Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A childcare provider operating two centers in Vermont participated in the federal Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP), which reimburses centers for meals provided to children if certain regulatory requirements are met. The provider had previously been cited for noncompliance in 2019, but the matter was resolved after corrective action. In 2022, the Vermont Agency of Education (AOE) again found serious deficiencies, including inadequate recordkeeping, improper meal claims, and failure to monitor facilities. The provider submitted a corrective-action plan, and AOE initially determined the deficiencies were fully and permanently corrected. However, a subsequent unannounced review in 2023 revealed recurring deficiencies, such as missing enrollment forms, incorrect eligibility determinations, and incomplete documentation.Following these findings, AOE issued a notice proposing to terminate the provider’s participation in CACFP and to disqualify the provider and two employees from future participation. The provider requested an administrative review. At the hearing, the provider acknowledged some paperwork was not in compliance but argued the errors were minor and unintentional. Due to time constraints, the hearing officer allowed both parties to submit post-hearing written arguments and documentation, to which the provider did not initially object but later challenged as a violation of due process and agency procedures.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case after the hearing officer affirmed AOE’s decision to terminate and disqualify the provider. The Court held that the hearing officer applied the correct legal standard and that the record supported the findings of persistent serious deficiencies. The Court also determined that the provider had not properly preserved its objection to post-hearing submissions and, regardless, was not prejudiced by the procedure. The Court affirmed the termination and disqualification from the CACFP. View "In re Butterfly Kisses Child Care Center, Inc." on Justia Law

An elderly man with multiple health conditions, including Parkinson’s disease and COPD, was admitted to a hospital due to worsening symptoms and hallucinations. During his stay, he became agitated and aggressive, prompting hospital staff to administer Zyprexa, a chemical restraint, after obtaining consent from his daughter. The medication was ordered as “every 4 hours,” but there was disagreement over whether this meant scheduled or as-needed administration. The patient received two doses, after which he suffered respiratory distress, was transferred to another hospital, and died a few days later from septic shock related to aspiration pneumonia.The Superior Court, Addison Unit, Civil Division, presided over a jury trial in August 2023. Both parties presented expert testimony on the standard of care for chemical restraints, and the plaintiff also introduced the hospital’s policy. The jury was asked whether the plaintiff had proven the applicable standard of care and answered “no.” As a result, the jury did not consider whether the standard was breached, causation, or damages. The plaintiff moved for a new trial under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59, arguing that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the evidence was conflicting and that the jury’s verdict was not clearly wrong or unjust.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. The Court held that the trial court acted within its discretion, as the evidence regarding the applicable standard of care was conflicting and not so clear as to require overturning the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a new trial. View "Watrous v. Porter Medical Center" on Justia Law

The case concerns a petitioner who was substantiated by the Vermont Department for Children and Families (DCF) for placing a child, L.M., at risk of sexual harm. The petitioner had a prior substantiation in 2006 for sexually abusing a minor and a 2019 conviction for open and gross lewdness involving an adult. In 2020, the petitioner and his husband, who had previously been substantiated as a minor, began babysitting L.M., an eight-year-old transgender boy. L.M. would sometimes stay overnight at their apartment, where another adult friend was also present. The petitioner did not inform his probation officer about this arrangement, despite probation conditions restricting his contact with minors. DCF received a report and, after investigation, substantiated the petitioner for risk of sexual harm to L.M.After the substantiation, the petitioner requested review. The Commissioner’s Registry Review Unit upheld the substantiation, and the petitioner appealed to the Human Services Board. A hearing officer recommended reversing the substantiation, but the Board adopted the hearing officer’s factual findings and nonetheless affirmed the substantiation, reasoning that the petitioner’s access to L.M., his prior record, lack of sex-offender treatment, and dishonesty during the investigation supported a finding of risk. The Board found that the petitioner had regular and ongoing access to L.M., including overnight stays, and that the presence of other adults did not amount to constant supervision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Board’s decision for abuse of discretion. The Court held that the Board reasonably inferred risk of harm based on the petitioner’s access to L.M., prior substantiation, and other factors. The Court rejected arguments that DCF was required to relitigate the 2006 substantiation or that DCF’s policies were inconsistent with statutory requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board’s decision upholding the substantiation. View "In re Appeal of S.C.-M." on Justia Law

