Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal stemmed from a written agreement between the City of Rutland and the Vermont Swim Association (VSA) that granted VSA the right to host its annual swim meet at a facility in a city park. VSA appealed the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the City. Because the plain language of the parties' contract did not require VSA to pay attorney's fees incurred by the City in pursuing either indemnity from VSA or other third-party actions, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Southwick v. City of Rutland" on Justia Law

Defendant Yai Bol appealed his conviction for giving false information to a police officer and possession of cocaine. He argued that the trial court erred by preventing his counsel from using a peremptory challenge to strike a black member of the jury pool. After it was seated and the trial conducted, the jury acquitted Defendant of the assault charges but convicted him of providing false information to a police officer and possession of cocaine. On appeal, Defendant contended that the trial court misstated federal constitutional jurisprudence in maintaining that the United States Supreme Court had ruled it impermissible to strike the sole black juror from the venire without stating a reason. He concluded that the court's erroneous denial of his peremptory challenge should result in a new trial because this ruling denied him a fair trial. Having found that the court erred in barring Defendant's peremptory challenge, the Supreme Court turned to the question of appropriate remedy: "[i]t is settled Vermont law that when a defendant is left with an undesired juror after exhausting his peremptory challenges in response to the trial court's failure to remove a juror properly challenged for cause, the court's error is reversible error." The Court remanded the case for a new trial. View "Vermont v. Bol" on Justia Law

This case originated from a quiet-title action by Defendant Richard Rupe and his father, Michael C. Rupe, who laid claim to certain mineral rights by way of adverse possession. Plaintiff Gary Rupe, Richard's brother, subsequently asserted his own claim to the mineral rights in question, and the probate court granted him a one-third interest in the rights.  Defendant and his father appealed the probate decision to the superior court, which, after first granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on certain issues, ultimately dismissed plaintiff's claim to the mineral rights and awarded all rights, title, and interest to Defendant. Plaintiff appealed the superior court judgment, arguing: (1) the court exceeded its authority by considering more than the issues raised in the statement of questions submitted on appeal from the probate court; (2) the court misstated the elements of proof for adverse possession and misapplied the law; (3) the court erred in failing to find adverse possession through co-tenancy; and (4) the court erred in its requirements relating to a claim of unjust enrichment. Taking each in turn, the Supreme Court reviewed the superior court record and affirmed its decision with respect to all of Plaintiff's issues on appeal. View "In re The Estates of Herbert Allen, Edward Allen and Edna Allen " on Justia Law

Respondent Alan Cote appealed a family court's garnishment order that directed the Social Security Administration to withhold his Social Security benefits to offset alimony arrearages. On appeal, Respondent contended that the garnishment order violated a provision of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act which imposes a cap on the percentage of aggregate disposable earnings that any court, state or federal, may garnish. While the trial court garnished only Respondent's Social Security disability benefits and not his veterans' disability benefits, the court did include the latter in its calculation of aggregate disposable earnings.  This broad calculation of disposable earning increased the percentage of Respondent's Social Security payments subject to garnishment.  Respondent contended that as defined and excluded from such a calculation by federal law, his particular veterans' disability benefits were not to be counted as earnings because they were not paid for a service related disability and are not received in lieu of retirement payments to which he would otherwise be entitled as earnings.  Upon review of the lower court's record and calculations, the Supreme Court agreed, reversed the lower court's order and remanded the case for recalculation of the garnishment. View "Cote v. Cote" on Justia Law

Petitioner Carlema (Limoggio) Iannarone appealed a family court's order that denied her motion to enforce the property division set forth in her and her ex-husband Robert Limoggio's original divorce decree. She contended the court abused its discretion by failing to enforce a provision requiring payment of $150,000 for the marital home and by failing to exercise its equitable power to impose a constructive trust on the home. Upon review of the lower court record and the divorce decree at issue, the Supreme Court concluded that Ms. Iannarone's claims were precluded by res judicata and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Iannarone v. Limoggio" on Justia Law

Defendant Trevor Herrick was convicted by a jury on second-degree murder charges and sentenced to twenty-two years to life.  Defendant was romantically involved with the victim's wife, and fatally stabbed the victim following a verbal and physical altercation. As the jury entered the courtroom to be sworn, three people walked in wearing t-shirts memorializing the victim.  Following voir dire, Defendant moved for mistrial, which the trial court denied.  On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury to consider his individual characteristics in connection with its "adequate provocation" charge for the mitigating defense of "passion-provocation manslaughter," and that the court erred in denying Defendant's motion for mistrial when the jury was exposed to potentially prejudicial extraneous influence by the t-shirts. Upon review of the trial court's record, the Supreme Court found that the trial court effectively concluded that the potential jurors did not demonstrate a state of mind inconsistent with deciding the case fairly: "[i]t made this decision based on its individual voir dire of the prospective jurors, none of whom stated that he or she would be unable to remain impartial.  The trial court is in a unique position to evaluate juror bias, and we defer to its conclusions." With regard to the trial court's ruling to the "adequate provocation" defense, the Court found the jury instructions "track[ed] our case law…and are not plain error." The Court affirmed the lower court's decisions and Defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Herrick" on Justia Law

