Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A police officer observed a vehicle late at night on a rural road in Vermont, where the passenger-side wheels of the vehicle left the paved portion of the road twice in quick succession. The road had only a center line and no edge markings. The officer, who had extensive training and experience in detecting impaired driving, interpreted the vehicle’s movements as erratic and indicative of possible impairment. The officer stopped the vehicle, and the driver was subsequently arrested for suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI) and driving with a suspended license. The officer’s observations were recorded on the cruiser’s camera.The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. The Vermont Superior Court, Addison Unit, Criminal Division, held a hearing and denied the motion to suppress, finding the officer’s testimony credible and concluding that the observed driving behavior—specifically, the vehicle’s wheels leaving the paved road twice—constituted erratic driving and provided reasonable suspicion of impairment. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to the DUI charge and appealed the denial of her suppression motion to the Vermont Supreme Court. The charge for driving with a suspended license was dismissed with prejudice.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and considered de novo whether those facts met the legal standard for reasonable suspicion. The Court held that the officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant based on the totality of the circumstances, specifically the erratic driving observed. The Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress, concluding that the stop was justified under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. View "State v. Norton" on Justia Law

A lender initiated a foreclosure action against a homeowner after the homeowner defaulted on a mortgage loan originally obtained in 2007. The mortgage was assigned several times before the foreclosure action began, and the lender’s predecessor filed suit in 2015. After a trial in 2018, the Vermont Superior Court, Civil Division, found in favor of the lender, concluding that the lender held the original note and mortgage at the time of filing and at trial, and that the homeowner had defaulted. The court issued a judgment of foreclosure by judicial sale, setting a redemption period for the homeowner.Following the expiration of the redemption period, the case was temporarily dismissed due to the homeowner’s bankruptcy. After the bankruptcy discharge, the lender successfully moved to reopen the case. The parties attempted mediation, which was unsuccessful. The lender then sought to substitute a new party as plaintiff due to post-judgment assignments of the mortgage, but later withdrew this request after issues arose regarding the validity of the assignments and the status of the note. The court vacated the substitution and ordered the lender to prove who the real party in interest was, warning that failure to do so would result in dismissal for lack of prosecution. After a hearing, the court found the lender failed to establish the real party in interest, dismissed the case with prejudice, and vacated the foreclosure judgment.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the case with prejudice for want of prosecution. The Supreme Court found no evidence of undue delay or failure to pursue the case by the lender, and concluded that the action could continue in the name of the original plaintiff under the applicable rules. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, reinstated the foreclosure judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ditech Financial LLC v. Brisson" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with aggravated stalking, violation of an abuse-prevention order, and violation of conditions of release. The charges stemmed from allegations that the defendant, who was subject to a relief-from-abuse order and criminal conditions of release due to an earlier assault, approached the complainant in a Walmart parking lot, maintained eye contact, circled the lot, and parked behind her, in violation of the orders prohibiting contact.The Superior Court, Washington Unit, Criminal Division, granted the State’s motion to hold the defendant without bail, finding that aggravated stalking was a felony involving an act of violence, as required by the Vermont Constitution and relevant statutes. The defendant appealed the hold-without-bail order. A specially assigned single Justice of the Vermont Supreme Court conducted a de novo review and concluded that aggravated stalking did not necessarily involve an act of violence as an element of the offense. The single Justice reversed the hold-without-bail order, imposed interim conditions, and remanded the case for the trial court to set conditions of release. The trial court then imposed conditions of release. The State subsequently filed a notice of appeal from the single Justice’s order.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the State had a statutory right to appeal the single Justice’s decision. The Court held that the State does not have a statutory right to appeal a single Justice’s order reversing a hold-without-bail decision under the relevant statutes. The Court reasoned that the statutory language only provides the State with a right to appeal from trial court orders regarding release, not from decisions of a single Justice of the Supreme Court. As a result, the Vermont Supreme Court dismissed the State’s appeal. View "State v. Beldiman" on Justia Law

