Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff challenged the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion to modify the parties’ parenting schedule. The parties were married in 2012. Plaintiff gave birth to their child in 2015, and defendant adopted the child through a second-parent adoption that was final in October 2016. The parties ended their sexual relationship in January 2017, but continued to live together and act as co-parents. In November 2017, the parties signed a “Marital Settlement Agreement” with the help of an application called “Wevorce.” In negotiating the agreement, they did not consult with lawyers or third parties, except for one half-hour consultation with “a lawyer on Church Street.” At the same time, they signed a court form titled “Agreement on Parental Rights and Responsibilities, Parent Child Contact and Provisions Relating to Children.” Plaintiff filed for divorce in December 2017, and submitted the parties’ stipulation to waive final hearing. The parties were still living together and sharing in the child’s care when they commenced the divorce action. The divorce was finalized in July 2018 at an uncontested hearing before the family division. Both parties represented themselves. At the time and following the divorce, they continued to live in the same house and to share care of the child. In November 2018, plaintiff moved out and became reluctant to allow defendant time with the child. Plaintiff had not discussed this “total move” with defendant beforehand. In January 2019, defendant filed a motion to modify parent-child contact on the ground that “[t]here has been a real, substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances in that the parent and child are no longer all living in the same household and there is no schedule for any parent child contact for Defendant.” Plaintiff opposed the motion to modify. When the request was granted, Plaintiff appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) holding a hearing on the motion to modify when a prior judge had determined that the case should proceed as a motion for relief from judgment; (2) finding that there was a real and unanticipated change in circumstances; and (3) assessing the best interests of the child. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Fabiano v. Cotton" on Justia Law

Father appealed a family division order terminating his parental rights to his son C.B., born in August 2016. The State filed a petition alleging that C.B. was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS) in October 2017 based on allegations that father had repeatedly engaged in domestic violence and mother continued to allow father to be around her and C.B. despite repeated abuse and court orders barring contact. A January 2018 order gave father the right to supervised parent-child contact, but he did not follow through and no visits took place. Father had a lengthy criminal history including a conviction for attempted aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. At the time of the final hearing, he had several charges still pending. Father required safe housing, employment, therapy, parenting classes, and time to develop a relationship with C.B. Given father’s lack of progress towards achieving case-plan goals, the trial court found there was no possibility he could safely parent C.B. in a time reasonable for C.B., given C.B.’s need for permanency, thus termination of his rights was granted. Father alleged on appeal that the court committed several errors related to paternal grandmother’s requests for a guardianship of C.B. in the probate division, and for visitation with C.B. in the family division. Father also claimed the court deprived him of standing at the merits stage, failed to assign him counsel, and erred in not directing a suitability assessment of paternal grandmother at the initial temporary-care hearing. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re C.B., Juvenile" on Justia Law

Defendant Jacob Rillo appealed his conviction for selling or dispensing a regulated drug (fentanyl) with death resulting, arguing that his guilty plea lacked a factual basis. After review of the trial court record, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed and reverse defendant’s conviction and sentence for that count. The matter was remanded to the trial court for resentencing on the remaining counts. View "Vermont v. Rillo" on Justia Law

Defendant, MontChilly, Inc., appealed a trial court’s order requiring it to remove portions of a fence that interfered with plaintiff VTRE Investments, LLC's easement for ingress and egress. MontChilly also contended the trial court improperly failed to issue a ruling on its counterclaim for trespass against plaintiff for parking on MontChilly’s property without any legal right to do so. On cross-appeal, plaintiff challenged the court’s holding that it was bound by a reciprocal easement allowing a drainpipe over its property on the ground that its predecessor in interest did not sign the instrument creating the easement. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order requiring MontChilly to remove portions of its fence, and remanded for the court to enter judgment on MontChilly’s trespass counterclaim. With respect to VTRE’s cross-appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the court’s judgment. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "VTRE Investments, LLC v. MontChilly, Inc." on Justia Law

Todd and Melissa Muller appealed a superior court decision granting summary judgment to their insurer, Progressive Northern Insurance Company. The Mullers challenged the court’s conclusions on how the setoff provision of their insurance policy should have been applied when there were multiple claimants. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that, construing the insurance policy as a whole, the setoff provision is unambiguous: It clearly provided that Progressive was entitled to reduce “all sums . . . paid” regardless of the number of claims made. View "Progressive Northern Insurance Company v. Muller" on Justia Law

Both the Vermont State Employees’ Association (VSEA) and the State of Vermont appealed a Labor Relations Board decision sustaining and dismissing in part a grievance filed by the VSEA on behalf of grievant Michael Welch, an employee of the Vermont Department of Liquor Control (DLC). Between 2007 and 2015, grievant worked as a state transport deputy sheriff with the Orange County Sheriff’s Department (OCSD). In 2015, he was hired by the DLC as a liquor-control investigator. The State determined that while working as a transport deputy, grievant had been a county employee, and therefore he was not eligible for salary and leave benefits available under the CBA to certain prior State employees beginning another State job. The VSEA then filed the instant grievance alleging that the State violated the CBA by failing to pay grievant at the contractually required step and failing to calculate his leave accrual at the contractually required rate. After considering the parties’ positions, the Board concluded that, for purposes of compensation and benefits, transport deputies are State employees exempt from the classified service. As a result, it found that the State violated Articles 30, 31, and 62 of the CBA in denying grievant compensation and leave benefits to which he was entitled. However, the Board determined that the State did not violate Article 45 because the promotional pay rate available thereunder applied only to those transferring between positions in the State classified service. The grievance alleged ongoing violations by the State of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA). After review, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed as to Articles 30, 31 and 62, but reversed as to Article 45. The matter was remanded for calculation fo the amount that grievant was owed under Article 45 of the CBA. View "In re Grievance of Michael Welch" on Justia Law

