Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Parents appealed the termination of their rights in M.L., born in 2014, and H.T., born in 2015, following a long-delayed initial disposition hearing. They argued the trial court: (1) committed plain error in accepting their stipulation that the children were in need of care or supervision (CHINS); (2) violated their due process rights by delays in the proceedings; and (3) erred in concluding that they would not be able to parent the children within a reasonable time. While the delay in the initial disposition hearing meant the court did not have to find stagnation in order to terminate the parents’ residual parental rights, the court made findings that supported termination. Contrary to parents’ assertion, the Vermont Supreme Court found the trial court did not “ignore[] the injustices that were apparent to service providers, expert witnesses and the GALs.” Instead, the Supreme Court determined the trial court applied the law and evaluated, based on the evidence, whether terminating parents’ rights would be in the children’s best interests. “While parents disagree with the court’s conclusion, they fail to show error.” View "In re H.T. & M.L." on Justia Law

Parents appeal the termination of their parental rights to son C.L.S. C.L.S. was born in February 2018. During mother’s last trimester of pregnancy, hospital staff reported to the Department for Children and Families (DCF) that mother had repeatedly tested positive for illicit unprescribed substances. She missed numerous prenatal and medication-assisted-treatment appointments during her pregnancy. She declined inpatient treatment or a referral to a substance-abuse clinic. Parents were unmarried but lived together prior to C.L.S.’s birth. At birth, C.L.S. weighed less than five pounds, had an underdeveloped esophagus, and was in withdrawal from having illegal drugs in his system. He initially required a feeding tube. Mother tested positive for numerous unprescribed illegal drugs. DCF took C.L.S into custody on an emergency basis on the day he was born and filed a petition alleging that C.L.S. was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). A temporary care hearing began the following day. The parents denied that C.L.S. was CHINS, sought a conditional order giving custody to father, and requested a contested temporary care hearing. The court continued custody with DCF but permitted parents to have unsupervised contact with C.L.S. while he remained in the hospital. C.L.S. was subsequently discharged to a foster home and father filed a motion requesting parent-child contact and unsupervised visitation. In September 2018, after a contested hearing, the court issued a disposition order continuing DCF custody and adopted a case plan calling for concurrent goals of reunification with either parent or adoption. Neither party appealed the disposition order. In January 2019, the State filed petitions to terminate mother’s and father’s parental rights. On appeal, neither parent challenged the court’s findings or conclusions in the termination order. Rather, they asserted the court committed various errors at the temporary care hearings that required reversal of the merits determination and subsequent disposition orders. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed termination. View "In re C.L.S." on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Grant was charged with one count of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor, to which he pled not guilty. He was not fingerprinted or photographed before arraignment. At arraignment, the State asked the court to impose four conditions of release. The first three conditions, to which defendant did not object, were: that he come to court when directed; keep a current address and phone number on file with his attorney and the court clerk; and not engage in criminal behavior. The last condition required defendant to “report to Brattleboro PD for the taking of fingerprints and photographs.” Defendant objected to the final condition at his arraignment. The issue in this case was whether, as a matter of course, every defendant charged with a misdemeanor may be ordered to submit to fingerprinting pursuant to 20 V.S.A. 2061(d). In ordering Defendant to submit to fingerprinting, it essentially created a blanket rule authorizing fingerprinting in every misdemeanor case. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the trial court’s action was counter to the Legislature’s direction, therefore reversing the trial court’s imposition of the condition. View "Vermont v. Grant" on Justia Law

