Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Donald Francis appealed his conviction of driving under the influence (DUI), arguing that the trial court impermissibly burdened the exercise of his Fourth Amendment rights when it allowed evidence of his refusal to submit to a warrantless blood draw and then instructed the jury that it was permitted but not required to draw an inference from that evidence. In addition, he argued this evidence should not have been admitted because it was not relevant and was unduly prejudicial. Based on its decision in Vermont v. Rajda, 2018 VT 72, the Vermont Supreme Court rejected defendant’s constitutional argument, and declined to address his unpreserved relevance and prejudice arguments. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Francis" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Sullivan asked the Vermont Supreme Court to vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing with a different judge. This was defendant’s second appeal following convictions for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI) with death resulting and for leaving the scene of a fatal accident. The trial judge sentenced defendant to two concurrent four- to ten-year terms. Defendant appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, but remanded for resentencing. The Supreme Court held the trial court had “abused its discretion by not continuing the sentencing hearing to allow defendant to present the testimony of his expert witness.” On remand, the same trial judge held a resentencing hearing, and after considering evidence from the first sentencing hearing and additional evidence, the trial judge reimposed two concurrent sentences of four to ten years, with credit for time served. Defendant contended the trial court did not have discretion to impose that sentence, arguing (1) the court did not have discretion to impose a minimum sentence above the statutory mandatory minimum absent a showing of aggravating factors; (2) to the extent the court’s findings support aggravating factors, those findings are incorrect and insufficient to support the sentence; and (3) the court abused its discretion in dismissing defendant’s mitigating evidence. Further, defendant argued the trial judge’s sentencing decision and process were driven by an impermissible personal animus against defendant. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the sentence. View "Vermont v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

Applicant Ahmed Hamid-Ahmed appealed a Vermont Board of Bar Examiners (Board) denying his application to take the Vermont bar exam. Applicant has a bachelor’s degree with a major in criminal justice and a Master of Laws degree (LLM) from Widener University School of Law. However, he does not have a Juris Doctor (JD) or a substantially equivalent law degree from a foreign or domestic non-approved law school, he has not enrolled in a law office study program, and he has not been admitted to any other bar, foreign or domestic. Despite this, applicant argues that he is eligible to take the bar exam under Vermont Rule of Admission to the Bar 8(c)(4)’s “curing provision” by virtue of his LLM. He further argues that the Board violated his due process rights when it denied his application but did not explicitly notify him of the process for appealing that decision to the Vermont Supreme Court. Because appellant did not meet the requirements outlined in the Vermont Rules of Admission to the Bar, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Ahmed M. Hamid-Ahmed" on Justia Law

Defendant Victor Pixley was charged with unlawful trespass after he was found in an unoccupied farmhouse. Defendant testified that he was homeless, and he and his friend entered the property looking for a place to sleep. He stated that he entered the property at night and did not see any signs noticing against trespass. Defendant stated that he does not read so he would not have understood the signs in any event. In closing arguments, defendant admitted to entering the land and going into the farmhouse, but he argued that he was not provided with meaningful notice against trespass. Defendant appealed his eventual conviction, arguing the trial court's instruction to the jury on the notice element of the trespass charge amounted to plain error. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Pixley" on Justia Law

Applicant LK Holdings, LLC appealed the Public Utility Commission’s dismissal of its application for a certificate of public good for a proposed group net-metered photovoltaic electric power system. The Commission dismissed the petition as incomplete because applicant failed to provide notice to adjoining landowners that its application had been filed. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Petition of LK Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ira Martel appealed the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment on his personal injury claims in favor of his employer, defendant Connor Contracting, Inc., and two co-employees, defendants Jason Clark and Stephen Connor. This case was about two separate exceptions to the exclusivity rule of workers’ compensation, the first of which applied when an employee is injured other than by accident, and the second of which applied when a person or entity could be held personally liable for an employee’s injuries. In August 2013, plaintiff was part of a four-person crew employed by Connor Contracting to perform roof repair work at the Montpelier Health Center. Defendant Jason Clark was the worksite foreperson, and defendant Stephen Connor was the treasurer of Connor Contracting and one of the company owners. While working on the project, plaintiff and the other members of the roofing crew used a personal-fall-arrest system (PFAS), which was safety equipment provided by Connor Contracting and required by the company’s safety program rules, the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Vermont Occupational Safety and Health Administration (VOSHA). Plaintiff was completing the soffit work when he fell from the edge of the roof, hit the ground below, and was injured. He was not wearing a PFAS at the time he fell. The parties disputed whether a complete PFAS system was still at the project site on that day and available for plaintiff’s use. Connor Contracting disputes the removal of the PFAS and states that defendant Clark left two harnesses and lanyards at the project site. The Vermont Supreme Court held plaintiff’s action against Connor Contracting was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of Vermont’s Workers’ Compensation Act. Furthermore, plaintiff’s action against the individual defendants is barred because the acts that plaintiff alleges give rise to liability fell within the scope of a nondelegable corporate duty and defendants, therefore, cannot be held personally liable for plaintiff’s injuries. View "Martel v. Connor Contracting, Inc." on Justia Law

