Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, the plaintiffs, Stowe Aviation, LLC and Stowe Airport Investment, LP, appealed from a denial of their motion to reopen a breach-of-contract case with the Vermont Agency of Commerce and Community Development. The plaintiffs had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Agency in 2014, outlining their intention to develop and expand the Morrisville-Stowe State Airport using funds secured through the EB-5 program. However, the Agency later transferred its obligations under the MOU to the Department of Financial Regulation (DFR) without informing the plaintiffs, leading to the failure of the airport project.The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Agency, alleging that the Agency breached its contract by failing to perform under the MOU and by transferring its obligations to the DFR without notice. The trial court dismissed the claims, and the case was closed. The plaintiffs then moved to reopen the case and amend their complaint, but the trial court denied their motion. The plaintiffs appealed this order.The Supreme Court of Vermont reversed the order and remanded the case, holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion to reopen the case. The Supreme Court reasoned that plaintiffs could potentially obtain relief to cure a pleading deficiency under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), and it was inappropriate for the trial court to deny relief simply because plaintiffs did not request leave to amend in their opposition papers before the court entered judgment. On remand, the plaintiffs must demonstrate a valid basis to vacate the previously entered judgment to prevent manifest injustice before they can file their amended complaint. View "Stowe Aviation, LLC et al. v. Agency of Commerce & Community Development" on Justia Law

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the civil division's decision to invalidate a portion of Donald Crofut's will that granted Sean Hammond an option to purchase Crofut's residence for $40,000. The court found that Crofut and Hammond had a relationship of trust and confidence. Hammond lived with Crofut, cared for him during his illness, and had access to Crofut's debit card. Evidence showed that Hammond made unauthorized purchases with Crofut's debit card and withdrew money from Crofut's bank account without permission. The court found that, had Crofut known about the theft, he would not have included the option provision in his will. As such, the option bequeathed to Hammond was found to be the result of undue influence. The court also held that partial voidance of a will is an acceptable remedy when undue influence is found, as it best preserves the testator’s intent and effectuates their desires. Here, the option provision was a small part of a much larger will, and the evidence of undue influence was unrelated to the other bequests and individuals. Therefore, invalidating the entire will would have contravened Crofut's intent. View "In re Estate of Crofut" on Justia Law

In this case, Scott Phillips appealed against the denial of his motion for acquittal, the jury charge, and his probation conditions by the criminal division of the Superior Court, Bennington Unit. The State of Vermont Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision.The case arose from a domestic violence incident where Phillips assaulted his girlfriend and threw a knife towards her. He was charged with three counts of domestic assault, two of which he was found guilty of by a jury. His post-trial motion for acquittal and a new trial was denied by the lower court.Phillips argued that conviction under 13 V.S.A. § 1043(a)(2) required the State to prove that he threatened a household member in addition to having used or attempted to use a deadly weapon on them. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, explaining that the statute criminalizes three distinct actions: (1) using a deadly weapon on a household member; (2) attempting to use a deadly weapon on a household member; or (3) possessing and threatening to use a deadly weapon on a household member. The court found that Phillips' actions of throwing the knife in the victim's direction could be inferred as an attempt to harm her with the weapon, which satisfies the requirements of the statute.Phillips also contested the jury instructions and the lack of a special verdict form. However, the Supreme Court found no error in the lower court's instructions or its decision not to provide a special verdict form.Finally, Phillips objected to his probation conditions, which included substance use screening, a prohibition from consuming alcohol, and a prohibition from possessing deadly weapons. The Supreme Court rejected this objection as well, as Phillips had not preserved these issues for appellate review and failed to adequately argue for plain-error review in his briefing.In sum, the State of Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment, finding no error in the interpretation of the statute, the jury instructions, or the probation conditions imposed on Phillips. View "State v. Phillips" on Justia Law

In an appeal from the Superior Court, Washington Unit, Civil Division, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to dismiss a case brought by H. Brooke Paige concerning the validity of the 2022 general election. Paige, a legal voter, contended that Act 60, which mandated mailing ballots and a postage-paid return envelope to all active voters due to the Covid-19 pandemic, invalidated all elections and public questions on the 2022 ballot. He argued that Act 60 contravened the Vermont Constitution's requirement for voters to cast ballots in person on election day. He also alleged that mail-in ballots were subject to fraudulent conduct, and separately, he claimed procedural deficiencies regarding the language of two public questions on the ballot. The lower court dismissed the case for lack of standing under § 2603, as Paige could not show that he had been personally injured by the alleged issues. In the appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court found that Paige failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, as his complaint did not allege that the result of any specific election was invalid due to material vote irregularities. The court noted that § 2603 allows voters to contest a particular election or public question, but it does not provide a means to challenge every election and question on a single ballot without distinguishing among them. Thus, the court affirmed the dismissal of Paige's complaint. View "Paige v. State of Vermont" on Justia Law

