Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Office of Child Support (OCS) filed a parentage action against Cody Thomas, alleging that he was the biological father of a child born in 2017. However, the complaint was lodged in 2021, beyond the two-year limitations period specified under 15C V.S.A. § 402. The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Family Division dismissed the action due to lack of standing. The OCS appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, arguing that its standing should be recognized as the action served the child's best interests. The Vermont Supreme Court, however, upheld the lower court's decision. The court determined that the two-year limitation for challenging parentage under § 402 was clear and unambiguous. It further noted that the statute provided for exceptions to this rule, none of which applied in this case. The court stated that allowing parentage claims beyond the two-year limit posed risks to a child's financial and psychological stability. Therefore, enforcing finality in parentage actions was in children's best interests, aligning with the overall purpose of the Vermont Parentage Act. The court concluded that the OCS lacked standing to challenge the child's parentage and affirmed the dismissal of the case. View "Booker v. Thomas" on Justia Law

In Vermont, the defendant, Denzel Lafayette, was charged with sexual assault, sexual exploitation by luring a child, and carrying a weapon while committing a felony. The case revolved around an incident in which Lafayette had sexual intercourse with a 15-year old girl, whom he had been communicating with on Facebook. Lafayette had also allegedly shown her a firearm during their encounter.The jury found Lafayette guilty of sexual assault and carrying a weapon while committing a felony. On appeal, Lafayette argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court committed an error by not instructing the jury that it had to find that the carrying of the gun was related to the sexual assault.The Vermont Supreme Court disagreed with Lafayette's claims. The court found that the victim's testimony provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find Lafayette guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of sexual assault. It further held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for carrying a weapon while committing a felony, as the gun had the potential to facilitate the sexual assault. The court also found no error in the jury instruction, as the relationship between the carrying of the weapon and the sexual assault was self-evident. Therefore, the court affirmed both of Lafayette's convictions.However, the court agreed with Lafayette's contention that certain probation conditions were overbroad and unduly restrictive. The court remanded the case to the trial court to strike one probation condition and to make findings, modify, or strike portions of two other challenged conditions. View "State v. Denzel Lafayette" on Justia Law

In this case, the State of Vermont appealed the superior court’s dismissal of charges against defendant Michael Armstrong on speedy-trial grounds. It had been more than nineteen years since the charges against defendant were first brought and more than fifteen years since defendant was adjudicated incompetent to stand trial. The trial court dismissed the charges, finding that the State had failed in its obligation to reevaluate defendant’s competency, thereby violating defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the delay was primarily due to defendant's incompetency, which was not attributable to the State, and the State had no duty to seek a reevaluation of the defendant's competency absent an indication of changed circumstances. The Court concluded that the defendant did not make a sufficient claim of denial of his right to a speedy trial, reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the charges, and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in a case involving a man who was convicted of assault and robbery following a jury trial. The defendant, Jason Bockus, appealed the conviction arguing that the trial court erred in not suppressing out-of-court non-eyewitness identifications and denying his motion for acquittal. He also contended that the court improperly punished him with a harsher sentence for exercising his right to go to trial.The primary issue in the case was whether the out-of-court identifications made by non-eyewitnesses, including family members and acquaintances of the defendant, should have been suppressed. The defendant argued that the identification procedure was unduly suggestive because the police officer showed the witnesses surveillance footage of the crime and then showed them a photo of the defendant. The defendant also argued that the police officer's failure to ask the witnesses not to discuss their own identifications with each other amounted to undue suggestiveness.The court disagreed, finding that the identification procedure was not unduly suggestive. The court noted that the police officer did not show unmasked depictions of the defendant until after each non-eyewitness viewed the surveillance footage and identified the defendant of their own accord. The court also found that the circumstances surrounding the identifications did not give rise to the danger of "irreparable mistaken identification."Regarding the motion for acquittal, the court concluded that the State had presented sufficient evidence to prove the identity of the defendant and that he used physical menace to commit the crime. The court also rejected the defendant's claim that the court imposed a harsher sentence because he exercised his right to trial, finding that the sentence was within the statutory limits and was not based on improper or inaccurate information.Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision and upheld the defendant's conviction and sentence. View "State v. Bockus" on Justia Law

In this case, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's decision to issue a no-stalking order against a man, John Langlois, who was found to have physically assaulted his neighbor, Gail Haupt, on two occasions. The altercations were the result of a property dispute between the two. The defendant argued that the court erred in considering his acts of physical violence as threats under the stalking statute, and that his actions were justified in defense of personal property. The court rejected both arguments.First, it held that physical violence can constitute a threat under the stalking statute because it communicates an intent to inflict physical harm. The court reasoned that by using violence against the plaintiff on two occasions, the defendant conveyed a message that he was willing and able to inflict physical harm, and therefore threatened the plaintiff within the meaning of the statute.Second, the court ruled that the common law defense-of-property privilege is not a defense to a civil stalking order. The court noted that the purpose of the stalking statute is to protect individuals from "severe intrusions on personal privacy and autonomy" and to limit "risks to the security and safety" of the individual. The court concluded that the "critical question in such proceedings is not who was at fault, but who, if anyone, is in need of protection." Therefore, the defendant's actions were not privileged and the court did not err in failing to consider his defense-of-property argument. As a result, the court upheld the no-stalking order against the defendant. View "Haupt v. Langlois" on Justia Law

