Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Vaillancourt Tree and Landscape Service appealed a trial court decision denying its post-trial motion for attorney's fees and costs under a theory of implied indemnification.  The issue on appeal was whether indemnity for attorney's fees is appropriate where a jury has found the putative indemnitor not liable in the underlying suit. Plaintiff Leonard Knappmiller owns a commercial property directly abutting a property owned by Defendants Joseph and Carolyn Bove.  This case grew from a dispute between Knappmiller and the Boves regarding the Boves' decision to cut down and remove a row of white cedar trees that allegedly straddled their property line.  The Boves hired Vaillancourt to cut and remove the trees.  Following the removal, Knappmiller filed a claim against the Boves for wrongful cutting of trees, alleging that the trees were located on Knappmiller's property and were removed without his consent.  Knappmiller later amended his complaint, adding Vaillancourt as a codefendant.  Vaillancourt consequently cross-claimed against the Boves for negligence, breach of contract, and indemnity.  Vaillancourt's cross-claim alleged that it had entered into a contract with the Boves, and that the Boves did not, but should have, informed Vaillancourt about tree ownership issues with Knappmiller before the trees were cut down and removed.  Vaillancourt's cross-claim demanded "judgment against the Boves . . . for indemnity, if Vaillancourt is found liable to Plaintiff and for any other damages suffered by Vaillancourt resulting from the Boves' negligence and breach of contract." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court: "[e]ven if [the Court] were to dispense with a requirement of finding fault on behalf of the Boves, the jury specifically found neither the Boves nor Vaillancourt liable for any wrongful act.  The jury did not reach Vaillancourt's cross-claim against the Boves because Vaillancourt requested attorney's fees only if Vaillancourt was found liable in the underlying suit.  More importantly, Vaillancourt did not object to the jury charge or the special verdict form -- both of which unequivocally instructed the jury to reach Vaillancourt's indemnity claim only if Knappmiller prevailed.  [The Court] therefore cannot discern any support for an award of attorney's fees, other than Vaillancourt's conclusory allegations that the Boves knew the trees straddled the boundary line and had a duty to inform Vaillancourt of that fact." View "Knappmiller v. Bove" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Kolibas was convicted by a jury of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child and two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal of his conviction, Defendant claimed the trial court in its instructions to the jury eliminated the element of intent from the State's burden of proving the aggravated assault charges. Defendant is the father of twelve-year-old A.K., who invited her thirteen-year-old friend, T.F., to a sleep-over. That evening, Defendant made smoothies for the two girls, his wife, and himself. At trial, Defendant testified that he placed one Ambien (a sleep aid) and half of a Valium (an anti-anxiety medication) into his wife's drink because she was "stressed out" and he "didn't want her bothering [him]." Defendant's wife testified that after Defendant left the kitchen to bring two smoothies to the girls, she poured her part of her drink into Defendant's cup. The girls drank the smoothies as they lay on a futon in A.K.'s bedroom and watched a movie. She soon felt dizzy and tired, and fell asleep in about thirty minutes. T.F. fell asleep and woke to Defendant touching her chest and genitals. The court instructed the jury that "[t]he State is not required to prove, but may prove, that the Defendant intended that a specific person be harmed in this [drugging] manner." Defendant admitted at trial he deliberately gave "stupefying drugs" to his wife. With the court's instruction, the Supreme Court concluded it was virtually assured the jury would find Defendant guilty of aggravated assault. "This is constitutional error: [b]ecause the State built its case around the theory that Defendant intended to drug the girls, Defendant built his defense on the theory of mistake. . . . However, after Defendant testified, the court decided that the State did not have to prove that he intended to drug a particular person, and that Defendant would not be permitted to argue to the jury a defense of mistake. As a result, the jury could have found Defendant guilty of aggravated assault against T.F. and A.K. if they did not believe he actually intended to drug them." Defendant's ability to defend against the specific charges brought by the State was so substantially prejudiced that the Court ordered a new trial. Because Defendant did not challenge his conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct, the Court did not disturb that conviction. View "Vermont v. Kolibas" on Justia Law

Appellants Warren and Wynne Kirschbaum appealed a trial court's ruling in favor of Appellee First Quality Carpets, Inc. arising from a dispute they had over carpet installed in 2007. The Kirschbaums argued that the civil division erred in awarding First Quality attorney's fees under 9 V.S.A. 4007(c) of the Prompt Pay Act because that section of the statute authorizing attorney's fees recovery effectively expired in 1996 pursuant to a sunset provision included in the Act. Alternatively, the Kirschbaums argued that because they withheld payment to First Quality in good faith, they were entitled to a directed verdict and that First Quality should not have been awarded attorney's fees under 4007(c). Finally, the Kirschbaums argued that the court erred in denying their counterclaim under the Consumer Fraud Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all respects. View "First Quality Carpets, Inc. v. Kirschbaum" on Justia Law