Central Vermont Medical Center (CVMC) submitted its proposed budget for fiscal year 2025, seeking an 11.9% increase in net patient service revenue (NPR) and a 5.5% increase in commercial rates, both of which exceeded the benchmarks set by the Green Mountain Care Board. The Board’s benchmarks, established in its annual guidance, were 3.5% for NPR growth and 3.4% for commercial rate growth. The Board required hospitals exceeding these benchmarks to provide credible justification, such as evidence of improved access or quality of care. CVMC’s submission was reviewed through hearings and public comment, during which the Board found that CVMC’s justifications were insufficient, particularly regarding efficiency, productivity, and cost containment.The Green Mountain Care Board, after considering the evidence and statutory obligations, modified CVMC’s budget, allowing a 6% NPR growth and a 3.4% commercial rate increase. The Board found that CVMC could achieve financial sustainability through cost reductions and improved productivity rather than higher price increases. The Board imposed specific terms and conditions on the budget, emphasizing the need for efficient operations and balancing financial needs with statewide health care affordability and access.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Board’s decision under a deferential standard, presuming the Board’s actions valid unless shown otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. The Court rejected CVMC’s arguments that the Board acted with unfettered discretion, violated procedural due process, or was required to regulate on a per-capita basis. The Court found that the Board’s process was guided by statutory standards, rules, and annual guidance, and that CVMC had adequate notice and opportunity to participate. The Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed the Board’s decision. View "In re Central Vermont Medical Center Fiscal Year 2025" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with first-degree murder of his wife and second-degree attempted murder of his mother-in-law after a violent attack with a meat cleaver in October 2017. Following his arrest, he was evaluated by multiple mental health experts, all of whom opined that he was legally insane at the time of the offenses. The initial prosecution was dismissed without prejudice by the Chittenden County State’s Attorney, who concluded there was insufficient evidence to rebut the insanity defense. After the defendant was released from psychiatric care, the Vermont Attorney General refiled the same charges.In the Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Criminal Division, the defendant moved to dismiss the renewed charges, arguing that the prior dismissal barred further prosecution under principles of collateral estoppel and judicial admissions, and that the Attorney General lacked authority to refile. The trial court denied these motions, finding that dismissal without prejudice did not constitute a final judgment on the merits and did not preclude reprosecution. The case proceeded to trial, where the defendant raised an insanity defense, but the jury convicted him on both counts.On appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court, the defendant raised five claims: (1) the prior dismissal barred the second prosecution; (2) his rights to a public trial and to participate in his defense were infringed; (3) the jury instructions were confusing and incomplete; (4) the court failed to protect jury impartiality by allowing unsupervised access to a graphic video; and (5) the court did not ensure competent language interpretation. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the Attorney General had authority to refile charges, that dismissal without prejudice did not bar reprosecution, and that collateral estoppel did not apply. The Court found no reversible error in the conduct of jury selection, jury instructions, video access, or interpretation services, and affirmed the convictions. View "State v. Gurung" on Justia Law

The State of Vermont brought a lawsuit against Meta Platforms, Inc. and its subsidiary Instagram, LLC, alleging violations of the Vermont Consumer Protection Act (VCPA). The State claimed that Meta intentionally designed Instagram to be addictive to teenagers, prioritized increased user engagement for advertising revenue despite known negative effects on teens, and misled consumers about the platform’s safety by downplaying or withholding internal research. Meta, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in California, operates Instagram nationwide, including in Vermont, where tens of thousands of teens and young adults use the platform daily. Meta collects user data in exchange for access to Instagram and sells targeted advertising to Vermont businesses, specifically aiming at Vermont teens.Meta moved to dismiss the complaint in the Vermont Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, arguing that Vermont lacked personal jurisdiction over it. The court denied the motion, finding that Meta’s contracts with Vermont users, targeted advertising sales to Vermont businesses, and research on Vermont teen engagement established sufficient contacts with the state. The court concluded these activities were sufficiently related to the State’s claims and that exercising jurisdiction would not be unfair. Meta sought and was granted interlocutory appeal on the jurisdictional issue.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court held that Meta’s continuous and deliberate exploitation of the Vermont market—through user agreements, targeted advertising, and research on Vermont users—constituted purposeful availment sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction. The Court further held that the State’s claims arose out of or related to these contacts, as the alleged harm occurred in Vermont and was connected to Meta’s business activities there. The Court concluded that exercising jurisdiction over Meta in this case comports with due process and affirmed the denial of Meta’s motion to dismiss. View "State v. Meta Platforms, Inc." on Justia Law

A general contractor was hired to oversee the construction of a hotel in Vermont and subcontracted with a firm to install metal siding panels manufactured by a third party. The subcontractor relied on installation instructions available on the manufacturer’s website, which did not specify the use of a splice plate to connect the panels. The panels were installed without splice plates, and after construction, the panels began to detach from the building, causing some to fall and damage nearby property. The contractor later discovered that the manufacturer had created an instruction sheet in 2006 recommending splice plates, but this information was not publicly available at the time of installation.The contractor initially sued the installer for breach of contract, warranty, and negligence in the Vermont Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division. The complaint was later amended to add a product liability claim against the manufacturer. After further discovery, the contractor sought to amend the complaint a third time to add new claims against the manufacturer, arguing that new evidence justified the amendment. The trial court denied this motion, citing undue delay and prejudice to the manufacturer, and granted summary judgment to the manufacturer on the product liability claim and on a crossclaim for implied indemnity brought by the installer, finding both barred by the economic-loss rule.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decisions. The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the third motion to amend due to undue delay and prejudice. It also held that the economic-loss rule barred the contractor’s product liability claim, as neither the “other-property” nor “special-relationship” exceptions applied. Finally, the Court found the contractor lacked standing to appeal the summary judgment on the installer’s implied indemnity claim. View "PeakCM, LLC v. Mountainview Metal Systems, LLC" on Justia Law

