Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Isaac Faham appealed his conviction of attempted sexual assault after a jury trial. On appeal, Defendant made two arguments: (1) the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of attempted sexual assault; and (2) the trial court unconstitutionally denied him the opportunity to present a complete and adequate defense by precluding him from introducing evidence of complainant’s prior drug use.  Upon review of the briefs submitted by the parties and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that at no point in his post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal did Defendant argue that the State presented insufficient evidence on the element of attempting to engage in a sexual act.  Because this issue was unpreserved, the Court did not reach it. With regard to his second issue on appeal, Defendant maintained that the excluded evidence was relevant to his defense that complainant fabricated the sexual assault complaint in retaliation for Defendant denying her access to drugs and then abandoning her in Charlotte.  Defendant asserted that the trial court’s exclusion of this evidence violated the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution by denying him the right to present a complete defense and to confront witnesses against him.  The Supreme Court concluded that Defendant’s proffers were insufficient to sustain his challenge to the trial court’s ruling. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Faham" on Justia Law

In this dispute between neighboring landowners, Defendants-Neighbors Demetrios and Alexandria Michaelides and Erwin and Ramona Waibel appealed a superior court order that rejected their claim that Plaintiff Jonathan Tibbetts violated a deed restriction limiting the number of houses to be constructed on his property.  Among other claims, Defendants contended the trial court erred in concluding that they lacked standing to enforce the restriction. When Plaintiff attempted to sell the property in question in 2005, the potential buyers discovered a five-house restriction in the deed between the previous original grantor and grantee and required consent of the owners of the five other houses as a condition of the sale.  Defendants refused to consent, and Plaintiff thereupon filed the underlying declaratory judgment action to clear the property of the restriction and obtain marketable title. Defendants answered and counterclaimed for a declaration that Plaintiff's residence violated the deed restriction and an injunction requiring its removal. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  In March 2010, the trial court issued a written ruling in favor of Plaintiff.  The court concluded that the five-house restriction in the original grantor-grantee deed was intended to benefit the land retained by the previous grantee-owner, and that Neighbors therefore lacked standing to enforce it.  The court issued a final judgment order in May 2010 and denied a motion for reconsideration the following July.  Upon review of the deed and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and affirmed its decision.  View "Tibbetts v. Michaelides" on Justia Law

This case arose out of relationships among three women: the victim, "Amy", and Defendant Lisa Lampman.  Amy and the victim were romantically involved for two and a half years.  After that relationship ended, Amy moved in with Defendant.  In January 2009, the three women encountered each other in a gas station parking lot where a fight ensued.  Four individuals were criminally charged as a result of the fight: Defendant, Amy, Nathan (Amy's son), and Anthony.  The proprietor of the gas station witnessed the victim being beaten and trying to defend herself.  Amy stated that she observed Defendant deliver a "football style kick" to the victim's face.  Throughout trial, Defendant maintained that the victim was the instigator, starting the fight by pushing Amy and that Defendant had merely acted in self defense.  Defense counsel objected a question posed to one of the witnesses, to which the trial court responded, "I'm finding independently that there was a conspiracy, at least an implicit conspiracy to beat up [the victim]," thus overruling defendant's objection. Defendant made no objection to this ruling at trial, nor did she request a limiting instruction or move for a mistrial.  Further, she did not raise any issue with the court's statement in her motion for a new trial.  However, on appeal, Defendant argued that by finding a conspiracy, the judge usurped the jury's role as fact finder on the ultimate issue of self-defense and deprived her of the right to a trial by jury.  Upon review of the trial record and briefs submitted in this case, the Supreme Court found that because this claim was argued for the first time in this appeal, Defendant failed to preserve her claim of error. With regard to other issues Defendant raised on appeal, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and that Defendant's conviction was supported by the evidence presented at trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Vermont v. Lampman" on Justia Law

