Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This is Defendant Robert O'Connor's second appeal in a partition action brought by his former girlfriend Plaintiff Debra Whippie to resolve the parties' respective interests in a house they held as tenants-in-common. The parties had had a ten-year relationship and two children together when they purchased a single-family residence together in 2002. Both parties were obligated on the mortgage, and both their names appeared on the deed. In the beginning, the parties agreed to share expenses equally; however, Plaintiff stopped paying her share of expenses in early 2003. She sought public sale of the property and an equitable division of the proceeds. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's findings that Plaintiff initially acquired an equal share in the property, that she ceased contributing to expenses in early 2003, and that Defendant's letter of no-trespass excluded her from the property. The Court remanded for an accounting of the parties' interests in the property based on their relative contributions, directing the trial court to determine the parties' shares and instructing the court not to credit Plaintiff for certain expenses. On remand, the trial court reconsidered the issues without an evidentiary hearing. The court granted Plaintiff an offset representing half of the rental value for the period of ouster and 61% of the property's value. Defendant then appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that Defendant was entitled to compensation for half of the maintenance costs he paid for the entire period, even after the ouster. On second remand, the trial court was directed to determine the value of Defendant's expenditures on maintenance costs for the period of September 2004 to September 2007. Half of this amount should be deducted from Plaintiff's share. Her share should then be credited with the already determined rental value for the ouster period. View "Whippie v. O'Connor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Terrance White appealed a superior court's order in his wrongful death action that granted summary judgment to Defendant Fletcher Allen Health Care, Inc. This case arose from the suicide of Plaintiff's fourteen-year-old daughter. Plaintiff sued Defendant, which employed a psychiatrist who was briefly involved with the decedent's case through a telepsychiatry research study. Plaintiff argued that summary judgment was improperly granted on the issue of the duty owed to decedent by the psychiatrist. Ultimately, the trial court found that the psychiatrist's contact with decedent was "so minimal as to not establish a physician-patient relationship," and consequently found that no duty existed at the time of decedent's death. Even assuming that a doctor-patient relationship was established, the court concluded that it was terminated following the video-conference and, thus, any duty was extinguished by termination of the relationship and no duty existed at the time of decedent's death. The court thus granted defendant's summary judgment motion. Plaintiff argued that the court erred in finding that the doctor owed no duty to decedent. They maintained that the doctor had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect decedent from the danger she posed to herself, and that the doctor did not effectively terminate the doctor-patient relationship prior to decedent's death. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Plaintiff and thus reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for additional proceedings. View "White v. Harris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Natalie Billings appealed a family court's final judgment order in favor of her husband Jireh Billings, Sr.  Plaintiff argued on appeal: (1) the family court abused its discretion by granting husband's motion in limine excluding evidence of any revocable trusts or wills under which he may be a beneficiary; (2) the family court abused its discretion when it refused to include as marital property suitable for distribution two irrevocable trusts of which husband is a beneficiary; and (3) the family court abused its discretion by nullifying husband's maintenance arrearage of $8,312.74.  Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the family court's decision with regard to the distribution of property and the maintenance award. The Court affirmed the family court on all other issues. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Billings v. Billings" on Justia Law

John Pegues (Father) appealed a family court's denial of his motion to reinstate parent-child contact with his daughter following a voluntary suspension of such contact due to an allegation of child sexual abuse.  Father and Ann Marie DeSantis (Mother) were married in 1991, adopted their daughter in 1996, and separated in 2004. The parties worked out an informal visitation schedule, though there was no overnight contact due to Mother's concerns about Father's drinking. Mother was also concerned about Father's "physical boundary" issues: the level of play between Father and the daughter and its intensity became a source of concern for Mother. For two years following the divorce, that "play" would ultimately end in allegations of sexual abuse against Father. In 2006, Father was charged with felony aggravated sexual assault of his daughter.  After an eighteen-month investigation, the state dismissed the charges with prejudice.  Father moved to dissolve an interim suspension order in July 2008. The family court concluded that the effect of abuse on daughter and on her relationship with father was "the most critical factor in this case," and that it was not in the daughter's best interest to have visitation with her Father. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the family court's finding of sexual abuse by a preponderance of the evidence was insufficient to support the family court's order that effectively terminated Father's parental rights.  The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "DeSantis v. Pegues" on Justia Law

Tinotenda Rutanhira (Father) appealed a family division order awarding Sara Rutanhira (Mother) primary legal rights and responsibilities for the parties' daughter based on the court's conclusion that Father exercised poor judgment in desiring to take his daughter to his birth country, Zimbabwe.  On appeal, Father contended that the trial court abused its discretion by considering evidence outside of the proceeding.  He also challenged the court's finding that he planned to leave daughter in Zimbabwe while he traveled to South Africa and claimed the court erred when it considered testimony regarding his desire to travel to Zimbabwe because of an earlier stipulated agreement between the parties.  Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in relying on evidence gathered outside the proceeding, which Father did not have an opportunity to contest. The Court reversed and remanded the case for the family court to rehear this matter. View "Rutanhira v. Rutanhira" on Justia Law

