Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff David Lay appealed a superior court’s order that granted summary judgment to Defendants William J. Pettengill, Elizabeth F. Novotny, and Daniel K. Troidl on his complaint. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from an internal investigation into his behavior as a state trooper and his subsequent resignation from the Vermont State Police (VSP). Plaintiff argued that the superior court erred in granting judgment to Defendants on his claims of fraudulent nondisclosure, retaliatory prosecution, malicious prosecution, and negligent referral. He also challenged several discovery rulings made by the court. Plaintiff was suspended from duty due to an ongoing investigation by the Internal Affairs Unit. He would later hire a lawyer and settle charges against him which included falsification and misuse of property and evidence; making a false statement; failing to follow-up or make reports in numerous cases; and abuse of authority for conducting a warrantless search. The Windham County State Attorney's office became involved in commencing a criminal prosecution against Plaintiff. A judge found probable cause to issue a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest. At the time the second investigation was pending, Plaintiff had found new work by a private company. He was terminated from his job as a result of the arrest warrant. Upon returning to Vermont, he was charged with numerous crimes. He reached a plea agreement. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed suit against defendants raising numerous claims, including fraudulent nondisclosure, violation of his civil rights, and malicious process. In April 2010, the court issued the summary judgment decision from which Plaintiff appealed. Finding no legal basis for Plaintiff's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court and dismissed his case. View "Lay v. Pettengill" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Andrew Kennery, on behalf of the estate of Gladys Kennery, appealed the decision of the Windham Superior Court that granted the State's motion for summary judgment on his complaint alleging negligence, gross negligence, and civil rights violations against the State, two state troopers, and the Vermont Department of Public Safety (VDPS). Plaintiff's lawsuit stemmed from a "welfare check" the troopers performed on Plaintiff's decedent, Gladys Kennery. Gladys's daughter had requested that the troopers check on her elderly mother, but the troopers searched the wrong residence. Meanwhile, Gladys had collapsed in her backyard and was unable to get back up and reach shelter. Gladys was found the next morning and died twelve days later from hypothermia caused by prolonged exposure to the cold. The superior court held that the State owed no duty of reasonable care in performing the welfare check, thereby defeating Plaintiff's claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants. Genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether a duty of care was created under the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A based upon the State's undertaking to perform the welfare check and whether the troopers breached that duty such that the State was liable under the Vermont Tort Claims Act (VTCA). The Court also held that the court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's claim of gross negligence against the troopers. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kennery v. Vermont" on Justia Law

"This is a case of avoidable error and its consequences." The Vermont League of Cities and Towns (VLCT), the workers' compensation insurance carrier for the Town of Randolph, settled a compensation claim of Claimant Stacey Colson and paid the settlement amount to the Office of Child Support pursuant to an earlier order that OCS issued to collect Claimant's back child support payments. VLCT failed to deduct the amount of an attorney's fee lien granted by the Commissioner of the Department of Labor (DOL) to claimant’s lawyer. VLCT acted with the understanding that the lawyer would not seek the fee if, as occurred, claimant was awarded a lump-sum compensation amount. The lawyer sought her fee, but VLCT resisted double paying that amount, and the dispute has ended up before the Supreme Court after two decisions from the Commissioner and one from Superior Court. Claimant appealed the Commissioner’s grant of summary judgment to VLCT, in which the Commissioner concluded that VLCT acted appropriately in paying over the entire proceeds of claimant’s workers’ compensation award to OCS. Claimant argued that his attorney's lien had priority over OCS's claim for child support arrearages. He claimed that the Commissioner's findings were incomplete and contradictory, that the Commissioner erred when she determined his attorney’s lien did not have priority, and that DOL should be compelled to enforce his attorney’s lien for fees. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the OCS lien was first in time and therefore took priority, and affirmed the Commissioner's holding that VLCT could not be required to pay the attorney's fee amount to Claimant's attorney. View "Colson v. Vermont League of Cities & Towns" on Justia Law

Mother Karen Cegalis appealed a family court's order that awarded primary custody of her five-year-old son to Father Raymond Knutsen. On appeal, Mother argued the family court made numerous errors in its decision, that the evidence could have only lead to the conclusion that she should have been awarded primary custody. Even if this was a close case, and even if inclined to reach a different result on the same facts, "[the Supreme Court] repeatedly stated . . . that [its] review of custody matters is limited, and that [the Court] must defer to the judgment of the trial court applying its own common sense and experience." Accordingly, the Court found that the evidence presented to the family court was sufficient to support the court's judgment awarding custody to the Father. View "Knutsen v. Cegalis" on Justia Law

