Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Joseph Bruyette appealed an order compelling him to provide a DNA sample for inclusion in the Vermont DNA database. Defendant was convicted of one count of burglary and three counts of sexual assault in 1990. He has been continuously incarcerated in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC) since 1987. For most of this time, defendant has been held in facilities out of state. In 1998, the Vermont Legislature passed a law creating a state DNA database. Defendant’s convictions qualified as designated crimes under the law, so the statute required him to submit a DNA sample. He argued 20 V.S.A. 1933(b) excused him from providing a DNA sample because he has previously provided a sample. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s rejection of defendant’s position that the statute exempted him from providing a subsequent sample. View "Vermont v. Bruyette" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Cameron Crogan was seriously injured when he rode his motorbike into a cable strung across a beach access road at the lakeside residential development where he lived with his family. As a result, his mother filed a negligence action against several entities related to the development, including the homeowners’ association and a separately formed beach association, as well as certain individuals in both their individual and representative capacities. The civil division granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment primarily on the grounds that, given the undisputed facts of this case, Vermont’s Recreational Use Statute protected them from liability, and the individual defendants did not owe plaintiff a duty of care in connection with the accident that led to this lawsuit. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the individual defendants were entitled to summary judgment, but reversed the trial court’s determination that the Recreational Use Statute was applicable in this case. Accordingly, the case was remanded for further proceedings concerning plaintiff’s claims against the non-individual defendants. View "Crogan v. Pine Bluff Estates et al." on Justia Law

This case arose out of a wife’s longstanding efforts to collect money owed to her by her ex-husband under a 2013 final divorce order that was reduced to a money judgment in 2018. Husband contended his then-current assets, including a home and tractor, were exempt from collection under 21 V.S.A. 681 because he purchased them with workers’ compensation settlement funds. He argued in the alternative that, with respect to the tractor, that the tractor should be exempt under 12 V.S.A. 2740(19) because it was “reasonably necessary” for his support. Husband further argued that an investment account he held is a Workers’ Compensation Medicare Set-Aside Account (WCMSA) that is also exempt from collection. Finding no reversible error in the trial court judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Geraw v. Geraw" on Justia Law

Petitioners T.O. and L.O. were the grandparents of S.O., a child adjudicated as a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). Petitioners appealed an order of the Human Services Board concluding that the Board lacked jurisdiction to determine whether DCF failed to comply with certain provisions of state and federal law concerning the care of children by relatives. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Board’s judgment. View "In re Appeal of T.O. & L.O." on Justia Law

Earl Scott appealed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the State of Vermont concerning his claim for compensation under the Vermont Innocence Protection Act (VIPA). In April 2010, Scott was charged with two counts of sexual assault against a person under the age of sixteen. Scott was twenty-two at the time the charges were filed. The offenses were alleged to have occurred “sometime during 2003 or 2004.” Subsequently, Scott pleaded guilty to an amended charge of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child and was sentenced to two to five years’ incarceration. He began serving his sentence in January 2012. While in custody under sentence, Scott brought a claim for post-conviction relief (PCR) in civil court. The claim was later amended to assert that the plea colloquy did not comply with the requirements of Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 11(f) and that his criminal counsel was ineffective on several other grounds. While the PCR claim was pending, Scott reached his maximum sentence date and was released in March 2016. In May 2016, the State conceded Scott’s plea colloquy did not comply with Rule 11 and that his conviction should be vacated, resulting in the remand of the prosecution to the criminal division. Scott’s counsel submitted a proposed order vacating the criminal conviction in June 2016, providing Scott with a copy. Also, while the PCR claim was pending, Scott learned he had not been given proper credit for good time and had therefore served time beyond his actual maximum release date. He made a claim seeking compensation for the time he remained in jail beyond that point. In July 2016, with knowledge that his criminal conviction was going to be vacated, Scott signed a general release of claims against the State in exchange for $40,000. Scott filed the lawsuit at issue here, seeking recovery under the VIPA. The State moved for summary judgment, arguing the general release barred Scott’s claim. Alternatively, the State contended Scott was not entitled to relief because he was not “actually innocent,” and he either fabricated evidence or committed perjury during proceedings related to the charged offense. In ruling on the motion, the court held that the language of the release was unambiguous, and that it plainly operated to preclude Scott’s claim. The court also determined that, even setting aside the general release, plaintiff’s action could not proceed because he did not meet the VIPA’s actual-innocence requirement. It did not reach the State’s alternative argument. Finding no reversible error in the trial court’s order, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the State. View "Scott v. Vermont" on Justia Law

Defendant Jonathan Richards appealed after he was convicted by jury conviction on one count of misdemeanor unlawful trespass. He argued the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on an essential element of the crime, contending that 13 V.S.A. 3705(a) should have an implied mental state requirement, or knowledge element. Defendant also argued the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the probation condition that he not “engage in criminal behavior” because the condition was impermissibly vague. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the Vermont Legislature intentionally omitted a knowledge element in the misdemeanor unlawful trespass statute, and that the probation condition provided sufficient notice of proscribed conduct. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Vermont v. Richards" on Justia Law

Donald Zucker appealed a summary-judgment decision awarding attorney’s fees to Gregory Wark, because Zucker refused to mediate a dispute arising out of a real estate purchase and sale agreement. On appeal, Zucker argued he was not required to mediate because the purchase and sale agreement was not an enforceable contract. To this, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed, reversed the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment, and vacated the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. View "Zucker v. Wark" on Justia Law

Neighbors appealed three Vermont Environmental Division rulings related to their appeal of the Agency of Natural Resources’ (ANR) decision to authorize Snowstone, LLC, to discharge stormwater at a proposed project site pursuant to a multi-sector general permit (MSGP). The court dismissed for lack of statutory standing most of neighbors’ questions on appeal and dismissed the remaining questions as not properly before the court. In addition, the court concluded that neighbors’ motion for a limited site visit was moot, given its dismissal of neighbors’ appeal. Finally, the court granted landowners Justin and Maureen Savage’s motion to intervene in the proceedings. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that neighbors had standing to appeal the ANR’s authorization to act under a MSGP, and that their motion for a limited site visit was not moot. Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded the court acted within its discretion to allow landowners to intervene. Accordingly, dismissal of neighbors’ appeal was reversed, as was the dismissal of the motion for a site visit, and the court’s decision to grant landowners intervention was affirmed. View "In re Snowstone Stormwater Discharge Authorization (Harrington et al., Appellants)" on Justia Law

Claimant Sadeta Zebic appealed the Commissioner of Labor’s decision not to certify a question for review to the superior court, arguing that the Commissioner had no discretion not to certify her proposed question. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded it did not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because claimant previously appealed to the superior court, and the statutory scheme provided that a workers’ compensation claimant could appeal either to the superior court or directly to the Supreme Court. View "Zebic v. Rhino Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Burlington and the Vermont Agency of Transportation (VTrans) jointly constructed the Champlain Parkway, a roadway project intended to connect Interstate 189 to downtown Burlington, and planned to make numerous improvements to the surrounding area. Fortieth Burlington, LLC (Fortieth) owned property adjacent to the project and challenged the decision of the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) to grant the project a renewed stormwater discharge permit. Fortieth argued before ANR and the Environmental Division that the agency unlawfully waived a filing deadline in its 2017 stormwater regulations and misinterpreted a provision of its 2017 Stormwater Management Manual. Finding no inconsistency with the governing statute or previous agency interpretations, “no unjust, unreasonable, or absurd consequences, and no compelling indications of error,” the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the City was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "In re Champlain Parkway SW Discharge Permit (Fortieth Burlington, LLC, Appellant)" on Justia Law