In October 2015, the State charged defendant Michael Tobin with aggravated sexual assault based on allegations that defendant had sexually abused his biological son while the child was under the age of thirteen. After a jury trial in December 2016, the jury found defendant guilty. Defendant, on his own and through counsel, made several arguments on appeal. The Vermont Supreme Court understood those arguments as: (1) there was insufficient evidence that the victim was under thirteen years old because the State provided no evidence of the victim’s date of birth; (2) defendant was not properly informed of the charge; (3) there was a Brady violation because the State withheld recordings of witnesses’ statements; (4) defendant’s counsel provided ineffective assistance; (5) the State violated 3 V.S.A. 129a; (6) the case was outside the statute of limitations; (7) his conviction violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and was untimely filed; and (8) the trial court committed plain error in correcting defendant’s sentence when he was not present. The Supreme Court found no reversible errors and affirmed defendant's convictions. View "Vermont v. Tobin" on Justia Law

Defendant Christian Noll appealed his conviction for stalking, arguing that: (1) the criminal stalking statute, as it existed when he was charged, was facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; (2) application of the statute to his case was unconstitutional; (3) the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to convict him of stalking; (4) the jury instruction allowed the jury to convict based on time-barred acts; and (5) the jury instruction failed to adequately describe the parameters of the true-threat doctrine under the First Amendment. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the criminal stalking statute at the time defendant was charged was facially valid because it included within the definition of stalking only constitutionally unprotected threatening speech. The statute was appropriately applied to defendant because, considering the evidence overall, a jury could conclude that the expression, which formed part of the stalking charge, was constitutionally unprotected threatening speech. However, the Court concluded the jury instruction allowed the jury to convict defendant based solely on acts that occurred outside of the applicable statute of limitations. On this basis, the Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Vermont v. Noll" on Justia Law

This case was presented to the Vermont Supreme Court after a lengthy bench trial between appellants/cross-appellees Kneebinding, Inc. (Kneebinding) and Kneebinding company directors John and Tina Springer-Miller (the Springer-Millers), and appellee/cross-appellant Richard Howell that resulted in a series of interlocutory decisions before final judgment. Kneebinding and the Springer-Millers appealed the trial court’s decisions regarding: (1) a stipulated fine for Howell’s alleged violations of an injunction prohibiting him from speaking in certain settings about Kneebinding or the Springer-Millers; (2) termination of the injunction; (3) other contempt sanctions for Howell’s alleged violations of the injunction; (4) defamation damages; (5) Kneebinding’s claim of tortious interference with contract; and (6) attorney’s fees. With respect to their appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. Howell appealed the trial court’s denial of his third-party shareholder derivative and direct claims against the Springer-Millers for fraud in the inducement and various alleged breaches of fiduciary duties. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on these claims. View "Kneebinding, Inc. v. Howell" on Justia Law

The State appealed a Vermont Labor Relations Board decision interpreting a collective bargaining agreement between the State and the Vermont State Employees’ Association (VSEA). The question at issue was whether a change made to the agreement’s family-leave provisions in 1999 limited an employee’s right to use more than six weeks of accrued, paid sick leave while on family leave because of the employee’s own serious illness. The Board found that, although the agreement itself was ambiguous, extrinsic evidence showed that the parties did not intend to limit the use of sick leave. The State argued on appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court that the contract was not ambiguous and that the limitation on use of sick leave applies. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Board. View "In re Grievance of Kobe Kelley" on Justia Law