Margaret Chickanosky appealed a family court order granting Michael Chickanosky sole physical and legal rights and responsibilities over their child. On appeal, the mother contended that: (1) the family court's findings and legal conclusions are inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial and are based on inadmissible evidence; (2) the family court erred in failing to consider her argument that father's reason for moving should be considered when deciding whether there has been a change in circumstance, such that the co-parent's rights to physical custody are reduced; and (3) the family court erred in failing to consider her argument that mother should maintain physical custody when father decided to move and mother had the majority of physical custody. Upon review of the family court record, the Supreme Court found that the family court concluded that the father should have been awarded primary physical rights and responsibilities because "this would best allow daughter to maintain relationships with both parents and families and develop independence and autonomy. We will not overturn such an award when, as here, it reflects the sound judgment of the family court in light of the evidence." View "Chickanosky v. Chickanosky" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute over an administrative amendment to the master development plan for Killington Resort Village granted to its co-applicants, the current owners of Killington Resort Village and SP Land Company. The District One Environmental Commission originally granted this administrative amendment authorizing the creation of fifteen subdivided lots over approximately 368 acres of Killington Resort Village for transfer to SP Land Company for "future development purposes" pursuant to Act 250 Rule 34(D). Mountainside Properties, LLC, an adjoining property owner, appealed the Environmental Court's denial of its motion to alter and amend the grant of summary judgment in favor of SP Land. Mountainside argued that the Environmental Court erred because: (1) administrative amendments under Rule 34(D) require an underlying Act 250 land use permit, and (2) co-applicants' fifteen-lot subdivision cannot be approved without demonstrating compliance with all Act 250 criteria under 10 V.S.A. 6086(a), as required by 10 V.S.A. 6081(a). Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Mountainside's argument and reversed the Environmental Court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re SP Land Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant Diana Charland appealed her sentence following her jury conviction on a charge of driving while intoxicated (DWI), third or subsequent offense.  She argued that the trial court improperly enhanced her sentence, without advance notice to her, based on its unsupported assumptions that her husband gave perjured testimony at her trial and that she suborned that false testimony.  Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "[a]lthough we have addressed each of defendant's arguments, we acknowledge that the United States Supreme Court held in 'Dunnigan' that when a defendant objects to sentence enhancement resulting from the court's conclusion that the defendant committed perjury at trial, the trial court 'must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice, or an attempt to do the same, under the perjury definition we have set out.'  In this case, the trial court made no findings meeting the standards of Dunnigan.  The court concluded that defendant had suborned her husband's perjured trial testimony, but offered no rationale for that conclusion other than that it was obvious.  While defendant's failure to object meant that the Dunnigan findings requirement was not triggered, we do not suggest that the court's bare conclusion would have been sufficient if there had been an objection.  We affirm on this record because the record demonstrates that the court could reach the conclusion that it did." View "Vermont v. Charland" on Justia Law

Defendant Rebecca Wetter was charged with and convicted of three counts of endeavoring to incite a felony and one count of conspiracy.  The charges were based on allegations that Defendant and her daughter Jennifer desired to have Defendant's husband killed, and had asked several mutual friends if they would commit the murder or find someone else who would. Defendant contended that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing a detective to testify regarding the contents of a telephone conversation between Defendant and an informant which the detective listened to over a speaker phone with the informant's knowledge.  Defendant also argued it was error in the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the defense of renunciation, and that the court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence without holding an evidentiary hearing.  Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error committed by the trial court, and affirmed Defendant's convictions. View "Vermont v. Wetter" on Justia Law

The issue on this appeal centers on who should bear responsibility for the cost of cleaning up petroleum contamination caused by releases from a gas station's underground storage tanks. The controversy in this appeal was between the State of Vermont, which runs the Vermont Petroleum Cleanup Fund (VPCF) and Stonington Insurance Co. (Stonington), which insured Bradford Oil, the owner of the underground storage tanks, for approximately a three-and-a-half-year period. The State appealed the trial court's judgment limiting Stonington's liability to a 4/27 share of past and future cleanup costs and awarded the State $45,172.05. On appeal, the State argued: (1) the Supreme Court's application of time-on-the-risk allocation in "Towns v. Northern Security Insurance Co." did not preclude joint and several liability under all standard occurrence-based policy language; (2) the circumstances here, including the reasonable expectations of the insured and the equity and policy considerations, support imposing joint and several liability on Stonington for all of the State's VPCF expenditures; and (3) even if time-on-the-risk allocation would otherwise be appropriate, Stonington was not entitled to such allocation because it failed to show sufficient facts to apply this allocation method in this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "Towns" was the controlling case law here, and the Court was unconvinced by the State's reasonable expectations, equity, and policy arguments to distinguish the "Towns" decision. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Bradford Oil Co. v. Stonington Insurance Co." on Justia Law