Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Robert Caldwell was recruited by Champlain College's then-president Don Laackman in September 2016 and worked as Vice President of Advancement and later as Chief Advancement Officer from January 2017 to September 2019. His role was primarily as chief fundraiser. In fiscal year 2018, he missed his fundraising goal by approximately seventeen percent, and in fiscal year 2019, he missed his goal by more than 56 percent, resulting in a shortfall of over 2.2 million dollars. In May 2019, Caldwell was diagnosed with chronic kidney disease and informed President Laackman of his diagnosis. Laurie Quinn replaced Laackman as interim-president in June 2019 and discussed Caldwell's performance with him in July 2019. Caldwell mentioned he was dealing with health issues. In September 2019, Quinn fired Caldwell, citing his poor fundraising performance.Caldwell sued Champlain College in March 2021, alleging disability discrimination under the Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) and promissory estoppel. The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division granted summary judgment in favor of Champlain College on both claims. Caldwell appealed the decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework for assessing disability discrimination claims and found that Champlain College provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Caldwell's termination—his failure to meet fundraising goals. Caldwell failed to provide evidence that this reason was pretextual. Additionally, the court found that Caldwell did not present any evidence of a specific and definite promise that would support his promissory estoppel claim. Therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Champlain College. View "Caldwell v. Champlain College Inc." on Justia Law

A husband appealed a final divorce order that set aside a prenuptial agreement and instead allocated an equitable division of property. The family division found the agreement unconscionable because it would prevent the wife from receiving any significant property settlement or spousal maintenance. The husband argued that the court applied an incorrect standard of unconscionability and made errors in the property settlement proceedings.The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Family Division, initially found that both parties had made full financial disclosures and entered the agreement voluntarily. However, the court later concluded that the agreement was unconscionable because it left the wife in the same financial situation as if they had not married, which the court believed undermined the status of marriage. The court also quashed subpoenas for the wife's father and sister and incorrectly calculated the length of the marriage.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the family division applied the wrong standard for assessing unconscionability. The Supreme Court held that prenuptial agreements are enforceable if they are entered into voluntarily, with full financial disclosure, and are not unconscionable at the time of execution. The court found that the agreement's terms, which left the parties in the same financial situation as before marriage, were not inherently unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed the family division's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to consider the wife's alternative arguments regarding the enforceability of the agreement, including whether the husband's behavior constructively forced her to file for divorce. View "Lacroix v. Rysz" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted by a jury of sexual assault, lewd and lascivious conduct, and obstruction of justice. The charges stemmed from allegations made by the defendant's daughter, K.O., who reported that her father had sexually assaulted her over a period of seven years, starting when she was ten years old. The State charged the defendant with multiple counts, including sexual assault and aggravated repeated sexual assault of K.O., as well as lewd and lascivious conduct against K.O. and another minor, A.S. The defendant was also charged with obstruction of justice based on his actions during the investigation.The defendant appealed his convictions, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated due to jury irregularities, that evidentiary rulings undermined his right to a fair trial, and that the jury instructions were misleading. The Superior Court, Lamoille Unit, Criminal Division, had previously denied the defendant's motions to exclude certain jurors for cause and had admitted various pieces of evidence over the defendant's objections.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's challenges for cause against certain jurors, as there was no evidence of implied bias. The court also found that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the audio recording of K.O.'s conversation with police, the prenuptial agreement, the photo display, and the diagram of the vulva, as these pieces of evidence were relevant and not unduly prejudicial. The court concluded that the jury instructions were not misleading and did not direct a verdict on any element of the crime. The court also found no plain error in the description of the sexual acts necessary to convict the defendant on each charge. View "State v. Orost" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Kristina and Stephen Polak, and defendants, Felipe Ramirez-Diaz and Yesica Sanchez de Ramirez, are neighbors in St. Albans. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants alleging defamation, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) after defendants allegedly made false reports to police and the court accusing plaintiffs of criminal activity. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants falsely reported an assault and a gun threat, leading to anti-stalking complaints and an Extreme Risk Protection Order (ERPO) petition against Kristina Polak, which were ultimately denied. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants repeated these false claims to neighbors and community members.The Superior Court, Franklin Unit, Civil Division, granted defendants’ special motion to strike plaintiffs’ claims under Vermont’s anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that defendants’ statements were protected petitioning activity in connection with public issues. The court also imposed a discovery sanction on plaintiffs for failing to respond to defendants’ interrogatories and requests for production, prohibiting plaintiffs from introducing evidence that should have been disclosed. The court subsequently awarded summary judgment to defendants on the remaining defamation claim, noting plaintiffs’ failure to identify specific defamatory statements or produce evidence of actual harm.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in granting the special motion to strike. The Supreme Court held that defendants’ statements were not made in connection with a public issue, as they concerned a private dispute between neighbors and did not affect a large number of people or involve a matter of widespread public interest. The Supreme Court reversed the order granting the motion to strike and remanded for further proceedings on the stricken claims. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s imposition of the discovery sanction and the award of summary judgment on the remaining defamation claim, finding no abuse of discretion. View "Polak v. Ramirez-Diaz" on Justia Law