A childcare provider operating two centers in Vermont participated in the federal Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP), which reimburses centers for meals provided to children if certain regulatory requirements are met. The provider had previously been cited for noncompliance in 2019, but the matter was resolved after corrective action. In 2022, the Vermont Agency of Education (AOE) again found serious deficiencies, including inadequate recordkeeping, improper meal claims, and failure to monitor facilities. The provider submitted a corrective-action plan, and AOE initially determined the deficiencies were fully and permanently corrected. However, a subsequent unannounced review in 2023 revealed recurring deficiencies, such as missing enrollment forms, incorrect eligibility determinations, and incomplete documentation.Following these findings, AOE issued a notice proposing to terminate the provider’s participation in CACFP and to disqualify the provider and two employees from future participation. The provider requested an administrative review. At the hearing, the provider acknowledged some paperwork was not in compliance but argued the errors were minor and unintentional. Due to time constraints, the hearing officer allowed both parties to submit post-hearing written arguments and documentation, to which the provider did not initially object but later challenged as a violation of due process and agency procedures.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case after the hearing officer affirmed AOE’s decision to terminate and disqualify the provider. The Court held that the hearing officer applied the correct legal standard and that the record supported the findings of persistent serious deficiencies. The Court also determined that the provider had not properly preserved its objection to post-hearing submissions and, regardless, was not prejudiced by the procedure. The Court affirmed the termination and disqualification from the CACFP. View "In re Butterfly Kisses Child Care Center, Inc." on Justia Law

An elderly man with multiple health conditions, including Parkinson’s disease and COPD, was admitted to a hospital due to worsening symptoms and hallucinations. During his stay, he became agitated and aggressive, prompting hospital staff to administer Zyprexa, a chemical restraint, after obtaining consent from his daughter. The medication was ordered as “every 4 hours,” but there was disagreement over whether this meant scheduled or as-needed administration. The patient received two doses, after which he suffered respiratory distress, was transferred to another hospital, and died a few days later from septic shock related to aspiration pneumonia.The Superior Court, Addison Unit, Civil Division, presided over a jury trial in August 2023. Both parties presented expert testimony on the standard of care for chemical restraints, and the plaintiff also introduced the hospital’s policy. The jury was asked whether the plaintiff had proven the applicable standard of care and answered “no.” As a result, the jury did not consider whether the standard was breached, causation, or damages. The plaintiff moved for a new trial under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59, arguing that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the evidence was conflicting and that the jury’s verdict was not clearly wrong or unjust.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. The Court held that the trial court acted within its discretion, as the evidence regarding the applicable standard of care was conflicting and not so clear as to require overturning the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a new trial. View "Watrous v. Porter Medical Center" on Justia Law

The case concerns a petitioner who was substantiated by the Vermont Department for Children and Families (DCF) for placing a child, L.M., at risk of sexual harm. The petitioner had a prior substantiation in 2006 for sexually abusing a minor and a 2019 conviction for open and gross lewdness involving an adult. In 2020, the petitioner and his husband, who had previously been substantiated as a minor, began babysitting L.M., an eight-year-old transgender boy. L.M. would sometimes stay overnight at their apartment, where another adult friend was also present. The petitioner did not inform his probation officer about this arrangement, despite probation conditions restricting his contact with minors. DCF received a report and, after investigation, substantiated the petitioner for risk of sexual harm to L.M.After the substantiation, the petitioner requested review. The Commissioner’s Registry Review Unit upheld the substantiation, and the petitioner appealed to the Human Services Board. A hearing officer recommended reversing the substantiation, but the Board adopted the hearing officer’s factual findings and nonetheless affirmed the substantiation, reasoning that the petitioner’s access to L.M., his prior record, lack of sex-offender treatment, and dishonesty during the investigation supported a finding of risk. The Board found that the petitioner had regular and ongoing access to L.M., including overnight stays, and that the presence of other adults did not amount to constant supervision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Board’s decision for abuse of discretion. The Court held that the Board reasonably inferred risk of harm based on the petitioner’s access to L.M., prior substantiation, and other factors. The Court rejected arguments that DCF was required to relitigate the 2006 substantiation or that DCF’s policies were inconsistent with statutory requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board’s decision upholding the substantiation. View "In re Appeal of S.C.-M." on Justia Law