A hospital submitted its proposed budget for the upcoming fiscal year, requesting a 6.1% increase in net patient revenue (NPR) and a 2.8% increase in commercial negotiated rates. The hospital justified its request by citing increased patient volume and efforts to reduce wait times. The Green Mountain Care Board, which regulates hospital budgets in Vermont, had previously issued guidance setting a 3.5% benchmark for NPR growth and a 3.4% benchmark for commercial rate increases, requiring hospitals to justify any requests above these benchmarks.After reviewing the hospital’s proposal, the Green Mountain Care Board approved a 5.0% NPR increase—higher than the benchmark but lower than requested—citing the hospital’s strong financial health and the need to balance access to care with cost containment. The Board also approved the requested 2.8% commercial rate increase but included a footnote reducing this increase to 1.2% due to a prior budget overage, referencing a separate budget-enforcement order. The hospital appealed the Board’s decision to the Vermont Supreme Court, arguing that the Board’s NPR decision was arbitrary and that the reduction in the commercial rate increase violated procedural requirements under the Vermont Administrative Procedure Act (VAPA).The Vermont Supreme Court held that the Board had adequately explained its decision to approve a 5.0% NPR increase and acted within its discretion, given the statutory mandate to balance cost control and access to care. However, the Court struck the footnote reducing the commercial rate increase to 1.2%, because the underlying budget-enforcement order had been reversed by the Vermont Superior Court for failure to follow VAPA procedures and was no longer valid. The Supreme Court otherwise affirmed the Board’s decision. View "In re Rutland Regional Medical Center Fiscal Year 2025" on Justia Law

A property owner challenged the tax assessment of its facility in Salisbury, Vermont, for the 2023-2024 tax year. After a grievance hearing attended by both the property owner and its attorney, the town listers denied the grievance and mailed the decision by certified mail to the property owner’s address of record. The property owner received the notice twelve days before the deadline to appeal but did not forward it to its attorney until after the appeal period had expired. The attorney then filed an appeal to the Board of Civil Authority (BCA), which was rejected as untimely.The property owner appealed to the Vermont Superior Court, Addison Unit, Civil Division, arguing that the town violated its procedural due process rights by failing to send notice of the listers’ decision to both the property owner and its attorney. The Superior Court allowed the property owner to amend its complaint and ultimately granted summary judgment in its favor, relying on Perry v. Department of Employment & Training, which required notice to both a claimant and their attorney in the context of unemployment benefits. The court ordered the BCA to hear the untimely appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that, in the context of property tax grievances, procedural due process does not require notice to be mailed to both the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s counsel. The Court distinguished Perry as limited to unemployment-benefit proceedings and found that the statutory scheme for property tax appeals only requires notice to the taxpayer. Because the property owner received actual notice and had sufficient time to appeal, the Court concluded that due process was satisfied. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s decision and instructed that summary judgment be entered for the Town of Salisbury. View "Salisbury AD 1, LLC v. Town of Salisbury" on Justia Law

A woman and her former husband divorced in 2011, entering into a detailed stipulation that was incorporated into a final divorce order by the Vermont family division. The order awarded her sole legal parental rights for their three minor children and required the husband to pay spousal maintenance for a set period. It also required him to maintain a $400,000 life insurance policy naming her as the sole beneficiary for at least fifteen years or until his maintenance obligation was paid in full, whichever was later. After remarrying, the husband obtained new life insurance policies naming his new wife as beneficiary and assigned part of one policy to a lender as collateral. Upon his death, the ex-wife discovered she was not a beneficiary on these policies and sued, seeking the insurance proceeds based on the divorce order.The Vermont Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Civil Division, denied the ex-wife’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings to the defendants. The court found that Vermont law prohibited courts from ordering postmortem spousal maintenance or requiring life insurance to secure such maintenance, and concluded the life-insurance provision in the divorce order was invalid and unenforceable. The court ordered the insurance proceeds to be distributed to the new wife and the lender, and granted interpleader relief to one insurer.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Vermont law recognizes an equitable cause of action to recover life insurance proceeds based on a divorce order, and that parties may agree to secure maintenance with life insurance, even if the court could not impose such a requirement unilaterally. The Court affirmed the interpleader relief but reversed the remainder of the judgment, remanding for further proceedings to determine the ex-wife’s equitable entitlement to the insurance proceeds and the priority of competing claims. View "diMonda v. Lincoln National Corp." on Justia Law