The University of Vermont appealed a Vermont Labor Relations Board decision that predoctoral fellows and trainees are employees under the State Employees Labor Relations Act (SELRA). United Auto Workers, Local 2322, filed a petition to represent a bargaining unit of select graduate students, including predoctoral fellows and trainees. The University objected, arguing that these individuals were not employees under SELRA. The Board held a three-day hearing and concluded that predoctoral fellows and trainees were employees, as they provided services for compensation and were supervised or monitored by the University.The Board found that approximately 1700 graduate students were enrolled at the University, with 57 being predoctoral fellows and trainees. These fellows and trainees received stipends, tuition reimbursement, and health insurance, and were required to adhere to specific program requirements, such as internships and professional development. However, they did not receive W-2s, and the University did not withhold taxes from their stipends. The Board concluded that all individuals in the proposed bargaining unit, including predoctoral fellows and trainees, were employees because they worked for the University in return for compensation.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the Board's findings did not support its conclusion that predoctoral fellows and trainees were employees. The Court noted that the Board made no findings that these individuals worked for the University or that their tasks benefited the University. The Court also highlighted the lack of findings regarding the University's control over the fellows and trainees' work. Consequently, the Court reversed the Board's decision and remanded the case for further consideration of the issue. View "In re United Auto Workers, Local 2322" on Justia Law

Two state senators filed a declaratory judgment action, arguing that Governor Phil Scott exceeded his authority by appointing Zoie Saunders as Secretary of Education on an interim basis without the Vermont Senate's advice and consent. The Governor appointed Saunders after the Senate rejected her initial nomination. The senators contended that the Governor's action bypassed the Senate's constitutional role.The Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, dismissed the suit on the merits. The court found that the Governor had the constitutional authority to make interim appointments without the Senate's advice and consent. It concluded that the relevant statutes did not apply to interim appointments and rejected the senators' arguments about bad faith and the invalidity of Saunders' actions.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and found it moot due to subsequent events. In November 2024, the Governor appointed Saunders as Secretary of Education while the Legislature was in recess, and her nomination was later submitted to the Senate for advice and consent. This appointment superseded the earlier interim appointment, rendering the controversy over the April 30 appointment no longer live. The court dismissed the appeal, noting that any opinion on the April 30 appointment would be advisory and that the case did not meet the criteria for the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception. View "McCormack v. Scott" on Justia Law