Juvenile M.E. appealed the family division’s dismissal of the State’s petition to declare her a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). In May 2019, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) filed a petition alleging that M.E. was without proper parental care. The CHINS petition was based on mother’s admitted use of heroin on one occasion and allegations that M.E. had been exposed to drug use and paraphernalia while in the care of her parents. The court issued an emergency care order transferring custody to DCF. After a temporary care hearing, custody was continued with DCF. A merits hearing was held; subsequently the court concluded the State failed to establish the merits and dismissed the petition. “[A]ny time the State seeks to interfere with the rights of parents on the generalized assumption that the children are in need of care and supervision, it must first produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the statutory directives allowing such intervention are fully satisfied.” The fact that there was evidence in the record to contradict the court’s findings was insufficient for the Vermont Supreme Court to reverse the trial court’s conclusion. Accordingly, the Court affirmed dismissal of the CHINS petition. View "In re M.E." on Justia Law

Defendant Andrew Stewart, Jr. pleaded guilty to assault and robbery with a deadly weapon based on allegations that during the evening of February 11, 2017, defendant held a gun to the complainant’s head in the parking lot of a restaurant, demanded her money, and took her bag, wallet, and phone. At the plea colloquy, Defendant stated, “I’m not denying I robbed anyone, sir. In my heart I know I robbed somebody. . . . Do I remember putting a gun to her head and telling her to give me money? No, sir, I do not. I don’t remember the incident.” He said that he had had sufficient time to discuss the plea agreement with his attorney and had no concerns with his attorney’s work for him. The trial court acknowledged it was “struggling somewhat with the defendant’s acknowledgement of the factual basis here.” But the court accepted defendant’s plea because defendant “repeatedly asserted” the following: the plea was voluntary; he had committed the crime and could not remember the incident only because he was intoxicated at the time; and he did not contest the State’s evidence. On appeal of his ultimate conviction, defendant argued the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Based on the trial court’s “struggle” with accepting defendant’s plea, and “given our liberal standard for granting a withdrawal of plea,” the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion. View "Vermont v. Stewart" on Justia Law

On a winter night in 2014, strong winds blew through the town of Georgia, Vermont, causing a partially constructed livestock barn to collapse. Commercial Construction Endeavors, Inc. (CCE), the contractor building the barn, sought recompense for the resulting losses from its insurer, Ohio Security Insurance Company. However, insurer and insured disagreed as to policy coverage for costs incurred by CCE in removing the remains of the collapsed barn and rebuilding it to its pre-collapse state. Ultimately, CCE sued Ohio Security for breach of contract. In successive summary-judgment rulings, the trial court held that the contractor’s rebuilding expenses were covered under the policy, but the cost of debris removal was not. Ohio Security cross-appealed the first ruling and CCE appealed the second; the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the first ruling and affirmed the second. The Court determined the additional collapse coverage applied only to “Covered Property,” which was business personal property; CCE did not dispute that the barn was not business personal property and thus was not “Covered Property.” Therefore, the court’s first summary-judgment ruling was reversed. The debris removal was not a loss involving business personal property. As a result, it was not a loss to “Covered Property” at that term was defined by the policy at issue. View "Commercial Construction Endeavors, Inc. v. Ohio Security Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Defendant Adam Provost appealed a civil division determination that plaintiff Burlington School District could disclose, in response to a newspaper’s public records request, an unredacted copy of a Resignation Agreement reached by the District and Provost concerning his employment with the District. Provost argued the civil division: (1) lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the District’s request for declaratory relief regarding a matter within the exclusive purview of the Public Records Act (PRA); and (2) erred by granting the District’s request for declaratory relief based on its conclusion that Provost had waived any objection to release of the agreement, even assuming it had jurisdiction to consider the request. The Vermont Supreme Court determined the District and Provost entered into a contract acknowledging the obligation of the District, as a public entity subject to the PRA, to release the Resignation Agreement "under the provisions of applicable law." The District and Provost had reached a legal stalemate over whether release of an unredacted copy of the Agreement would violate not only the PRA, but also their Agreement, which would expose the District to a breach-of-contract claim. Under these circumstances, it was entirely appropriate for the superior court to exercise its general jurisdiction to adjudicate the District’s request for declaratory relief. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Burlington School District v. Provost" on Justia Law

