Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Linda Nordlund appealed a grant of summary judgment by the Superior Court, Environmental Division (Environmental Court) in favor of Defendants Elizabeth Van Nostrand, and Mark and Nancy Van Nostrand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff owned property that abuts the Van Nostrand property. The Van Nostrand property runs behind and is contiguous with both the Nordlund and front parcels. The back parcel does not border a public road. These parcels have been the subject of numerous proceedings. In a 2006 quiet title action, the superior court determined that the Nordlund parcel was burdened by an existing eighteen-foot right-of-way benefiting the back parcel. In 2004, Defendants applied for a zoning permit to build a house on the back parcel. The zoning administrator originally granted the permit, but Plaintiff appealed the decision to the local review board. The Board reversed, finding that the Nordlund right-of-way did not meet locality's rule that requires a fifty-foot-wide right-of-way in order to develop landlocked property. Defendants appealed that decision to the Environmental Court. In the course of the proceedings, Defendant Elizabeth Van Nostrand granted defendants Mark and Nancy Van Nostrand a fifty-foot-wide right-of-way across her property (the front parcel) that connected the back parcel to the closest road without crossing onto the Nordlund parcel. Defendants applied for a new zoning permit citing the Van Nostrand right-of-way as the means of complying. The Board approved the permit and Defendants subsequently constructed a house on the back parcel. This case stems from what Plaintiff claimed is a misuse of the Nordlund right-of-way to access the now completed home on the back parcel. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that this use violated the prior zoning decisions that originally disallowed the right-of-way as a basis for development of the back parcel. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Environmental Court had no jurisdiction because there was no violation of a zoning decision respecting Defendants' property or use of the rights-of-way in question. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff's case. View "Nordlund v. Van Nostrand" on Justia Law

This case stems from a dispute over the 1973 William C. Alden Trust (the Trust) benefiting the Grantor's second wife Nancy Alden, his two children by Nancy, and his three children from his first marriage. Todd Alden and Julia Alden Dee, two of Grantor's children by his first marriage, alleged that Nancy in her capacity as trustee, acted fraudulently and in violation of her fiduciary duties in her administration of the Trust and invaded trust principal through self-dealing, concealment, and misrepresentations. They sought to hold Nancy and her two children liable for damages resulting from the alleged improprieties. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted that of the Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant, Estate of Nancy B. Alden. Julia Dee and Todd Alden appealed. The sum of Defendants' arguments to the Supreme Court contended that there were multiple disputed issues of material fact that should have precluded summary judgment. Upon review of the lengthy history of the Trust and the parties' litigation pertaining to the Trust, the Court found that Defendants' simply failed to prove their case: "[a] lack of sufficient evidence on one side does not mean a disputed issue of fact remains." The Court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Trust. View "In re Estate of Alden" on Justia Law

