Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A group of Burlington residents appealed a summary judgment order from the Environmental Division that upheld a permit for the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception Parish Charitable Trust to demolish church structures on its property. The residents argued that the court erred in concluding that 24 V.S.A. § 4413(a)(1)(C) prevented the City of Burlington from applying its Comprehensive Development Ordinance (CDO) to restrain the demolition. They also contended that the court erred in denying their motion to compel discovery regarding the pending sale of the property to a nonreligious buyer, asserting that the sale was relevant to the applicability of § 4413(a)(1)(C).The Environmental Division granted summary judgment to the Trust, finding that the intended functional use of the property was for religious purposes, specifically the deconsecration of the Cathedral through demolition, which was an ecclesiastical process. The court concluded that applying the CDO would interfere with this intended functional use. The court also denied the residents' motion to compel discovery, determining that the information sought was unrelated to the issue on appeal, which was limited to whether § 4413(a)(1)(C) exempted the property from regulation under the CDO.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. The Court held that the applicability of § 4413(a)(1)(C) depends on the intended functional use of the property at the time of the application, not on the identity of the owner or potential future uses. The Court found that the Trust's intended use of the property for religious deconsecration through demolition was protected under § 4413(a)(1)(C). The Court also upheld the denial of the motion to compel discovery, as the future use of the property by a potential buyer was irrelevant to the current application. Thus, the summary judgment in favor of the Trust was affirmed. View "In re Cathedral of the Immaculate Parish Charitable Trust Appeal" on Justia Law

Garret Hirchak, Manufacturing Solutions, Inc., and Sunrise Development LLC (plaintiffs) appealed a trial court's order dissociating Garret from Hirchak Brothers LLC and Hirchak Group LLC (defendants) and requiring the LLCs to pay over $900,000 in equity interest, unpaid compensation, and reimbursements. Plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in not recognizing oppression by the majority members of the LLCs, treating a $300,000 down payment made by Garret as gratuitous, declining to order reimbursements for certain services and cash advances, and refusing to assess prejudgment interest on any of the reimbursements. Defendants cross-appealed, arguing that the court erred in awarding compensation to Garret after he breached his fiduciary duties.The Superior Court, Lamoille Unit, Civil Division, found that Garret had breached his fiduciary duties by failing to make explicit agreements on service rates and withholding financial records. The court ordered Garret's dissociation from the LLCs and required the LLCs to pay Garret $375,000 for his equity interest, $215,430 for cash advances made before March 2020, and $213,591.84 for unpaid compensation from October 2019 to January 2021. The court also ordered reimbursement of $71,537.64 and $50,214.57 for unpaid invoices from MSI and Sunrise, respectively, before March 2020. The court denied prejudgment interest on any reimbursements and rejected Garret's claim for the $300,000 down payment.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that Garret was not entitled to reimbursement for the $300,000 down payment or for cash advances and invoices after March 2020 due to his breach of fiduciary duties. The court also upheld the denial of prejudgment interest, finding it was within the trial court's discretion. However, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's award of compensation to Garret after March 2020, concluding that his breach of fiduciary duties forfeited his right to compensation during that period. The case was remanded for a recalculation of the compensation due to Garret. View "Hirchak v. Hirchak" on Justia Law

In 2009, the petitioner pled guilty to simple assault and unlawful trespass without expressly agreeing to the facts of the charges, instead accepting the affidavits provided by police officers. Later, he was charged with new crimes, including gross negligent operation resulting in death and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death. The State sought an enhanced sentence based on his prior felony convictions, including the 2009 unlawful trespass conviction. In March 2018, the petitioner pled guilty to the new charges and admitted to being a habitual offender, resulting in an enhanced sentence of nineteen years to life.The petitioner filed a postconviction relief (PCR) petition in March 2022, arguing that the enhanced portion of his sentence was unlawful due to the lack of a factual basis for his 2009 conviction. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Civil Division, granted summary judgment in favor of the petitioner, vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing without the habitual-offender enhancement, citing that the law at the time of his plea allowed for such a challenge.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner waived his right to challenge the predicate convictions supporting the enhanced sentence when he entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea in 2018. The court referenced its previous decisions, including In re Torres and In re Gay, which established that a defendant who pleads guilty waives the right to collaterally attack the sentence based on prior convictions. The case was remanded for consideration of the petitioner's unaddressed ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. View "In re Velde" on Justia Law

