Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Gravel & Shea PC sued defendant Costello, Valente & Gentry, P.C., claiming unjust enrichment for receiving attorney’s fees without compensating plaintiff for work done to procure a settlement. The dispute arose from lawsuits involving an employee’s injury at work and his employer’s worker’s compensation insurance. Plaintiff represented the employer in a lawsuit against its insurer, Cornerstone Risk Management, LLC, while defendant represented the employee in a personal-injury lawsuit against the employer. The employee settled with Lloyd’s of London, Cornerstone’s professional-liability insurer, and defendant received its contingency fee from the settlement proceeds.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, granted summary judgment to plaintiff, concluding that under the common-fund doctrine, equities required defendant to contribute to plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. The court found that plaintiff’s efforts in the Cornerstone action led to the settlement from which defendant received its fees. The court also held a bench trial on damages and awarded damages to plaintiff. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly expanded the common-fund doctrine and that the facts did not support a claim of unjust enrichment.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to plaintiff. The Supreme Court held that the common-fund doctrine did not apply because there was no common fund created by plaintiff’s efforts that benefitted both parties. The court emphasized that the common-fund doctrine is limited to cases where a party’s efforts create a fund that benefits others who did not contribute to the litigation costs. The court remanded the case for the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of defendant, concluding that plaintiff could not maintain an unjust-enrichment claim under the circumstances. View "WWSAF Special Partners Group, LLC (Series D) v. Costello, Valente & Gentry, P.C." on Justia Law

Petitioner James Fredrick filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his confinement in Vermont on a governor’s warrant pending extradition to New York for a second-degree murder charge. The superior court denied the petition, concluding that the extradition process requirements were met. On appeal, Fredrick argued that the governor’s warrant and New York’s extradition application lacked an authenticated copy of the indictment as required by Vermont law.The Caledonia Superior Court, Civil Division, held a hearing and denied Fredrick’s request, reasoning that the governor’s warrant was prima facie evidence that the extradition requirements were satisfied. The court found that the documents showed Fredrick was lawfully charged by indictment. Fredrick appealed the decision on January 9, 2025.During the appeal, Governor Scott recalled the original governor’s warrant and issued a new one, including a copy of the indictment signed by the grand jury foreperson. Fredrick filed another habeas corpus petition challenging the new warrant, which was also denied, and an appeal is pending.The Vermont Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that the original governor’s warrant was withdrawn and Fredrick’s confinement is now based on a new warrant. The court found no applicable exceptions to mootness, as Fredrick did not demonstrate that the issue was capable of repetition yet evading review, nor did he show negative collateral consequences. The court concluded that there was no longer an actual controversy, and the appeal was dismissed. View "In re James Fredrick" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Vermont’s Auditor of Accounts and the Attorney General. The Auditor sued the Attorney General, alleging non-compliance with the statutory obligation to provide legal advice. The Auditor sought a declaratory judgment affirming his right to retain counsel to sue the Attorney General and mandamus to compel the Attorney General to answer specific legal questions. The trial court dismissed the Auditor’s claims and denied his request for attorneys’ fees.The dispute arose from the Auditor’s audit of a Burlington tax increment financing (TIF) district. The Auditor encountered a perceived gap in TIF statutes and sought advice from the Attorney General, who answered one question but directed the Auditor to other entities for the remaining questions. The Auditor claimed this was a violation of the Attorney General’s duty under 3 V.S.A. § 159 and threatened to sue. The Attorney General responded, explaining her statutory obligations and asserting that the Auditor lacked authority to sue.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the Auditor’s claims for mandamus and declaratory judgment related to the specific TIF questions, concluding that the Attorney General had provided legal advice as required by 3 V.S.A. § 159. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the broader declaratory judgment claim, finding no live controversy as the Attorney General had provided legal advice and there was no policy of refusing to do so.However, the court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the Auditor’s claim for declaratory judgment regarding his right to retain counsel and sue for mandamus. The court held that the Auditor has implied statutory authorization to seek mandamus to enforce the Attorney General’s duty under 3 V.S.A. § 159. The court also affirmed the denial of attorneys’ fees, finding Rule 54 inapplicable for the relief sought by the Auditor. View "Office of the Auditor of Accounts v. Office of the Attorney General" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Aleksandra Veljovic, filed a lawsuit against TD Bank, N.A. and its former employee, Zlata Cavka, alleging negligence, negligent supervision, and respondeat superior. Veljovic claimed that Cavka negligently notarized a fraudulent document used by her ex-husband to secure a divorce order in Serbia, which resulted in the loss of her marital property. Veljovic argued that TD Bank should be held liable for Cavka's