Defendant Elliott Russell appealed his jury conviction for aggravated assault, arguing: (1) it was an error to admit certain correspondence he sent while incarcerated because its content was irrelevant and prejudicial; (2) the evidence presented was not sufficient to support a jury verdict of guilty; and (3) the court's denial of his request for a jury charge on the lesser offense of simple assault was in error.  This case arose from a 2007 incident at bar in Bennington where Defendant was drinking with a group of companions, including Henry Dummeyer.  The victim and his friend, Felix Rivera, were also drinking in the pub.  Defendant and Dummeyer were smoking outside the pub when Dummeyer's girlfriend told them that the victim had made an upsetting comment directed at her. When Dummeyer and Defendant confronted the men, Dummeyer began yelling about the victim's behavior toward his girlfriend.  As they exchanged angry words back and forth, Defendant and the victim became engaged in a physical altercation. The two men separated, and Rivera saw the victim holding his stomach and defendant with a knife in his hand.  The victim came to Rivera's aid, kicking Defendant out of the way, at which point defendant left the scene.  Dummeyer began physically attacking the victim who tried to fight back while exclaiming "I've been stabbed."  At some point Dummeyer too left the scene.  Rivera contacted emergency services while driving the victim to the hospital and indicated the victim had started the fight.  At the hospital, doctors treated the victim for injuries to the head, chest, and abdomen, consistent with stab wounds. Aggravated assault requires specific intent to harm.  To that end, the State sought to introduce certain letters defendant wrote before the altercation in which he threatened another victim. Over defendant's objections, the court allowed portions of the letters to be read at trial.  The jury found Defendant guilty of aggravated assault, and Defendant appealed. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found the admission of the letters probative with regard to Defendant's intent to harm. Further, the Court was "unconvinced that the evidence reasonably supported an instruction" for the lesser offense of simple assault. Under these circumstances, the evidence did not reasonably support an instruction on simple assault.  The Court found trial court's determination was therefore proper. View "Vermont v. Russell" on Justia Law

Defendant Applejack Art Partners, Inc., appealed a trial court enforcing an arbitration award and entered judgment in Plaintiff Albert Stephens, III's favor for $1,538,164.50 plus interest. Plaintiff began working with the company in September 2006 and subsequently invested $1,125,000 in the company in exchange for stock shares.  In April 2008, Applejack terminated plaintiff's employment.  Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants Applejack, Jack P. Appelman, Aaron S. Young, and William Colvin (collectively, Applejack) and Applejack counterclaimed.  Applejack also sought an order enforcing its right to repurchase Plaintiff's stock.  The parties engaged in binding arbitration and following four days of evidentiary hearings, the arbitrator issued his decision.  He found that in October 2006, plaintiff executed an employment contract, stock purchase agreement, and shareholders' agreement.  Pursuant to the stockholder's agreement, the executive stockholders had the right to buy out plaintiff's shares in the event that plaintiff's employment was terminated.  The agreement identified a specific formula for valuing the stock shares and allowed for Applejack to either pay for the stock in full or provide a 10% down payment and a promissory note for payment of the balance in three equal annual installments, plus interest. Plaintiff refused to sell his stock, in part because he misunderstood the terms of the stock purchase agreement.  An arbitrator concluded that Applejack had the right to buy the shares, and it ordered Plaintiff to transfer his stock into an escrow account, pending full performance of all payment obligations. Applejack did not meet its obligation on the first payment and Plaintiff brought an enforcement action.  Plaintiff sought both a judgment confirming the arbitration award as well as an immediate judgment for all amounts awarded by the arbitrator due to Applejack's default.  The court granted Plaintiff's request.  It found that Applejack's default went to the essence of the arbitrator's award and that Applejack could not now resort to the terms of the promissory note to delay its payments. Applejack argued on appeal that the court should have remanded this case to the arbitrator for clarification, although it was not clear what part of the award Applejack believed was ambiguous.  Applejack also suggested (apparently for the first time on appeal) that notwithstanding the arbitrator's decision Plaintiff should simply keep the stock shares because Applejack was unable to pay for them.  Finally, Applejack asserted that the court erred in ordering full payment of the award suggesting that by doing so, the court modified the arbitration award under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) without authority to do so.  It also argued that there was no clear basis for accelerating the payments due. Upon review of the arbitration record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court nor from the arbitration proceedings and affirmed the decision against Applejack: [t]he court imposed an appropriate remedy for Applejack's default, and there was no error." View "Stephens III v. Applejack Art Partners, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a 180-foot telecommunications tower in the town of Hardwick would have an undue adverse effect on the aesthetics of the area in violation of Criterion 8 of Act 250.  Neighboring landowners appealed the issuance of an Act 250 land-use permit for the project.  Specifically, they contested (1) whether the project violated a clear, written community standard intended to preserve the aesthetics of the area, and (2) whether a reduction of the tower's height was a mitigating step that the developer should have taken to improve the harmony of the project with its surroundings.  Upon review of the briefs submitted by all interested parties and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Environmental Division of the Superior Court that determined that the tower would not have an undue adverse effect under Criterion 8. View "In re Rinkers, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant David Boglioli appealed his conviction for voluntary manslaughter and raised multiple grounds for reversal.  Among them, Defendant alleged he was denied a fair trial when he was precluded from presenting evidence of the victim's threats against others.  Defendant claimed reversible error on various theories regarding the jury instructions.  He also argued that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the verdict of guilty for voluntary manslaughter and that this verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.  Prior to the killing, Defendant and his victim had a history.  The two were neighbors and the victim made a habit of tormenting Defendant.  According to the evidence presented at trial, the victim physically assaulted defendant on numerous occasions and shot projectiles at defendant's home including BBs, darts, pellets, rocks, and bullets.  He also threatened to kill and hurt Defendant and verbally harassed him. Defendant raised the affirmative defense of self-defense.  The State requested a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, which the trial court granted over Defendant's objection.  The jury convicted defendant of voluntary manslaughter. Upon review of all of the issues Defendant raised on appeal, the Supreme Court took all in turn and affirmed the trial court's decision in its entirety. View "Vermont v. Boglioli" on Justia Law