Costco sought to operate a gas station adjacent to its retail store in Colchester, Vermont, near a busy highway interchange. The company obtained both municipal and Act 250 permits, which included conditions requiring traffic mitigation measures—specifically, improvements at a nearby intersection (the MVD Improvements) or, alternatively, implementation of modified traffic signal timings if a larger state highway project (the DDI Project) was not yet under construction. Two neighboring businesses, who also operated gas stations nearby, actively participated in the permitting process and subsequent litigation, arguing that Costco’s gas station would exacerbate traffic congestion and that Costco should not be allowed to operate the station at full-time hours until the DDI Project was complete.After initial permits were issued, the neighbors appealed to the Vermont Superior Court, Environmental Division, which upheld the permits with the mitigation conditions. The neighbors then appealed the Act 250 permit to the Vermont Supreme Court, which affirmed the sufficiency of the mitigation measures. As the DDI Project faced delays, Costco sought and received permit amendments allowing limited-hours operation of the gas station, subject to the same traffic mitigation conditions. The neighbors continued to challenge these amendments and argued that the Vermont Agency of Transportation (AOT) should have been joined as a co-applicant, and that Costco needed further permit amendments to operate at full-time hours.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the Environmental Division had jurisdiction to consider whether Costco could operate the gas station at full-time hours. The Court concluded that Costco was not required to seek further amendments to its Act 250 or municipal permits before commencing full-time operation, as the permit conditions were satisfied either by the commencement of the DDI Project or by implementation of the signal timing modifications. The Court affirmed the Environmental Division’s decision and found the neighbors’ remaining arguments moot. View "In re Costco Wholesale Administrative Decision" on Justia Law

In September 2018, six-year-old L.F. made statements to her foster mother about inappropriate touching by her stepfather, Andy LaGore. These statements were recorded and reported to the Department for Children and Families. L.F. later reiterated these allegations during an interview at the Children’s Advocacy Center, identifying LaGore as the perpetrator. LaGore was subsequently charged and convicted of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child.During pretrial motions, LaGore sought to introduce evidence of a 2016 incident where L.F. had made similar allegations against her biological father, Jordan. The trial court denied this motion, ruling that the 2016 statements were not relevant and did not demonstrate that L.F. was confused about the identity of the perpetrator in the 2018 incident. The court found no evidence that L.F.’s statements about her biological father were false or that she was confusing the two men.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the trial court’s decision. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the 2016 statements, as they were not relevant to the 2018 allegations. The court emphasized that the exclusion of irrelevant evidence does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The Supreme Court affirmed LaGore’s conviction, finding that the trial court acted within its discretion and that LaGore’s constitutional rights were not violated. View "State v. LaGore" on Justia Law

Janet Cote owns a property that was previously a gas station site. After discovering significant petroleum contamination in the soil, she applied for and received reimbursement from the Petroleum Cleanup Fund (PCF). The Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) later denied further reimbursement for costs associated with a licensed engineer and additional items on Cote’s property. The Environmental Division affirmed the ANR’s decision in part and reversed in part. Cote appealed the denied reimbursements.The Environmental Division held a two-day hearing and concluded that the ANR must reimburse Cote for electrical work, concrete work, and wastewater work, as these were pre-approved and the ANR’s subsequent denial was unreasonable. However, the court upheld the ANR’s denial of costs for a licensed engineer and other punch list items, finding the ANR’s decision reasonable and consistent with the law.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the ANR’s denial of reimbursement for the licensed engineer and punch list items was reasonable. The court found the Environmental Division’s analysis lacking, as it did not adequately explain why the ANR’s denial was reasonable or provide sufficient findings of fact. The court noted that the Environmental Division merely restated the ANR’s conclusory arguments without proper analysis.The Vermont Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, instructing the Environmental Division to make adequate factual findings and any additional conclusions necessary on the disputed reimbursement claims. The court emphasized the need for clear reasoning and analysis to support the decision. View "In re Cote/Maquam Shore Market" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Julio Davila, was released on furlough in October 2021 following a 2014 conviction. In April 2022, he absconded from furlough, leading the Vermont Department of Corrections (DOC) to issue a "Return on Mittimus Request" and an arrest warrant. In August 2022, Davila was arrested in Massachusetts for driving with a suspended license and cocaine trafficking. He was held without bail on both the Vermont warrant and Massachusetts charges. In September 2022, Davila waived extradition to Vermont but remained incarcerated in Massachusetts until December 2023, when he was released on his own recognizance and transported to Vermont.Davila filed a grievance with the Vermont DOC, requesting credit towards his Vermont sentence for the time spent incarcerated in Massachusetts. The DOC denied his request, stating he was not under their supervision. Davila then filed a complaint in the Washington Civil Division, seeking a writ of mandamus to credit his Vermont sentence from September 2022 onwards. The court granted summary judgment to the DOC, concluding Davila was not entitled to credit for time served in Massachusetts.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court held that under 28 V.S.A. § 808e(c), Davila was not entitled to sentence credit while a warrant was outstanding. The court also held that 13 V.S.A. § 7031(c) did not apply because Davila was not "awaiting transportation" to Vermont while incarcerated in Massachusetts. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding Davila was not entitled to credit for the 490 days spent in Massachusetts. View "Davila v. Deml" on Justia Law