Defendant Gregory Welch was convicted by jury of lewd and lascivious conduct. At trial, the State introduced evidence that defendant fled when police tried to arrest him, and the court instructed the jury on the use of flight evidence as suggesting consciousness of guilt. Defendant argued on appeal that the court erred in failing to instruct jurors that they could not return a guilty verdict based solely on the evidence of flight. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Welch" on Justia Law

R.L. Vallee, Inc. appealed the superior court’s denial of its motion to intervene in a state condemnation action seeking property rights for a highway project. Vallee argued: (1) it had a right to intervene under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(1) because Vermont’s highway condemnation statute conferred an unconditional right to intervene; and (2) it had a right to intervene under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) because it had an interest relating to property that was subject to the condemnation action and intervention was necessary to protect that interest. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court held that Vallee had an unconditional statutory right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(1), and accordingly, reversed. View "Agency of Transportation v. Timberlake Associates et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff lived in Stowe, Vermont with her husband C.D. and their teenage daughter. Plaintiff and her husband co-founded a business, Transegy, LLC, that provided leadership development and executive coaching. Plaintiff worked from a home office and used her personal cell phone number as the contact number for the business. C.D. previously worked at a company called Inntopia. Defendant lived in Stowe, Vermont as a writer, political strategist and media consultant who had a “reputation as an aggressive operator in his professional pursuits.” He was in a romantic relationship with L.S., who also lived in Stowe and had a teenage son who attended high school in the same class as plaintiff’s daughter. Sometime in 2017, C.D. had a sexual encounter with L.S., who had been exploring potential employment opporunities with Inntopia. Shortly after the incident, L.S. reported to defendant that C.D. sexually assaulted her. L.S. filed a sexual-harassment lawsuit against C.D. and Inntopia, which settled in May 2017. As part of the settlement, L.S. signed a nondisclosure agreement. Plaintiff was unaware of L.S.’s allegations and her husband’s infidelity until the lawsuit settled. Shortly before the settlement, plaintiff began receiving numerous calls from a number with no caller ID. Evidence at trial showed that between April 2017 and March 2018, defendant called her cell phone twenty-six times from a masked number. Defendant also called C.D.’s cell phone repeatedly during this period. In total, he called or texted plaintiff’s and C.D.’s cell phones a total of 151 times. Many of the phone calls took place in the evening, including calls after ten or eleven p.m. Ultimately, plaintiff filed a complaint for Order Against Stalking against defendant. Defendant appealed a final stalking order requiring him to stay 300 feet away from plaintiff. He argued that his conduct of: (1) calling plaintiff’s cell phone repeatedly from a number with no caller ID; (2) sending three shipments of books addressed to her husband to the house she and her husband shared, including primarily books about rape; and (3) watching her in a coffee shop for an unspecified period of time, could not be considered stalking under the civil stalking statute, 12 V.S.A. 5131. Construing the terms of section 5131 narrowly because it mirrored the criminal stalking statute, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that defendant’s conduct in this case did not rise to the level of stalking, and therefore reversed. View "Hinkson v. Stevens" on Justia Law

In May 2018, appellants Green Mountain Fireworks, LLC and its owner Matthew Lavigne, began selling fireworks from a retail store in Colchester, Vermont. As described in their complaint, the “intended purpose” for the store was “to sell retail fireworks to consumers.” In relation to the retail store, appellants obtained a license from the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) as a “Type 53 - Dealer of Explosives.” They also got a building permit and a certificate of occupancy from the Town Zoning Administrator. These zoning permits were the only two permit applications appellants submitted to the Town. The issue this appeal presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review centered on whether 20 V.S.A. 3132(a)(1) authorized municipalities to grant permits for the general retail sale of fireworks to consumers who do not hold valid permits to display those fireworks. Appellants appealed the superior court's dismissal of two actions: (1) their appeal of the Town of Colchester selectboard’s denial of their application for a permit to sell fireworks pursuant to 20 V.S.A. 3132(a)(1); and (2) their request for a declaratory judgment that, even without that distinct permit, they had “all possible and applicable permits” and were permitted under section 3132 to sell fireworks in the manner described in their complaint. The Supreme Court concluded that section 3132(a)(1) required a distinct permit for the sale of fireworks, but did not authorize a permit for the general retail sale of fireworks along the lines proposed by appellants. The only fireworks sales authorized by statute were sales to the holder of a display permit for the purpose of the permitted display. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgments. View "Green Mountain Fireworks, LLC, et al. v. Town of Colchester et al." on Justia Law