This appeal represented "the latest skirmish" in a long-running dispute over plans to develop a Wal-Mart discount retail store on an undeveloped 100-acre parcel of land in the Town of St. Albans. Appellants were interested individuals and groups opposed to the project. They appealed an Environmental Court decision that granted the site plan, conditional use, subdivision, and Act 250 permits for the development. They contended the trial court erred in: (1) approving site plan and conditional use permits despite the alleged conflict of interest of several members of the Town's development review board; (2) finding that the subdivision was compatible with adjacent land uses; and (3) concluding that the developer could reapply for an Act 250 permit despite an earlier denial.  Upon review of the lower court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.   View "In re JLD Properties of St. Albans, LLC" on Justia Law

This case was an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of Appellant RBS Citizens, N.A.'s motion for a writ of attachment to Appellee Jan Ouhrabka's property, which Appellee owned jointly with his wife as tenants by entirety.  The trial court held that a creditor like RBS cannot attach property owned jointly by a debtor and a nondebtor when they hold that property as tenants by entirety.  RBS contended on appeal that the estate of tenancy by entirety is an anachronism whose continuing utility should be reconsidered.  In the alternative, RBS argued that Vermont law did not explicitly preclude granting a creditor prejudgment attachment where the property is held jointly by the debtor and a nondebtor in a tenancy by entirety.  Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court disagreed with RBS' argument and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "RBS Citizens, N.A. v. Ouhrabka" on Justia Law

The question before the Court in this case was what style of civil discourse may constitute "threatening behavior."  Defendant Jason Sanville appealed a trial court's revocation of his probation for violating a condition that read, "Violent or threatening behavior is not allowed at any time."  He contended that he could not have violated the condition because his only action was speaking with no accompanying physical conduct.  In December 2008, while Defendant was on probation, his mother entered into a rental agreement for the lease of a mobile home. Defendant, with the landlord's knowledge, lived in the trailer with his mother and performed some repairs on the property in lieu of a portion of the rent.  In March 2009, the landlord claimed that some rent was past due and that Defendant had failed to complete some of the agreed-upon repairs.  Defendant disputed those claims, at times suggesting he would destroy the mobile home, undo the repairs he had made, and, on at least one occasion, saying he was going "to kick [landlord and her husband's] butts."  At no time, however, did he approach or make a physical gesture towards the landlord.  Upon review of the revocation record and applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court did not question "the trial court's findings that defendant had a testy relationship with his landlord and made disrespectful comments to her and her husband on several occasions.  But the conclusion that his choice of words to express his anger and frustration violated his conditions of probation was erroneous.  Defendant's comments to his landlord push the boundaries of appropriate behavior for someone in the process of criminal rehabilitation, but it cannot be said that he was fairly informed that such bluster would result in his loss of freedom the condition is simply too vague." The Court reversed the revocation of Defendant's parole because its conditions failed to thoroughly apprise Defendant of the conduct prohibited. View "Vermont v. Sanville" on Justia Law

This case concerns a construction contract dispute between contractor Trombly Plumbing & Heating and homeowners Edward Quinn, Thomas Quinn, and Regina Gority ("Homeowners"). In the summer of 2007, Trombly and the Homeowners agreed that Trombly would perform services relating to the heating and hot water systems of Homeowners' residential vacation property. Between November 2007 and February 2008, Homeowners experienced a number of problems with the home that they attributed to Trombly's work, such as pipes freezing and furnaces shutting down and leaking.  Trombly brought an initial action for breach of contract and violation of the Prompt Payment Act (9 V.S.A. 4001-4009) seeking the balance due plus the cost of collection.  The Homeowners counterclaimed for breach of contract, negligence, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, and consumer fraud.  They sought actual and punitive damages, as well as litigation costs. The trial court ultimately decided that Trombly could not recover from the Homeowners and the Homeowners could not recover from Trombly, and each party would bear its own costs and fees.  The court found that the Homeowners were not liable to Trombly for anything beyond what they had already paid because the work "was not well done," there were many problems with the work, and the problems were not resolved until another plumber came to fix them.  The court thus found the Homeowners to be the prevailing parties on Trombly's claims because Trombly did not prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence.  As Trombly did not prevail on the merits of the case, the court found there could be no award of attorney's fees.  The court also dismissed all of the Homeowners' counterclaims.  It found that the evidence submitted was insufficient, given that there was no testimony from anyone who did repair work about the problems that had to be corrected or whether the amounts paid for corrective work were fair and reasonable. On appeal, Trombly argued the trial court erred by: (1) improperly placing the burden of proof on contractor with respect to homeowners' defenses and making insufficient findings to support its decision, and (2) improperly applying the "substantially prevailing party" standard under the Prompt Payment Act.  Homeowners cross-appealed, arguing the trial court erred in finding that homeowners were not qualified to offer testimony as to damages for the corrective work performed.  Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision with regard to all issues brought on appeal. View "Trombly Plumbing & Heating v. Quinn" on Justia Law