In this termination of parental rights case, the Supreme Court considered two separate appeals pertaining to a mother’s and father’s respective rights to their two daughters, seventeen-year-old R.W. and thirteen-year-old N.W. The case presented novel jurisdictional questions because the parents and children are citizens of Sri Lanka and, although mother and the children have been residents of Vermont for a number of years, father resided in Sri Lanka and has never been to Vermont. The Department for Children and Families (DCF) petitioned to terminate both mother’s and father’s residual parental rights. The family division granted the request as to mother, but concluded it lacked personal jurisdiction over father. Mother appealed termination of her parental rights, arguing that the superior court applied the incorrect standard of proof with respect to changed circumstances and engaged in a faulty best-interests analysis. DCF filed a separate appeal as to father, arguing that even though father lacked minimum contacts with Vermont, the court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the status of his children, who were within the court’s jurisdiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the termination of parental rights was a determination of status and could be adjudicated when the forum state has a sufficient connection to the children, even absent minimum contact jurisdiction over a parent. Further, in this case, the Court held that exercise of jurisdiction was authorized by the UCCJA and was reasonable given the strong interests of the state and the children in resolution of father’s rights as well as the lack of any conflicting jurisdictional claims by another state or country. The Court affirmed the termination of the mother's parental rights. View "In re R.W. and N.W." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Celeste Puppolo, executor of the Estate of Eva Puppolo, appealed a jury verdict in favor of Defendant Donovan & O'Connor, LLC stemming from a legal malpractice action. Plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in denying a motion to withdraw her counsel, that she was denied a fair trial when the court allowed Defendant’s attorney to testify to the merits of the underlying medical malpractice action, and that the trial court improperly admitted expert testimony that exceeded the scope of the defendant’s expert disclosure. Plaintiff's was unpersuaded by the results of investigations into the death of her aunt Eva, and consulted with Defendant about bringing a wrongful death and survivorship claim against the aunt's nursing home and attending physicians. In light of the autopsy report, and the conclusions of the police, Defendant declined to take the case. Defendant told Plaintiff that the limitations period for the survival action began to accrue when she was appointed executor of the estate. Defendant conceded that this statement was incorrect and that the limitations period had actually begun to accrue two months earlier, when the original executor was appointed. Defendant also conceded that it failed to specifically notify Plaintiff of the two year limitations period for the wrongful death action. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the home and physicians through another attorney. Both claims were dismissed on summary judgment as time-barred. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against Defendant, claiming that her reliance on its legal advice deprived her of the opportunity to pursue the wrongful death and survivorship claims for her aunt's death. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its decisions in Plaintiff's case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the jury verdict against Plaintiff. View "Puppolo v. Donovan & O'Connor, LLC" on Justia Law

The parties in this case separately appealed the trial court order that awarded damages in excess of $78,000 to Plaintiff SEC America (SEC). Defendant Marine Electric Systems, Inc. (MES) contended the court erred in: (1) failing to reduce the damage award for partial payment; (2) granting an award for lost profits; and (3) relying on inadmissible evidence. SEC asserts the court erred in concluding that it acted unreasonably in failing to mitigate damages. This case arose out of a transaction to supply an electrical component for installation in jamming devices to be used by NATO forces in Afghanistan to disrupt the remote detonation of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). MES placed an order for power converters for its devices. SEC made a partial shipment of the converters, and continued working on the remaining units. MES' contract with NATO had collapsed, and MES' customer who promised to purchase the completed jammers reneged on its promise. MES sued its client and ultimately reached a settlement. None of the proceeds from the settlement went to SEC. Subsequently SEC filed suit against MES for breach of contract. Following a bench trial, the court found in SEC's favor. MES appealed, and SEC filed a cross-appeal. MES argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in arriving at the proper amount of damages owed to SEC. Finding "no clear error to compel reversal of the judgment," the Court affirmed the trial court. View "SEC America, LLC v. Marine Electric Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant William Therrien Jr. appealed the civil suspension of his driver’s license and his conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI). Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress all evidence obtained after administration of a preliminary breath test (PBT) because the State failed to prove that defendant voluntarily consented to take the PBT. The record reflected that the arresting trooper put the machine in front of Defendant and told Defendant to take the test. He also provided Defendant with instructions on how to proceed. The trooper did not ask Defendant if he consented to take the test or advise defendant that he had a right to refuse. The court found that Defendant did not think he had a choice and therefore provided a sample of his breath. The PBT indicated that defendant’s blood alcohol was above the legal limit. The Supreme Court "look[ed] no further than the plain language of the statute to conclude that when an officer has a reasonable suspicion of DUI, he may 'request' that the suspect provide a breath sample, but not order such participation." The Court concluded that the trooper omitting the formal "request" was harmless error and affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Therrien" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Kenvin appealed a district court's judgment that required him to pay restitution and sentenced him to a twelve month term in jail. Following a car accident that resulted in a fatality, a jury convicted defendant of negligent operation of a motor vehicle. On appeal, he contended the trial court erred in ordering him to pay restitution where: (1) the State failed to establish the amount of loss by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) the State failed to show that the loss was the direct result of the crime committed or that the decedent’s family members were the direct victims of the crime; and (3) the court failed to make findings regarding his ability to pay. Defendant also contended the trial court erred in sentencing him to eleven to twelve months to serve because a sentence with a gap of thirty days between the minimum and maximum term is a fixed sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court "recognize[d] that the decedent’s family members have suffered greatly. The decedent, however, was the sole victim of defendant’s crime for consideration of restitution. Under statute, any restitution award must be limited to the material losses that the decedent incurred as a direct result of defendant’s crime." Here, the only loss included in the restitution orders, according to the State’s description, was the medical bill not covered by insurance. The Court reversed the district court's order pertaining to the calculation of restitution. On all other matters, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Kenvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs James and Heidi Glassford, who brought suit to obtain compensation for an allegedly negligent home inspection, appealed a superior court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of home inspector Defendants The BrickKicker and GDM Home Services, Inc. (a franchisee of BrickKicker) based on the terms of a binding arbitration agreement in the parties' contract. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the superior court erred in rejecting Plaintiffs' contention that the terms of the home inspection contract were unconscionable under the common law and unfair and deceptive under Vermont’s Consumer Fraud Act (CFA). Upon review of the contract in question, as well as the superior court record, the Supreme Court found the contractual provisions limiting liability to the cost of the inspection and yet requiring arbitration that would necessarily cost more than the amount of the liability limit unconscionable. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court’s decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Glassford v. BrickKicker" on Justia Law