Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The petitioner worked part-time as a bus fueler and washer at Marble Valley Regional Transit (MVRT) for approximately four years. He passed a preemployment drug screen and signed an acknowledgment of MVRT’s drug and alcohol policy, which included random drug testing and termination for a positive drug test. In December 2022, he tested positive for marijuana during a random drug test and was terminated in January 2023 for violating U.S. Department of Transportation and Federal Transit Administration (FTA) regulations. The petitioner had a medical marijuana card issued in early 2020.The petitioner applied for unemployment benefits, which were denied by a claims adjudicator on the grounds of misconduct. He appealed to an administrative law judge (ALJ), who affirmed the denial but reduced the disqualification period to six weeks, recognizing the medical use of cannabis. The petitioner then filed a document with the Employment Security Board, seeking a declaratory ruling on the applicability of the misconduct disqualification provision to off-duty medical cannabis use. The Board treated this as an appeal and affirmed the ALJ’s decision, stating that the petitioner’s actions constituted misconduct under MVRT’s drug policy.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Board’s decision. The Court held that the Board properly declined to issue a declaratory ruling because the petitioner had an available remedy through a direct appeal. The Court emphasized that declaratory rulings are not a substitute for timely appeals of agency decisions. The petitioner’s appeal of the Board’s decision was dismissed as untimely, and the Court affirmed the Board’s order declining to issue a declaratory ruling. View "Skoric v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

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A neighbor, Myrna Nathin, appealed the Environmental Division's denial of her motion to reopen a judgment declaring an Act 250 land-use permit for an adjoining property abandoned. Nathin argued she did not receive adequate notice of the petition to abandon the permit. The property in question, located on Burchard Road in Dover, Vermont, was initially permitted for subdivision and infrastructure development in 1993, with extended deadlines for completion. However, no construction occurred, and the current landowners, the Beasleys, sought to abandon the permit in 2022.The district commission declined to review the abandonment petition, citing jurisdictional issues, and the Environmental Division later declared the permit abandoned in January 2023. Nathin, who lives in New Jersey, claimed she did not receive the notice sent to her Vermont address and only learned of the abandonment in August 2023. She filed a motion for relief from judgment under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which the Environmental Division denied, stating she lacked standing as she was not a party to the original proceeding.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. The Court held that Nathin did not have standing to file a Rule 60(b) motion because she was not a party to the abandonment proceeding. The Court also found that the Environmental Division had adhered to its procedural rules and that Nathin's lack of notice did not warrant reopening the case. The Court emphasized that procedural rules must be enforced to ensure fairness and regularity, and Nathin's failure to intervene in the original proceeding precluded her from seeking relief. View "In re Burchard Road Petition" on Justia Law

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The Board of Allied Mental Health Practitioners denied an application for a license to practice clinical mental-health counseling in Vermont, citing the applicant's failure to meet educational prerequisites. The applicant, who graduated from a non-accredited program, argued that her coursework met the requirements through a combination of two courses. She also claimed that the Board had previously accepted similar coursework from another candidate, J.L., and sought to present evidence to support this claim.The Office of Professional Regulation (OPR) upheld the Board's decision. The applicant appealed, arguing that the Board and OPR improperly limited her ability to demonstrate that she was treated differently from similarly situated candidates. She also contended that the Board failed to justify its allegedly inconsistent application of licensing regulations. The appellate officer denied her motion to present additional evidence, concluding that the Board's evidentiary ruling was a matter of record and that the applicant was not seeking to introduce evidence of procedural irregularities but rather the excluded evidence itself.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the decisions of the Board and OPR. The Court held that comparator evidence might be relevant in some circumstances but found that the applicant failed to make a threshold showing that the Board had accepted credits from two courses in J.L.'s case. The Court also concluded that the Board did not abuse its discretion in excluding further evidence about J.L.'s coursework as cumulative and of dubious relevance. The appellate officer's denial of the motion to present additional evidence was also upheld, as the applicant did not demonstrate good cause for the motion. The Court affirmed the lower decisions, finding no basis to disturb them. View "In re McNamer" on Justia Law