In this case, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Vermont Public Utility Commission approving a contract under 30 V.S.A. § 248(i) for the purchase of out-of-state renewable natural gas by Vermont Gas Systems, Inc. (VGS). The contract, which was proposed to last for fourteen-and-a-half years, required VGS to purchase a minimum volume of renewable natural gas that would be produced and transported from a landfill in New York. The contract was part of VGS's efforts to invest in nonfossil gas and incorporate renewable natural gas into its gas supply to meet regulatory requirements and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.The appellant, Catherine Bock, a ratepaying customer of VGS, challenged the Commission's findings with respect to the contract’s contribution towards satisfying emissions reductions under the Vermont Global Warming Solutions Act of 2020. Bock also disputed the Commission’s finding that the contract, with a condition imposed by the Commission, would comply with least-cost planning principles.The court rejected Bock's arguments, finding that the Commission's conclusions were supported by the evidence in the record and were not clearly erroneous. The court noted that the contract was only one of VGS's strategies to reduce emissions pursuant to the Vermont Global Warming Solutions Act of 2020. It also pointed out that there was sufficient evidence to support the Commission's determination that the contract was cost-effective and consistent with least-cost planning principles. View "In re Petition of Vermont Gas Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, Rein Kolts appealed the denial of his petition for postconviction relief (PCR) arguing ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. Kolts was charged with aggravated sexual assault of a child and, despite two confessions, he rejected plea deals and was ultimately found guilty, receiving a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five-years-to-life. Kolts later filed a PCR petition alleging that his attorney failed to adequately inform him about the mandatory minimum sentence and did not advise him to accept the plea offer. The PCR court agreed that Kolts' counsel's performance was deficient but determined that Kolts did not suffer prejudice, as it was not probable that the original criminal trial court would have accepted Kolts' guilty plea. The Vermont Supreme Court disagreed with the PCR court's decision, stating it erred by considering postconviction evidence in making its determination. The court concluded that in determining whether the criminal court would have accepted a plea agreement, the PCR court can only consider evidence that was available to the criminal court at the time it would have considered the plea. Therefore, the court reversed the PCR court's decision and remanded the case back to the civil division for reconsideration of Kolts' ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "In re Kolts" on Justia Law

In Vermont, a dispute arose among the owners of seven lots connected by a private road named Purple Mountain Road over how to allocate maintenance costs for the road. The plaintiffs, who own five of the seven lots, argued that each lot owner should contribute based on the percentage of distance traveled from the public highway along the private road to reach their respective lot. The defendants, who own the remaining two lots, argued that all parcel owners should divide costs equally. The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Civil Division, granted summary judgment to the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court ruled that in the absence of an express agreement governing the maintenance of a private road, all parties deriving common benefit from the road must contribute "rateably," or in a manner that is reasonable and equitable given the benefits each owner receives, to the cost of maintaining the road, as per 19 V.S.A. § 2702. The court reasoned that all the parties have the right to use the entire private road at any time and share equally in the benefits offered by the road, such as enhanced private and commercial access to their properties and the privacy provided by the cul-de-sac. Therefore, all parties must pay an equal fee for the maintenance of the road. View "Rawley v. Heymann" on Justia Law

In the case, Maple Run Unified School District (the District) appealed a trial court order which granted the Vermont Human Rights Commission (the Commission) a motion to dismiss the District’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The dispute arose from a complaint of sexual harassment filed by a student in the District. The student's mother later filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that the District failed to comply with the Vermont Public Accommodations Act (VPAA), the anti-harassment provisions in Title 16, and the school’s own policy. The Commission decided to investigate the matter. The District filed a motion with the Commission to dismiss the investigation, arguing that federal regulations preempted Title 16 and the complaint failed to state a prima facie case of discrimination under the VPAA. The Commission denied the District’s motion and decided to continue the investigation. The District then filed a Rule 75 petition in the civil division against the Commission, which the Commission moved to dismiss arguing that there was no cognizable avenue for relief under Rule 75 and the superior court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review the petition. The court dismissed the District’s complaint. The District appealed claiming that subject-matter jurisdiction had been established under Rule 75 via either mandamus or prohibition. The Supreme Court of Vermont held that the Commission’s determination that the complaint states a prima facie case of discrimination under the VPAA is not reviewable under Rule 75 via either mandamus or prohibition, and therefore, the superior court did not err in dismissing the District’s petition. View "Maple Run Unified School District v. Vermont Human Rights Commission" on Justia Law

In this case decided by the State of Vermont Supreme Court, the defendant, Walter Taylor, III, appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, attempted domestic assault, assault and robbery, and obstruction of justice, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his request for a voluntary intoxication instruction and his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the obstruction-of-justice charge. The court affirmed the convictions.The case centered around an event in July 2021 where the defendant had an argument with his ex-girlfriend, which escalated into physical assault, and subsequently attacked a neighbor who was recording the incident on her phone. The defendant claimed that he was intoxicated at the time of the incident and argued that this should have been considered in his defense, as it could have affected his ability to form the necessary mental state for the charged crimes.However, the court held that the evidence did not establish a nexus between alcohol consumption and an effect on the defendant’s mental state. The court noted that there was no evidence regarding the size of the containers of the beverages that defendant had consumed, the timeframe in which they were consumed, or their alcohol concentration. The court found that the evidence of intoxication was insufficient to call into question whether defendant was capable of forming the required intent or whether he actually formed the required intent.On the charge of obstruction of justice, the defendant argued that his conduct could not be considered obstruction as there was no ongoing investigation at the time of the alleged assault. The court disagreed, ruling that the existence of a pending judicial proceeding is not required to prove obstruction of justice. The court concluded that the defendant's conduct, which included assaulting a person who appeared to be recording his conduct after being informed that the police were on their way, fell within the language of the obstruction of justice statute.Therefore, the court affirmed the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, attempted domestic assault, assault and robbery, and obstruction of justice. View "State v. Walter Taylor, III" on Justia Law