Applicant Times and Seasons, LLC, appealed the Environmental Court's grant of summary judgment to the Natural Resources Board and the corresponding denial of Applicant's "Act 250" permit application to construct and operate a gift shop and deli with related improvements in the Town of Royalton. On appeal, Applicant argued that it could avail itself of the definition of "primary agricultural soils" in 10 V.S.A. 6001(15) as it was amended during the course of its litigation to secure compliance with the only Act 250 criterion for which it did not receive approval. Upon review of the legislative history of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that a reconsideration application is a continuation of an original Act 250 permit application. Accordingly, the submission of a reconsideration application is not a separate vesting event: "[c]ontrary to applicant's proposed interpretation, an applicant on reconsideration may not simultaneously take advantage of the laws in effect at the time of the initial application and those in effect at the time of the reconsideration application. It is not a two-way street." The Court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment against Applicant. View "In re Times and Seasons, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellants Shenandoah, LLC, David Shlansky, Ting Chang, and other entities and individuals, appealed the Environmental Court's summary judgment decision upholding an "Act 250" jurisdictional opinion. Appellants have a variety of overlapping interests. Mr. Shlansky created an irrevocable trust (Trust) to benefit his and his wife Chang's children. As settler of the Trust, Mr. Shlansky contributed the property that is the subject of the underlying jurisdictional opinion. The Trust has an ownership stake in various companies that have engaged in land-development activities in the relevant jurisdictional area. Shenandoah, LLC, one such created entity, sought to build a ten-unit residential housing project. In August 2008, Shenandoah requested a jurisdictional opinion to determine if the project required an "Act 250" permit. In a September 2008 decision, the district coordinator found that the project required an Act 250 permit because it involved the construction of a housing project with ten or more units. Appellants appealed portions of this decision to the Environmental Court. The court upheld the district coordinator's jurisdictional opinion. The court concluded that Mr. Shlansky and Ms. Chang benefited from the Trust's land-development activities so the Trust's development activities were attributable to them personally. Appellants challenged this conclusion on appeal. As support for their position, they pointed to the affidavits filed by Mr. Shlansky, Ms. Chang and "the legal existence of the Trust, which is irrevocable." Upon review of the lower court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Court's decision. As the Environmental Court concluded, benefit to the parents rendered them "persons" affiliated with subdivisions and development previously undertaken by entities owned or affiliated with the Trust as defined by Act 250. View "In re Shenandoah LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner Allen Rheaume is currently serving a life sentence as a habitual offender. He has forty-eight convictions, five of which either involve sex crimes or have a sexual element. He also has had sixty-three disciplinary report convictions while incarcerated. He challenged his classification by the Department of Corrections (DOC) as a "high risk" sex offender and that designation's concomitant programming requirements. The trial court granted respondent's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that review under the state rules of civil procedure was unavailable for classification and programming decisions made by the DOC. The question of whether an inmate designated as "high risk" can appeal his programming requirements through Vermont Rule of civil Procedure 75 is one of first impression for the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court found that no statute provides for review of DOC programming decisions, "so the question becomes whether these fall within the class of decisions appealable at common law under one of the extraordinary writs." The Court concluded that while an inmate may have review of his designation under Rule 75, the particular programming requirements promulgated after that designation becomes final are a matter of DOC discretion and as such are non reviewable under Rule 75. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court's determination that the programming requirements are not reviewable under Rule 75. View "Rheaume v. Pallito" on Justia Law

A group neighbors (Neighbors-Appellants) in the Town of Dorset appealed an Environmental Court decision that granted Applicant Bradford Tyler’s application for a zoning permit for the construction of a self-storage facility in the Dorset Village Commercial District. Appellants contend that the court erred in determining the rental storage units to be an authorized land use within the applicable Dorset zoning district. Applicant Tyler owns and resides on a 5.6-acre property located in the Village Commercial District (VC District) of Dorset. He filed for a zoning permit to construct a self-storage facility on his property. The Town Planning Commission issued written approval of applicant’s site development plan. Following this, the Town Zoning Administrator issued a zoning permit. Interested neighbors appealed to the Dorset Zoning Board of Adjustment, contending that applicant’s proposed self-storage facility is not a “retail sales/rentals” use, as required by the town’s Zoning Bylaws for development in the VC District. Neighbors, in response to applicant questioning the validity of a decision rendered by less than a majority of the Board, appealed to the Environmental Court. They asserted that, regardless of the majority vote issue, the earlier approval by the Zoning Administrator was erroneous and should be voided. Applicant cross-appealed, arguing that the Board’s denial was invalid and that the proposed facility was a permitted use in the VC District. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the question of whether a storage facility was permitted. The Environmental Court granted applicant’s motion and denied Neighbors’, holding that the proposed use was permissible as a “retail rental.” Upon review of the lower court's record and the applicable zoning statutes, the Supreme Court acknowledged the conflict created by a plain reading of the definition of "retail" in the statute: "[d]efining “retail” in terms of sales arguably creates a conflict when used to define “retail rentals” . .. Using the common understanding of the words involved, and in the context of the overall scheme and purpose of the VC District, it is clear that the Bylaws’ drafters intended “retail sales/rentals” to include only residential and small-scale commercial establishments trading in services or in goods, for sale and for rent, as opposed to renting storage space as applicant proposes." Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the Environmental Court. View "In re Tyler Self-Storage Unit Permits" on Justia Law