Defendants discovered that a parcel of land near their property was seemingly omitted from the plaintiff's deed. They arranged for the heirs of a previous owner to deed that parcel to them without confirming the heirs' ownership or consulting the plaintiff, who used the parcel. After recording their deed, defendants informed the plaintiff that they owned the parcel and asked her to remove her belongings. The plaintiff sued for deed reformation and slander of title.The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Civil Division, granted the plaintiff's claim for deed reformation on summary judgment and concluded that Mr. Kolodziej slandered the plaintiff's title after a bench trial. Defendants appealed the decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the plaintiff had a transferrable ownership interest capable of disparagement, as the reformed deed related back to the original deed. The court found that the defendants published a false statement by recording a deed that falsely claimed ownership of the disputed parcel. The court also concluded that Mr. Kolodziej acted with malice by recklessly disregarding the plaintiff's potential claim to the property. Finally, the court determined that the plaintiff's legal expenses incurred in clearing the cloud on her title constituted special damages necessary to sustain her slander-of-title claim. The court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the deed reformation and the ruling on the slander-of-title claim, including the award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff. View "Massucco v. Kolodziej" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her partner, owners of Health Hero Farm LLC, sought to buy out a local farming family from their partnership. During this period, they befriended the defendant, a local auto-repair shop owner with a small farm. They discussed forming a partnership with him, and plaintiff represented to the Vermont Land Trust that they were partnering with the defendant to secure approval for the buyout. Plaintiff and defendant agreed to purchase Galloway cattle, with plaintiff advancing the funds. Plaintiff insisted on a written agreement, but defendant preferred a handshake deal. Eventually, defendant signed a promissory note without reading it, which included an attorney’s-fees provision.The Superior Court, Grand Isle Unit, Civil Division, held a bench trial and concluded that the promissory note did not accurately reflect an agreement between the parties. The court found that the note was a contract of adhesion and awarded plaintiff damages and prejudgment interest under a theory of unjust enrichment, rather than enforcing the promissory note.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the promissory note was unambiguous and enforceable according to its terms. The court found that defendant’s failure to read the note before signing it did not constitute a defense to enforcement. The court also determined that the note was not a contract of adhesion and was not unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Falcao v. Richardson" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with attempted second-degree murder for allegedly stabbing his roommate in the neck with a fillet knife in November 2019. The defendant admitted to the stabbing but claimed self-defense. The roommate testified that they had a good relationship and were drinking buddies, but a scuffle at a bar led to the incident. The bartender corroborated the roommate's account, adding that the defendant was angry and mentioned having a knife. The defendant testified that he acted in self-defense because the roommate threatened to kill him.The Superior Court, Franklin Unit, Criminal Division, conducted the trial. The jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated assault, a lesser-included offense of attempted second-degree murder. The defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the court erred in handling a discovery violation, denying judicial notice of the bartender's dismissed DUI charge, and failing to ensure the jury could hear defense counsel's questions due to COVID-19 mask protocols. The court denied the motion, finding no prejudice from the discovery violation and offering remedies the defendant declined. It also found no error in denying judicial notice and attributed any hearing issues to defense counsel's failure to speak up.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not commit plain or structural error by failing to sua sponte inquire if jurors could hear defense counsel's questions. It found no prejudice from the discovery violation, as the defendant declined offered remedies. The court also upheld the trial court's decision not to take judicial notice of the bartender's dismissed DUI charge, finding the proposed method appropriate. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decisions. View "State v. L'Esperance" on Justia Law

Susan McHugo Inouye sought damages and equitable remedies against Gregory McHugo, Nancy McHugo, and the estate of Patricia Bixby McHugo, alleging that Patricia breached a contract for mutual wills made with Susan’s father, John McHugo, under which Susan was a beneficiary. The trial court dismissed Susan’s claims, concluding that Patricia’s notice of intent to revoke her will during John’s life meant there was no detrimental reliance and thus no enforceable contract. Alternatively, the court found that John consented to rescission of the mutual-wills contract.The Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, initially reviewed the case. The court found that John had notice of Patricia’s intention to change her will and did not alter his own estate plan in response. The court concluded that there was no detrimental reliance by John and that mutual consent was not required to revoke the contract. The court also suggested that John’s inaction indicated his consent to rescind the contract. Susan appealed the decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the mutual-wills contract was enforceable on its own terms and that unilateral notice of intent to revoke was insufficient to rescind the contract. The court held that mutual consent was required to revoke the contract, as explicitly stated in the contract. The court found that the trial court’s conclusion that John consented to rescission was inadequately supported by the record, as mere inaction did not constitute consent. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Inouye v. Estate of McHugo" on Justia Law