actions. The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed Veljovic's complaint with prejudice, concluding that she could not recover for purely economic losses and failed to demonstrate a special relationship between the parties. The court also denied her post-judgment request to amend her complaint.TD Bank moved to dismiss the complaint under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Veljovic's claims were barred by the economic-loss rule, that neither TD Bank nor Cavka owed her an independent duty of care, and that she failed to plead facts establishing necessary causation. The court granted the motion, finding that Veljovic sought compensation solely for economic losses and did not establish a special relationship with the defendants. The court also dismissed the claims against Cavka after Veljovic failed to respond to a show-cause order.Veljovic appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint and denying her motion to amend. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that Veljovic did not allege sufficient facts to show a special relationship with the defendants and that her claims were barred by the economic-loss rule. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying her motion to amend the complaint, as the proposed amendments would not have established a special relationship or overcome the economic-loss rule. View "Veljovic v. TD Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, owners of a dairy farm and residences adjacent to Burlington International Airport, sued the City of Burlington for soil and water contamination caused by runoff from the airport. The contamination was due to the use of aqueous film-forming foam containing PFAS by the Vermont Air National Guard, which leased part of the airport. Plaintiffs alleged negligence, trespass, private nuisance, de facto taking, violation of the Vermont Groundwater Protection Act, increased water surface drainage, and direct negligence.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed the complaint for failure to join the United States and the Guard as necessary and indispensable parties, and on the basis of municipal immunity. The court found that the United States and the Guard were necessary parties because their actions were central to the claims and their absence could lead to inconsistent obligations for the City. The court also held that municipal immunity applied to the claims related to firefighting services.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of the negligence claim (Count 1) because it was based on the Guard’s firefighting activities, making the United States and the Guard necessary parties. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the other claims (Counts 2-5 and 7), which were based on the City’s failure to contain contaminated water on its property. The court found that these claims did not require the presence of the United States or the Guard as necessary parties.The court also remanded the case for further consideration of whether municipal immunity applied to the City’s maintenance and operation activities alleged in the surviving counts. The court noted that municipal airport operations are generally considered proprietary functions, which are not protected by municipal immunity. The case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Belter v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

In 2012, the plaintiff was convicted of felony sexual assault and sentenced to five years to life in prison. In August 2020, his conviction was vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and he was released after serving over eight years. In June 2023, the plaintiff sued the State of Vermont under the Vermont Innocence Protection Act (VIPA), seeking over $400,000 in damages for his imprisonment. The State moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the VIPA only allows claims for those exonerated through DNA evidence proving actual innocence.The Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, granted the State's motion in January 2024. The court found that the VIPA's plain language limits claims to those exonerated through DNA testing. The court noted that the statute's language, particularly in § 5572, specifies that a person exonerated "pursuant to this chapter" must have been exonerated through the DNA testing process outlined in subchapter 1 of chapter 182 of Title 13. Since the plaintiff's conviction was vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel and not through DNA testing, he did not qualify for compensation under the VIPA.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the VIPA's plain language clearly limits compensation to individuals exonerated through DNA testing. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the statute allows for broader claims of exoneration, emphasizing that the statute's provisions must be read together and that the only means of exoneration authorized by chapter 182 is DNA testing. The court also denied the State's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the plaintiff's claim survived his death under Vermont's survival statutes. View "Reynolds v. State" on Justia Law

In 2012, Bill Simmon, an employee of Vermont Community Access Media, Inc. (VCAM), invited Ciara Kilburn and her minor sister Brona to VCAM’s premises to record a commercial. Simmon secretly recorded the sisters changing clothes using VCAM’s equipment and shared the videos online, where they were viewed millions of times. In 2020, the Kilburns filed a lawsuit against Simmon for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligence per se, and against VCAM for vicarious liability, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed claims against Vermont State Colleges and did not instruct the jury on vicarious liability or NIED. The jury found Simmon liable for invasion of privacy and IIED, and VCAM liable for negligent supervision. Each plaintiff was awarded $1.75 million in compensatory damages against both Simmon and VCAM, and $2 million in punitive damages against Simmon. The court denied VCAM’s motions to exclude evidence, for a new trial, and for remittitur, and also denied plaintiffs’ request to hold VCAM jointly and severally liable for Simmon’s damages.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. It held that emotional-distress damages were available to plaintiffs for VCAM’s negligent supervision because the claim was based on intentional torts (invasion of privacy and IIED) for which such damages are recoverable. The court found no error in the jury’s award of damages, concluding that the evidence supported the verdict and that the damages were not excessive. The court also ruled that plaintiffs waived their claim for joint and several liability by not objecting to the jury instructions or verdict form before deliberations. View "Kilburn v. Simmon" on Justia Law