Mountain View Community School, Inc. appealed a trial court order that rejected its request for a property tax exemption for "lands owned or leased by colleges, academies or other public schools" under state law. Mountain View contended the court misinterpreted the law in denying the requested exemption. For a number of years, Mountain View operated a private nonsectarian school for students from preschool through eighth grade at two separate locations in the City of Rutland. Mountain View's only use of the properties was as a school. While maintaining that it was statutorily exempt from the payment of property taxes, Mountain View nevertheless paid them under protest from 1994 through 2007. When the school's assessed value increased dramatically in 2006 and 2007, however, it sought an exemption. The City declined to grant the exemption, and in response, Mountain View filed suit for declaratory relief and an injunction to prevent a threatened tax sale. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the lower the court mistakenly conflated the "public use" and "public school" exemptions in the statute, seeking to determine whether the school served "an indefinite class" under the former when, in fact, Mountain View was relying on the latter. The Court reversed the decision of the lower court. View "Mountain View Community School, Inc. v. City of Rutland" on Justia Law

Defendant Graham Simmons appealed a district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence of a computer and other stolen items discovered in the execution of a search warrant at his residence. Probable cause supporting the warrant was obtained through subpoenas requiring production of internet addresses and data from internet service providers. Defendant challenged the subpoena of internet records as a warrantless search in violation of the state constitution. Furthermore, Defendant contended that information in the warrant was supplied by an unknown tipster whose reliability was not reasonably established. Upon review of the evidence and the trial record, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant failed to properly preserve his first contention and held that the trial court's refusal to suppress the evidence was not plain error. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the informant's input and credibility was ultimately irrelevant to issuing the warrant. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Vermont v. Simmons" on Justia Law

Defendants Charles and Hubert Lovell appealed a grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff Duane Amsden. In 1997, Phillip Lovell, father of Charles and Hubert, executed a will appointing Charles and his stepson Duane as co-executors. He also executed a power of attorney naming Charles as his attorney-in-fact. The principal asset of the senior Lovell's estate was a farm. In 2003, Philip Lovell's wife Zada quitclaimed her interest in the farm to her husband. Then, Charles, acting as attorney-in-fact, executed a quitclaim deed conveying the farm from his father to Hubert and himself for no consideration. Several of the Lovell's other children and stepchildren, including Plaintiff, signed a consent statement dated May 31, 2003, approving the transfer. In 2008, following the death of Zada Lovell, Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action in the probate court claiming the transfer of the farm to defendants was invalid under state law, and sought to establish the estate of Phillip Lovell as the farm's rightful owner. The probate court issued a declaratory judgment order in favor of Defendants, finding that the quitclaim transfer was valid because the language of the POA failed to restrict defendant Charles Lovell's power to gift the property to himself or others. The superior court reversed, granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The court found that the amended POA statute prohibited an attorney-in-fact from making gifts of the principal's property to himself or others unless the POA "explicitly" granted such authority. Defendants appealed. Upon review of the POA and records of the Lovell estate, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court order. The Court found that Charles Lovell could not, pursuant to his powers as his father's attorney-in-fact, transfer title of his father's farm to himself and his brother, Hubert Lovell, where the power of attorney failed to explicitly grant the power to make such a gift. View "In re Estate of Lovell" on Justia Law

This case concerned the use of a hilltop cemetery on a farm in Hartland, Vermont. The petitioner, Harold Guite, now owns the farm property. He claimed that the cemetery plot was owned by heirs of the Aldrich family, who settled the property as a farm in approximately 1775 and remained there until selling the farm in 1853. Respondent Jerome King's family purchased the farm property in 1950 and owned it until 1983. Prior to selling the property, Respondent buried the cremated remains of his parents in the hilltop cemetery. Petitioner was aware of the cemetery and its location when he bought the property. Petitioner filed suit for a declaratory judgment regarding his rights in the hilltop cemetery. Petitioner wanted to remove the cemetery and return the plot to "private farm property." Respondent claimed that the Aldrich family reserved only an easement in the cemetery plot. Thus, he contended title to the plot remained with the farm so that he could use it to bury his parents, and, by the deed to the property and by operation of Vermont law, the remains could not be moved. The trial court adopted Respondent's theory and denied the petition. Upon review of the trial court records, the Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner's theory was correct and reversed the decision against him. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Guite" on Justia Law