B.B. was charged with aggravated assault based on allegations from August 2016. In November 2018, B.B. was 20 years old, and filed a motion for youthful-offender status based on his age in 2016 . B.B. struggled with alcohol and heroin addiction, and his residential and employment situations were “unstable.” The State opposed the motion. There was prima facie evidence that B.B. “engaged in a new violent act” while he was “under the influence of alcohol,” even though B.B. was underage and was subject to a condition of release that required him to refrain from drinking alcohol. The youthful-offender statutory scheme would have allowed, if the criminal defendant was under twenty-two years old and was at least twelve years old at the time of the alleged offense, a motion to be filed with the criminal division requesting youthful-offender status. Attaining that status would provide for the defendant to obtain a battery of counseling and rehabilitation in addition to any punishment determined by the court. Only if the court finds that public safety will be protected may the court then go on to consider the other statutory factors. Following a hearing, the trial court concluded that B.B. had not met his burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that public safety would be protected if he were granted youthful-offender status, and denied the motion. B.B. requested permission to appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court, which was granted. However, finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "In re B.B., Juvenile" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a final relief-from-abuse (RFA) order issued by the superior court family division. The parties had an intimate relationship and began living together in 2011 in a house originally owned by plaintiff’s family but later purchased by the parties. The relationship ended in December 2017. In June 2018, plaintiff filed a motion for relief from abuse, asking the Orange County family division to order defendant to stay away from her and the parties’ home. The Orange County family division concluded defendant had engaged in abuse by stalking, and that there was danger of further abuse. A temporary order was extended for six months; at the end, the RFA was not extended. The court determined at that point, the parties were engaged primarily in a property dispute. On December 19, 2018, the day after the Orange County family division denied plaintiff’s motion to extend the previous RFA order, plaintiff filed a new request for an RFA order in the Washington County family division. In her affidavit, she alleged that a few hours after the previous day’s hearing, defendant entered her residence without her consent to retrieve his belongings. Plaintiff further alleged that defendant got inside the house through forced entry and disabled the outside security cameras. She stated that defendant had a history of restraining her and that the previous RFA order had expired only hours before he entered her residence. The Washington County family division granted a temporary RFA order and scheduled a hearing. Following the hearing, the court issued a final RFA order based on the court’s determination that defendant had abused plaintiff by placing her in fear of imminent serious physical harm. Defendant appealed that order, arguing that: (1) the record did not support the court’s determination that plaintiff was placed in reasonable fear of imminent serious harm; (2) the court failed to make findings concerning any danger of future abuse; and (3) the court abused its discretion by not allowing him to cross-examine plaintiff, unfairly limiting defendant’s direct testimony, and not admitting relevant video evidence of defendant entering plaintiff’s residence. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the record did not support the court’s determination that defendant abused plaintiff by placing her in fear of imminent serious physical harm, and vacated the RFA order. View "McCool v. Macura" on Justia Law

The issue presented to the Vermont Supreme Court in this case involved a state water-quality certification made pursuant to the federal Clean Water Act (CWA), issued by the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) for the operation of hydroelectric dams. ANR certified three dams operated by Morrisville Water and Light (MWL) and imposed conditions, including those to control the minimum amount of water released from each dam to support habitat for fish. MWL appealed these conditions to the Environmental Division. American Whitewater and Vermont Paddlers’ Club (collectively the Paddlers) also appealed, arguing that the conditions at one facility did not allow for whitewater boating. The Environmental Division rejected ANR’s flow rates and imposed MWL’s proposed flow rates, affirmed ANR’s conditions regarding a winter drawdown for one site, and imposed scheduled releases of water as requested by the Paddlers. ANR appeals and MWL cross appeals. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Environmental Division erred in rejecting ANR’s interpretation of its antidegradation policy and methodology for calculating flow rate, and affirmed the Environmental Division on the winter drawdown and timed releases for the Paddlers at the Green River facility. View "In re Morrisville Hydroelectric Project Water Quality" on Justia Law