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Frank Driscoll was running along East Shore Road in Isle La Motte when he was struck by a trailer being pulled by a truck driven by Benjamin Wright, an employee of Wright Cut and Clean, LLC. Driscoll was running on the left side of the road, facing traffic, while Wright was driving in the same direction on the right side. As Wright's truck approached, Driscoll moved to the left edge of the road but was struck by the trailer when he moved back towards the center. Driscoll was unconscious when police arrived and had no memory of the accident.Driscoll sued Wright for negligence and Wright Cut and Clean for vicarious liability and direct negligence in hiring, training, and supervising Wright. The Superior Court, Grand Isle Unit, Civil Division, bifurcated the claims and held a jury trial on the negligence claim. Driscoll's expert, Dr. Jerry Ogden, testified about the dimensions of the trailer and the truck's speed but could not establish Driscoll's position before the impact or a clear causative link between Wright's actions and Driscoll's injuries. The court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants, concluding that Driscoll failed to establish causation.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Driscoll did not provide sufficient evidence of causation, as his expert could not definitively link Wright's actions to the injury. The court emphasized that without clear evidence showing that Wright's alleged negligence caused the injury, the claim could not proceed. Consequently, the judgment in favor of Wright and Wright Cut and Clean was affirmed, and the direct negligence claim against Wright Cut and Clean was also dismissed due to the lack of an underlying tort by Wright. View "Driscoll v. Wright Cut and Clean, LLC" on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs, Miriam Lowell and Seth Healey, challenged the Vermont Department for Children and Families (DCF) after being investigated for child abuse and neglect. DCF substantiated the allegations and notified the plaintiffs, who then requested an administrative review. The review process was delayed, and the plaintiffs filed a federal lawsuit claiming the process violated their due process rights. The federal court denied their injunction request, and the plaintiffs later filed a similar complaint in state court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and mandamus under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75.The Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, dismissed the complaint, assuming the plaintiffs had a protected liberty interest but finding the administrative review process constitutionally sufficient. The court noted that the plaintiffs' claims of potential procedural violations were speculative and not reviewable. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the administrative review process did not provide adequate due process protections.The Vermont Supreme Court dismissed Lowell's claims as moot because the administrative reviewer overturned the substantiation against her, providing her with no further relief. For Healey, the court assumed a protected liberty interest but found the administrative review process constitutionally adequate under the Mathews v. Eldridge test. The court noted that the process provided sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard, with a neutral arbiter and the ability to present evidence. The court emphasized the importance of DCF's interest in protecting children and the availability of a prompt post-deprivation hearing before the Human Services Board, which offers more extensive procedural protections. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Healey's complaint, concluding that the administrative review process met due process requirements. View "Lowell v. Department for Children and Families" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs own a 325-acre property in Tunbridge, Vermont, crossed by two legal trails. The Town of Tunbridge converted these trails from Class 4 roads in 1987. In 2021, the Town's selectboard revised the town plan to potentially expand trail use, including bicycling. Plaintiffs opposed this and claimed exclusive authority over trail maintenance on their property. In 2022, the selectboard adopted a policy allowing private individuals to apply for permission to maintain the trails, prompting plaintiffs to seek a declaratory judgment that the Town lacked such authority.The Superior Court, Orange Unit, Civil Division, dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint as unripe, stating there was no justiciable controversy since no one had applied to maintain the trails. The court reiterated its stance from a prior action, emphasizing that discussions and policy adoptions did not constitute a concrete threat to plaintiffs' interests. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the new policy and procedure for trail maintenance created a sufficiently concrete controversy.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations demonstrated a sufficiently concrete threat of physical invasion and interference with their property rights. The Court held that the Town's formal assertion of authority to maintain and repair the trails, coupled with the procedure for private individuals to apply for permission, constituted an actual case or controversy. The Court reversed the trial court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiffs' declaratory judgment action to proceed. View "Echeverria v. Town of Tunbridge" on Justia Law

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The defendant, Allan Washburn, appeals a criminal division order granting the State’s motion for civil forfeiture of his dog, Chad, based on findings of animal cruelty. On three separate occasions, Chad was found locked in the defendant’s car under conditions that included high temperatures, lack of water, and unsanitary environments. The dog was observed to be in distress, unable to move freely, and suffering from malnutrition and lack of exercise. These incidents led to the defendant being issued a criminal citation for animal cruelty and the subsequent seizure of Chad.The Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Criminal Division, reviewed the case and found by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had subjected Chad to cruelty. The court credited testimony from animal control officers and humane officers who described the poor conditions Chad was kept in, including high temperatures inside the car, lack of water, and inadequate nutrition. The court also noted that Chad required medical attention upon being taken to an animal center. Based on these findings, the court granted the State’s motion for civil forfeiture of Chad.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the appeal and addressed three main arguments raised by the defendant: the criminal division’s jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceeding, the sufficiency of evidence for animal cruelty, and the admissibility of lay witness testimony regarding the car’s internal temperature. The court found no error in the lower court’s jurisdiction or its findings of animal cruelty. The court also determined that any potential error in admitting the temperature estimate was harmless, as there was ample other evidence supporting the finding of cruelty. Consequently, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to grant the civil forfeiture of Chad. View "State v. Washburn" on Justia Law