Nicole Stone, a person with disabilities who uses a motorized wheelchair, resides in St. Johnsbury, Vermont. In 2020, her mother’s boyfriend, Johnathan Chase, built an outdoor structure to facilitate socially distanced meetings for Stone. A neighbor complained about the structure, leading the town zoning administrator to inform Chase that it violated setback requirements and to advise him to seek a variance. The Development Review Board (DRB) denied the variance request without discussing Stone’s disability-related needs. Stone did not appeal the decision but filed a discrimination complaint with the Vermont Human Rights Commission.The Commission investigated and found reasonable grounds to believe the Town of St. Johnsbury discriminated against Stone based on her disability. The Commission filed a complaint in the Civil Division of the Superior Court, seeking various forms of relief, including declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and civil penalties. The Town moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that only the Environmental Division had jurisdiction over such claims. The Civil Division dismissed the complaint, concluding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because ruling on the discrimination claim would constitute an impermissible collateral attack on the final zoning decision.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Civil Division has jurisdiction over all Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act (VFHPAA) claims. The Court held that the finality provisions of 24 V.S.A. § 4472 do not preclude the Commission from seeking remedies for discrimination that do not require reopening the final zoning decision. The Court also determined that the Commission is not an "interested person" under the statute and is therefore not bound by the exclusivity-of-remedy provisions. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Vermont Human Rights Commission v. Town of St. Johnsbury" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Jane Doe, filed a complaint against Victoria Camacho, alleging sexual harassment, assault, and exploitation while incarcerated. The claims were subject to a three-year statute of limitations starting in April 2020. Doe initially filed a similar complaint in June 2022, but Camacho was not properly served within the required 60 days. Despite multiple extensions and attempts, service was not completed until January 2023, after the deadline had passed. The court dismissed the claims against Camacho in the original case due to insufficient service.In the current case, Doe refiled the complaint in July 2023, arguing that the Vermont savings statute or equitable tolling should apply to extend the statute of limitations. The trial court dismissed the complaint as time-barred, finding that the savings statute did not apply because the failure to serve Camacho was not due to unavoidable accident or neglect by the process server. The court also rejected the equitable tolling argument, noting that the State's actions did not mislead Doe regarding service.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court held that the savings statute did not apply because the failure to serve Camacho was due to Doe's lack of diligence, not an unavoidable accident or neglect by the process server. The Court also found that Doe did not preserve her equitable tolling argument for appeal, as it was not adequately presented in the lower court. Consequently, the dismissal of Doe's claims as time-barred was upheld. View "Doe v. Camacho" on Justia Law

The case involves two sisters, Stacey Martin and Christine Lyon, who inherited their family residence as tenants in common after their father's death in 2019. Their mother lived on the property until her death in 2022, after which the sisters agreed to prepare the property for sale. They decided to restore the property, with Christine performing most of the labor. However, their relationship deteriorated, leading Stacey to file a complaint seeking partition of the property.The Superior Court, Windsor Unit, Civil Division, held a one-day bench trial and issued written findings. The court calculated the contributions each sister made towards the mortgage, taxes, insurance, utilities, and agreed-upon maintenance and improvements. It credited Christine for her labor but excluded her discretionary improvements due to lack of evidence of increased property value. The court concluded that Christine's share of the equity was $187,450 and ordered her to take assignment of the property by paying Stacey $92,550. If Christine chose not to take assignment, the property would be sold, and the proceeds divided.Christine appealed the denial of her request for prejudgment interest, arguing it should be awarded as of right under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) or as a matter of discretion. The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that prejudgment interest is not available for partition awards, as partition is an equitable remedy, not an action for damages. The court concluded that the credits for Christine's contributions were part of the equitable distribution of the property and did not qualify as damages, thus not triggering prejudgment interest. View "Martin v. Lyon" on Justia Law