M.R., a minor, was substantiated by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) for sexual abuse of another minor. DCF sent the notice of substantiation to M.R.'s father, who requested an administrative review but did not participate in it. The review upheld the substantiation, and M.R.'s father did not appeal further. M.R. later sought a second review from the Human Services Board after the appeal period had expired, claiming he was unaware of the substantiation and the review. The Board dismissed his appeal as untimely.The Human Services Board found that M.R.'s appeal was not filed within the required 30-day period after the administrative review decision. M.R. argued that he was entitled to personal notice under the statute, that the lack of direct notice deprived him of due process, and that there was good cause for his delay in filing the appeal. The Board rejected these arguments and dismissed the appeal.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Board's decision. The Court held that the statutory requirement to send notice to the minor's parents or guardian was sufficient and did not violate due process. The Court found that the procedures in place were reasonably calculated to apprise the minor and their parents of the substantiation decision and their rights to request reviews. The Court also held that there was no good cause for M.R.'s untimely appeal, as the failure to appeal was due to factors within his father's control. Therefore, the Board's dismissal of the appeal as untimely was upheld. View "In re Appeal of M.R." on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with disorderly conduct, attempted assault on a law enforcement officer with bodily fluids, and misdemeanor unlawful mischief after an incident where he threatened a bystander and spat on an officer. Following his arrest, the defendant urinated, spat, and rubbed his genitals on various parts of his holding cell, leading to the cell's closure and $75 in clean-up costs.The Superior Court, Orleans Unit, Criminal Division, granted a judgment of acquittal on the disorderly conduct charge but denied acquittal on the attempted assault and unlawful mischief charges. The jury found the defendant guilty of both remaining charges. The defendant appealed, arguing that his actions did not constitute "damage" under the unlawful-mischief statute, 13 V.S.A. § 3701(c).The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the denial of the Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. The Court held that the term "damage" in the statute should be interpreted broadly to include actions that impair the use or function of property, even if they do not cause physical harm. The Court found that the defendant's actions resulted in a substantial impairment of the holding cell's use, as it had to be taken out of service and cleaned, incurring additional costs. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant's conduct constituted "damage" under the statute.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the jury had sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty of misdemeanor unlawful mischief. View "State v. Wells" on Justia Law

Landowners Nicole Ritchie and Elisabeth McIntee, in collaboration with the Brewster River Mountain Bike Club, replaced an old footbridge on their property in Underhill, Vermont, with a new bridge to provide access to a recreational trail network. The new bridge was larger and more secure than the old one, and a ramp was added to connect it to the existing trail. Neighbors David Demarest and Jeff Moulton contested the improvements, arguing that they violated the town's zoning regulations.The Town of Underhill Developmental Review Board granted a retroactive conditional-use permit and variance for the bridge and ramp. The neighbors appealed to the Environmental Division, which found that the bridge's installation caused minimal land disturbance and was used for recreational purposes by the landowners and the public. The Environmental Division voided the permit, ruling that the bridge was a de minimis recreational use of private property and not subject to zoning regulations.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. The Court held that the bridge constituted a de minimis recreational use of private property, as it involved minimal land disturbance, had a small footprint, posed minimal health and safety risks, and was used for recreational purposes. The Court concluded that the bridge was outside the scope of the town's zoning ordinance and did not address the neighbors' other arguments regarding the permit and the Club's standing. View "In re Brewster River Mountain Bike Club, Inc. Conditional Use Application" on Justia Law

The claimant worked for the defendant when he suffered a hernia in March 2021. The defendant accepted liability for the injury. Shortly after, the claimant left his job with the defendant and began working at Meeting House Furniture Restoration. In July, he also started working at Black Back Pub, holding both jobs concurrently until he left Meeting House in September 2021. The claimant continued working at the Pub until October 8, 2021, when he underwent hernia surgery. The parties agree that the claimant was disabled from work as of the surgery date.The Commissioner of Labor reviewed the case and determined that the claimant's disability benefits should be calculated based on his "average weekly wages" as defined by 21 V.S.A. § 650(a). The claimant argued that his wages from both Meeting House and Pub should be included in this calculation. However, the Commissioner applied Workers’ Compensation and Occupational Disease Rule 8.1500, which states that only wages from employers the claimant was working for at the time of disability should be included. The Commissioner concluded that Rule 8.1500 was a valid exercise of the Department’s rulemaking authority and excluded the wages from Meeting House.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. The Court held that Rule 8.1500 is consistent with 21 V.S.A. § 650(a)(4), which requires that wages from concurrent employment be included in the average weekly wage calculation only if the claimant was employed by multiple employers at the time of injury. The Court found that the rule was within the Department’s legislative grant of authority and did not compromise the intent of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Therefore, the rule was a valid exercise of the Department’s rulemaking authority. View "Hill v. Agri-Mark, Inc." on Justia Law