The case involves a wrongful-death action brought by the Estate of Jared Shaffer, through Daniel Shaffer as administrator, against Northeast Kingdom Human Services, Inc. Jared Shaffer, a developmentally disabled adult, died on April 18, 2017, from a sudden pulmonary embolism caused by metastatic testicular cancer. The estate claimed that the defendant, responsible for overseeing Jared's Medicaid waiver funds and coordinating his care, was negligent in its duties, leading to Jared's death.Initially, the estate sued Heartbeet Lifesharing, Dr. Peter Sher, and the defendant in federal court, but the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after a settlement with Dr. Sher’s medical practice. The estate then filed the wrongful-death action in the civil division against the defendant and Heartbeet. Before the trial, the estate settled with Heartbeet, leaving the case to be tried solely against the defendant. The defendant asserted a comparative negligence defense, implicating Daniel Shaffer, Jared's father and co-guardian, in Jared's death.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case after the estate appealed a jury verdict in favor of the defendant. The estate argued that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on comparative negligence, providing misleading jury instructions, and sustaining objections to certain questions posed to the defendant’s corporate representative. The estate also contended that the jury deliberated too quickly and that the evidence overwhelmingly supported its claim of negligence.The Vermont Supreme Court found that while the trial court erred in conflating the identity of the plaintiff with Daniel Shaffer, the estate was not prejudiced because the jury never reached the question of comparative negligence, having found no negligence on the defendant's part. The court also upheld the trial court's evidentiary rulings and found no error in the jury's deliberation process. The jury's verdict in favor of the defendant was affirmed. View "Shaffer v. Northeast Kingdom Human Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Applicants sought an Act 250 permit to construct a farm store on Route 5 in Hartland, Vermont. The proposed project includes a 9000 square-foot, two-story building with a deli, bakery, eating area, and parking lot. The store will sell products primarily from the applicants' nearby farm, Sunnymede Farm. The project site is a vacant lot near the Interstate 91 interchange, with significant traffic and no existing sidewalks.The District 3 Environmental Commission approved the project and issued the permit. The Hartland Planning Commission (HPC) appealed to the Environmental Division, arguing the project did not meet Act 250 Criteria 9(L) and 10. The Environmental Division granted summary judgment to the applicants, finding the project satisfied both criteria. The HPC then appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the project made efficient use of land, energy, roads, utilities, and other supporting infrastructure, as required by Criterion 9(L). Although the project met the definition of strip development, the court found it would not contribute to a pattern of strip development due to its agricultural nature and specific conditions limiting its use. The court also determined that the project conformed with the local town plan under Criterion 10, despite the HPC's argument to the contrary. The court affirmed the Environmental Division's grant of summary judgment to the applicants. View "In re SM Farms Shop, LLC Permit Appeal" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Shayne Lynn, was the founder and majority owner of High Fidelity, Inc., a Vermont cannabis business. In late 2020, defendants Peter Miller and Christopher Driessen, who controlled Slang Worldwide, Inc., proposed a merger between High Fidelity and Slang. They assured Lynn that Slang was financially sound and promised an $18 million investment into High Fidelity. Based on these representations, Lynn agreed to the merger in June 2021. However, Lynn later discovered that Slang was financially unstable and needed to borrow $18 million to survive. Lynn was subsequently terminated from his position.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed Lynn's complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held that Lynn did not allege any actionable misrepresentations to support a fraud claim and failed to allege justifiable reliance or the existence of a duty to support a negligent misrepresentation claim. Lynn appealed the decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the statements made by Miller and Driessen about Slang's financial health were opinions and not actionable misrepresentations of fact. The promise of an $18 million investment was a future promise, not a misrepresentation of existing fact, and Lynn did not allege that Miller and Driessen intended to renege on the promise when it was made. The court also found that Lynn's claim of misleading financial data was not pled with particularity as required by Rule 9(b).Regarding the negligent misrepresentation claim, the court held that Lynn did not adequately allege justifiable reliance, as he did not claim that the truth about Slang's financial status was unavailable to him. The court affirmed the dismissal of Lynn's complaint. View "Lynn v. Slang Worldwide, Inc." on Justia Law