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The claimant, a New Hampshire resident, was employed by a Vermont corporation with its principal place of business in New Hampshire. His job required traveling between New Hampshire and Vermont job sites. On September 13, 2022, while working at the New Hampshire facility, the claimant injured his hand. He filed for workers' compensation benefits with the employer's Vermont insurance carrier, which denied the claim due to lack of jurisdiction.The claimant appealed to the Vermont Department of Labor, arguing that his employment constituted "employment in this State" under 21 V.S.A. § 616(a). Both parties moved for summary judgment. The Commissioner granted summary judgment to the employer, concluding that the claimant did not meet the jurisdictional requirements because he was not hired in, did not reside in, and was not injured in Vermont. The Commissioner also found that the claimant worked more hours in New Hampshire than in Vermont and rejected the claimant's broader interpretation of jurisdiction under the statute.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. The Court held that 21 V.S.A. § 616(a) requires an injury to occur in Vermont for jurisdiction to attach, with an exception for injuries outside the state if the worker was hired in Vermont. The Court found that the claimant did not meet these criteria. The Court also noted that the claimant's proposed interpretation would lead to absurd results, potentially extending Vermont's workers' compensation jurisdiction nationwide based on corporate domicile alone. The Court concluded that the Commissioner’s interpretation was consistent with legislative intent and precedent, and thus, Vermont lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the claimant’s workers' compensation claim. View "Burnett v. Home Improvement Company of Vermont" on Justia Law

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This case involves two consolidated appeals from Northwestern Medical Center and Rutland Regional Medical Center against the Green Mountain Care Board (GMCB). The GMCB had approved the proposed budgets of both medical centers for the fiscal year 2024, but with certain conditions. The medical centers challenged the GMCB's imposition of budgetary conditions that capped increases to rates charged to commercial payers. However, the medical centers had not properly raised their claims with the GMCB, leaving them unpreserved for review.The GMCB is an independent board that regulates the health care industry in Vermont. It reviews and establishes hospital budgets annually, with the aim of reducing the per-capita rate of growth in expenditures for health services in Vermont across all payers. The GMCB had released its established benchmarks for the 2024 fiscal year budget submissions, which included a benchmark that limited a hospital’s growth of net patient revenue/fixed prospective payment (NPR/FPP) to 8.6%, effectively capping increases to NPR/FPP growth by that amount. It also included a benchmark for commercial rate increases which provided that the GMCB would “also review and may adjust requested hospital commercial rate increases.”The GMCB approved the budgets of Northwestern and Rutland Regional, subject to certain conditions. These conditions included a cap on increases to commercial rates. However, neither Northwestern nor Rutland Regional had raised their claims with the GMCB, leaving them unpreserved for review.On appeal, Northwestern and Rutland Regional argued that the GMCB deprived them of due process by failing to provide adequate notice that it would impose the Commercial Rate Cap Conditions on their proposed budgets. They also claimed that the GMCB had no authority to impose the Commercial Rate Cap Conditions because the conditions lacked a factual basis and contradicted the GMCB’s initial approval of their proposed budgets. However, the Vermont Supreme Court declined to reach the merits of these claims because they were not preserved for review. The court noted that Northwestern and Rutland Regional had several opportunities to raise their claims with the GMCB before the GMCB issued its final budget decisions, but they failed to do so. Therefore, the court affirmed the decisions of the GMCB. View "In re Northwestern Medical Center Fiscal Year 2024" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a dispute between Damon Graham and Isiwat Adekoya over the primary parental rights and responsibilities (PRR) and parent-child contact (PCC) schedule for their child. The couple met in February 2021 and had a child in October 2021. After a strained relationship and a series of altercations, Adekoya moved to Texas with the child. Graham filed a parentage complaint in February 2022, and the parties agreed to a temporary PCC schedule of alternating two-week increments. The family court approved this arrangement. However, Graham appealed the family court's decision, arguing that it allowed Adekoya to control his PCC time with the child and that the provision requiring renegotiation of PCC as the child reached school age was premised on Adekoya's decision to enroll the child in preschool.The family court had awarded Adekoya primary PRR and set forth a PCC schedule. It found that the alternating biweekly schedule was in the child's best interests but recognized that maintaining this schedule indefinitely was not feasible due to the considerable physical distance separating the parents. The court ordered that the current PCC schedule would continue until the child entered preschool, at which point the schedule would automatically change. Graham argued that this decision gave Adekoya unilateral control over when the change in PCC would occur.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the family court's decision. It found that the family court did not suggest that Adekoya could dictate how Graham spends his PCC time with the child or control the child's daily routine or Graham's choice of childcare. The court also found that the family court had an evidentiary basis to conclude that the child's entrance to a certified preschool program was a proper future point for the parties to reconsider the PCC schedule. The court disagreed with Graham's claim that the family court improperly ruled on a future PCC schedule, stating that the language of the PCC order expressly left that task to a future court should the parties fail to agree on a PCC arrangement once the child is in preschool, turns four years old, or alternatively, enters kindergarten. View "Graham v. Adekoya" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law