Defendants Richard Barnett and Cedric and Leslie Sanborn appealed a judgment which ruled that the City of Montpelier may prohibit boating, fishing, and swimming in Berlin Pond, a public body of water located outside the City and used as the City's drinking water supply. The City contended that the restrictions were supported by both a state health order and the powers granted to the City by the State. The trial court agreed and issued a permanent injunction preventing Defendants from engaging in the listed recreational activities and from trespassing upon land surrounding the pond that is owned by the City. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court: "[The Court's] decision reflects the fact that, under the laws of this state, the recreational use of Berlin Pond is a matter of state concern requiring a resolution at the state level. . . . [The Court] determine[d] only that the City's current powers are limited to preventing trespass upon its property." View "City of Montpelier v. Barnett" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph McCarthy appealed his conviction of involuntary manslaughter. Defendant set up a dangerous shooting range on his property and invited others to join him in firing weapons at the site. An errant bullet struck and killed a neighbor in his nearby home. Defendant argued on appeal that: (1) a jury view of the scene presented misleading and prejudicial evidence and was not conducted with the necessary procedural and evidentiary safeguards; (2) the trial judge impermissibly assumed the roles of an advocate and a witness in reviewing the jury view; (3) the court erred by failing to excuse one of the jurors; and (4) his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Russell and Mary Ann Rueger and John Moyers appealed a trial courts grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Natural Resources Board and the District #9 Environmental Commission of Vermont. The matter arose from an Access to Public Records Act request. The court concluded that certain records held by Defendants reflected deliberations of an agency acting in a quasi-judicial role, and those were exempt from disclosure. Plaintiffs argued on appeal that the court erred in interpreting the Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the documents in question fell within the plain language of the Act, and were indeed exempt. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. View "Rueger v. Natural Resources Bd." on Justia Law

Juvenile Defendant A.C. appealed an adjudication of delinquency. On the basis of an incident at school, the State filed a delinquency petition against him, alleging that he engaged in open and gross lewdness and lascivious conduct towards the complaining witness, A.R. A.C. raised several evidentiary issues and argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the court's ruling. Upon review, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence to support the trial court's ruling, and affirmed the adjudication of delinquency. View "In re A.C." on Justia Law

Appellant John Madden appealed the Public Service Board's order granting a certificate of public good for Appellee Cross Pollination, Inc.'s planned construction of a solar energy farm in the Town of New Haven. Appellant claimed that the Board erred in applying 30 V.S.A. 248, which regulates the construction of electric generation facilities, and should not have issued the certificate because the solar farm will have an "undue adverse effect" on the aesthetics of the natural landscape as defined by 30 V.S.A. 248(b)(5). Appellant's issue on appeal was the Board's use of the "Quechee test" so named from the Supreme Court's decision in "In re Quechee Lakes Corp.," 580 A.2d 957 (1990)): that the Board erred in applying the Quechee test and should have concluded that under 30 V.S.A. 248(b)(5) the project would have an "undue adverse effect" on the aesthetics of the land, and as a result, no certificate of public good should have issued. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Board's findings in this case, and held that its decision was based on a correct reading of the law and is supported by its findings. View "In re Petition of Cross Pollination for a Certificate of Public Good" on Justia Law

Defendant Poulin Auto Sales appealed a trial court judgment that awarded attorney's fees under the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act (VCFA). Poulin argued that the court erred in holding it liable under the VCFA and refusing to reconsider evidence that a vehicle was sold "as is." In September 2006, Poulin purchased a 2001 Audi for $4800 at auction, where it received a clean document of title and an odometer disclosure form. Poulin brought the car to auction in January 2007 and sold it to Plaintiff Crawford Gregory. Plaintiff received a clean document of title, and Poulin certified that the odometer reading was correct at the time of sale. At resale, however, the odometer reading did not reflect the car’s actual mileage, the passenger side airbag was inoperable, and the title documents did not reflect the fact that the vehicle was previously salvaged and rebuilt. Plaintiff filed suit, and the trial court granted his motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for further findings on liability under the VCFA. On remand, both parties moved for summary judgment on the consumer fraud claim. After making further findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. In so doing, the court stated that it relied in part on the prior pleadings filed by the parties at the time of Plaintiff's original motion for summary judgment, filed in 2008, in addition to the parties' statements of undisputed facts in support of Plaintiff's renewed motion for summary judgment and Poulin's new cross-motion for summary judgment filed after remand. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that certain proffered documents were not before the trial court at either the pre- or post-remand summary judgment stages because Poulin did not attach them to either its 2008 or 2010 pleadings. Only later, when Poulin filed a motion to reconsider, were the documents attached. The court's refusal to reconsider this evidence was not an abuse of discretion, "for it was not the court's mistake that Poulin sought to correct - the court properly noted that Poulin had moved for summary judgment and could have submitted additional documents with the pleadings." View "Gregory v. Poulin Auto Sales, Inc." on Justia Law

The question before the Supreme Court was whether, and to what extent, a state's attorney was entitled to official immunity from civil liability for allegedly tortuous conduct concerning a local police officer. The trial court concluded that liability for the acts complained of was precluded by either qualified or absolute immunity, or was otherwise barred. In February 2010 when Plaintiff was employed as a police officer with the South Burlington Police Department, filed a complaint against Defendant, the Chittenden County State's Attorney, stating claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and intentional interference with Plaintiff's employment. The complaint alleged that Defendant (formerly a private lawyer and a member of what Plaintiff characterized as the Vermont "Drug Bar") harbored an animus against Plaintiff due to his police work. Plaintiff claimed that as state's attorney Defendant had "maliciously pursued a course of action . . . to undermine Plaintiff's work and credibility in the law enforcement community." As alleged in the complaint and in Plaintiff's later responses to discovery, Defendant's tortious misconduct included meeting with Plaintiff's supervisors to criticize his job performance and falsely accuse him of dishonesty; declining to file charges or seek search warrants based on Plaintiff's affidavits; threatening not to work with Plaintiff and thereby end his career if Plaintiff attempted to bypass the State's Attorney's office and obtain warrants directly from the trial court; criticizing Plaintiff's work when he was being considered by the State Police to serve on its Drug Task Force; impugning Plaintiff's honesty to other prosecutors; encouraging the filing of a civil-rights lawsuit against Plaintiff and testifying falsely in that action; and "leaking" harmful information about Plaintiff to criminal defense attorneys. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded "[t]he trial court's ruling was sound" and affirmed the trial court's ruling that the State's Attorney was entitled to absolute immunity. View "O'Connor v. Donovan" on Justia Law