In this complaint for review of governmental action under Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure 75, Plaintiff-inmate Brian LeClair appealed a superior court's refusal to order the Department of Corrections to give him double credit for time served in a correctional facility after his furlough status was improperly revoked.  In November 2006, Plaintiff was charged with burglary. This charge was based on an incident that occurred in April 2004, before Plaintiff's conviction on previous charges.  The new charge arose when DNA evidence connected Plaintiff to the earlier offense.  At the time of the new charge, Plaintiff had completed his minimum, but not his maximum, sentence.  Although he was on conditional reentry furlough when the new charge was filed, he was incarcerated for what was to be a short period of time for violating the terms of his conditional reentry furlough agreement.  When the new charge was filed, however, the Department revoked Plaintiff's furlough status, and he remained incarcerated.  Independent of his furlough revocation, Plaintiff was held for lack of bail on the new charge. In an August 2007 decision, the superior court ruled that because the sole basis of the revocation was plaintiff's alleged violation of his promise in the furlough agreement not to commit any illegal act, his furlough status had been improperly revoked based on an incident that occurred before he signed the agreement. Plaintiff filed a complaint for review of governmental action under Rule 75, arguing that the Department was compelled to award him credit for the 279 days between the revocation of his furlough and his conviction on the new burglary charge not only against his original sentences, but also against his sentence on the new charge.  In a May 2010 decision, the superior court ruled that plaintiff was not entitled to double credit for those 279 days, notwithstanding the fact that his furlough status had been improperly revoked. According to the State, the expiration of Plaintiff's underlying sentences and his acceptance into drug court on the most recent charge means that the Supreme Court's decision on the merits of Plaintiff's appeal would have no impact on Plaintiff, and thus there is no live controversy.  Plaintiff responded that a live controversy continued to exist because, if the Court found in his favor in this appeal, his maximum sentence would be considered completed in February 2010, before the latest charge, and thus he could receive credit against any new sentence for the time he spent in custody after the new charge was filed. Upon review, the Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff's appeal as moot. View "In re LeClair" on Justia Law

Appellant, Testator Orville Tucker's daughter, sought to reverse a trial court judgment that declined to admit Testator's purported last will and testament to probate.  This judgment followed a trial by jury, which rendered a special verdict that found Testator lacked testamentary capacity.  Appellant raised various issues relating to the burden of proof, the use of the doctrine of suspicious circumstances, the jury instructions, and the denial of post-judgment motions.  Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that all of Appellant's claims were moot or unpreserved, and accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "In re Estate of Orville Tucker" on Justia Law

On the afternoon of June 5, 2009, Defendant Theodore de Macedo Soares was stopped on Interstate 91 and issued a citation for speeding.  The citation stated that Defendant was traveling eighty miles per hour in a sixty-five-mile-per-hour speed zone.  The citation further stated that the accused could either pay the specified waiver amount or challenge the ticket. For the latter, if the prosecution proved its case, any fine within the specified penalty range could be imposed.  The citation noted that the waiver amount plus $50 for court costs is commonly assessed following a hearing.  The citation indicated a waiver amount of $140 and a penalty range from $36 to $1186. Defendant elected to contest the ticket at a judicial bureau hearing.  At the hearing, Defendant did not testify but cross-examined the state trooper who had cited him for speeding.  At the close of the hearing, the hearing officer upheld the citation and fined defendant $140 plus $50 for court costs, noting that defendant had been stopped for speeding nine times.  Defendant appealed to the district court, which upheld the judicial bureau's judgment.  The Supreme Court then granted defendant's request for permission to appeal. Defendant first argued that the traffic citation was unconstitutional because: (1) the penalty range applies only when a defendant chose to maintain a constitutionally protected right to challenge the citation; (2) the $50 in court costs is assessed only if a defendant is found guilty following a hearing; (3) the waiver amount is an improper incentive to settle that chills a defendant's right to challenge a citation; (4) the solicitation of a guilty plea violates the principle of a presumption of innocence; and (5) the process for issuing a citation does not assure a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court found "no constitutional violation and no merit to these arguments." The Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Vermont v. de Macedo Soares" on Justia Law