction on four grounds: (1) a State’s witness and a juror had improper contact during trial; (2) the trial court admitted excerpts of defendant’s testimony at a relief-from-abuse (RFA) hearing at which defendant was not represented by counsel; (3) the trial court admitted evidence of prior bad acts of defendant; and (4) the jury charge did not require the jury to identify which gunshot supported its conviction. Finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Mead" on Justia Law

Pro se defendant James Burke appealed his sexual assault conviction under 13 V.S.A. 3252(a)(1) and resulting eighteen-to-twenty-year sentence. Defendant contended that: (1) he was denied a speedy trial; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence that complainant made false accusations of sexual assault in the past; (3) the court erred by refusing to allow him to present evidence of complainant’s past convictions; (4) the court erred by denying his motion to proceed pro se and by ordering him shackled in court; (5) the court improperly imposed a fixed term of imprisonment; and (6) the court should have granted his motion for a new trial. Finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion and sufficient evidence in the record support the jury's verdict and the trial court's decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Burke" on Justia Law

Barrett Holby, Grethe Holby, Kristin Holby, and Wegard Holby appealed orders of the Public Service Board which granted New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC d/b/a AT&T Mobility (AT&T) a Certificate of Public Good (CPG) authorizing the installation of a monopine telecommunications tower and associated facilities in Weston, and denying the Holbys' motion to alter the CPG order. The Holbys' properties either abut the property on which the proposed project is to be built, or are in close proximity to it. The Holbys' appeal was grounded on their claims that they were denied procedural due process in connection with the Board proceeding. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Holbys did not have constitutionally protected interests at stake, and therefore affirmed the Public Service Board's decision. View "In re Petition of New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC d/b/a AT&T Mobility" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Vermont Human Rights Commission (HRC) and Ursula Stanley, an employee of the State Agency of Transportation, appealed the Washington Civil Division's decision to grant the State's motion to dismiss her complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Ms. Stanley complained that, under the Vermont Parental and Family Leave Act (VPFLA), 21 V.S.A. 472(c), which requires continuation of certain "employment benefits" during family leave, she was entitled to accrue, but was denied, paid vacation and sick time during the course of an unpaid parental leave. The trial court held that under section 472(c) an employee does not continue earning paid leave during unpaid parental leave. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss, finding that sections 472(a) and (b) of the VPFLA point to why the accrual of paid time-off and sick time are not benefits that employers must provide during unpaid leave. Section 472(a) states that an employee is "entitled to take unpaid leave." However, the statute permits employees to use already "accrued paid leave," such as vacation or sick leave, during parental leave. As the trial court noted, if an employee could demand accrual of paid leave from an employer under the VPFLA while on family leave, it must follow that at least a portion of the parental leave would be rendered paid leave, "a result not just inconsistent with, but contrary to, the employer's VPFLA obligation to provide unpaid parental leave only." View "Vermont Human Rights Commission v. Vermont" on Justia Law

Defendant Eddie Sinclair filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis in the criminal division, seeking to vacate a conviction from 1993 on the ground that his plea was not entered voluntarily. The court denied the motion, concluding there was no basis for a collateral attack on Defendant's plea. Defendant appealed, arguing his plea should be vacated because the sentencing court did not substantially comply with Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. In October 1992, the State charged Defendant with assault and robbery. Defendant entered a plea agreement with the State in which he agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of two-to-twelve years. In March 1993, the trial court held a change-of-plea hearing and engaged Defendant in plea colloquy. The court then accepted the plea and subsequently sentenced Defendant in accordance with the agreement. In November 2010, long after his sentence had been served, Defendant filed a pro se motion in the criminal division "pursuant to coram nobis" to "vacate/bring to trial/set aside" his 1993 conviction. Defendant claimed the plea was entered involuntarily because he was not told that the plea could be used to enhance a future sentence and he was under the influence of narcotics at that time. The motion alleged that he was currently serving a federal sentence that was enhanced based on his 1993 Vermont conviction. In a written order, the court denied the motion, ruling that Defendant had failed to demonstrate the plea colloquy was inadequate and that there was no basis for a collateral attack on the plea. The State contended that Defendant's petition was improperly brought in the criminal division because Defendant may not avail himself of coram nobis when postconviction relief (PCR) proceedings are available to him, and that they were available in this case. Thus, the State argued that the petition should be dismissed without reaching the merits of Defendant's arguments. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the State and concluded that Defendant was eligible to file a PCR petition and thus precluded from seeking relief through coram nobis. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the criminal division's denial of Defendant's motion. View "Vermont v. Sinclair" on Justia Law