The Office of Child Support (OCS) filed a parentage action against Cody Thomas, alleging that he was the biological father of a child born in 2017. However, the complaint was lodged in 2021, beyond the two-year limitations period specified under 15C V.S.A. § 402. The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Family Division dismissed the action due to lack of standing. The OCS appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, arguing that its standing should be recognized as the action served the child's best interests. The Vermont Supreme Court, however, upheld the lower court's decision. The court determined that the two-year limitation for challenging parentage under § 402 was clear and unambiguous. It further noted that the statute provided for exceptions to this rule, none of which applied in this case. The court stated that allowing parentage claims beyond the two-year limit posed risks to a child's financial and psychological stability. Therefore, enforcing finality in parentage actions was in children's best interests, aligning with the overall purpose of the Vermont Parentage Act. The court concluded that the OCS lacked standing to challenge the child's parentage and affirmed the dismissal of the case. View "Booker v. Thomas" on Justia Law

In Vermont, the defendant, Denzel Lafayette, was charged with sexual assault, sexual exploitation by luring a child, and carrying a weapon while committing a felony. The case revolved around an incident in which Lafayette had sexual intercourse with a 15-year old girl, whom he had been communicating with on Facebook. Lafayette had also allegedly shown her a firearm during their encounter.The jury found Lafayette guilty of sexual assault and carrying a weapon while committing a felony. On appeal, Lafayette argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court committed an error by not instructing the jury that it had to find that the carrying of the gun was related to the sexual assault.The Vermont Supreme Court disagreed with Lafayette's claims. The court found that the victim's testimony provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find Lafayette guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of sexual assault. It further held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for carrying a weapon while committing a felony, as the gun had the potential to facilitate the sexual assault. The court also found no error in the jury instruction, as the relationship between the carrying of the weapon and the sexual assault was self-evident. Therefore, the court affirmed both of Lafayette's convictions.However, the court agreed with Lafayette's contention that certain probation conditions were overbroad and unduly restrictive. The court remanded the case to the trial court to strike one probation condition and to make findings, modify, or strike portions of two other challenged conditions. View "State v. Denzel Lafayette" on Justia Law

In this case, the State of Vermont appealed the superior court’s dismissal of charges against defendant Michael Armstrong on speedy-trial grounds. It had been more than nineteen years since the charges against defendant were first brought and more than fifteen years since defendant was adjudicated incompetent to stand trial. The trial court dismissed the charges, finding that the State had failed in its obligation to reevaluate defendant’s competency, thereby violating defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the delay was primarily due to defendant's incompetency, which was not attributable to the State, and the State had no duty to seek a reevaluation of the defendant's competency absent an indication of changed circumstances. The Court concluded that the defendant did not make a sufficient claim of denial of his right to a speedy trial, reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the charges, and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in a case involving a man who was convicted of assault and robbery following a jury trial. The defendant, Jason Bockus, appealed the conviction arguing that the trial court erred in not suppressing out-of-court non-eyewitness identifications and denying his motion for acquittal. He also contended that the court improperly punished him with a harsher sentence for exercising his right to go to trial.The primary issue in the case was whether the out-of-court identifications made by non-eyewitnesses, including family members and acquaintances of the defendant, should have been suppressed. The defendant argued that the identification procedure was unduly suggestive because the police officer showed the witnesses surveillance footage of the crime and then showed them a photo of the defendant. The defendant also argued that the police officer's failure to ask the witnesses not to discuss their own identifications with each other amounted to undue suggestiveness.The court disagreed, finding that the identification procedure was not unduly suggestive. The court noted that the police officer did not show unmasked depictions of the defendant until after each non-eyewitness viewed the surveillance footage and identified the defendant of their own accord. The court also found that the circumstances surrounding the identifications did not give rise to the danger of "irreparable mistaken identification."Regarding the motion for acquittal, the court concluded that the State had presented sufficient evidence to prove the identity of the defendant and that he used physical menace to commit the crime. The court also rejected the defendant's claim that the court imposed a harsher sentence because he exercised his right to trial, finding that the sentence was within the statutory limits and was not based on improper or inaccurate information.Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision and upheld the defendant's conviction and sentence. View "State v. Bockus" on Justia Law

In this case, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's decision to issue a no-stalking order against a man, John Langlois, who was found to have physically assaulted his neighbor, Gail Haupt, on two occasions. The altercations were the result of a property dispute between the two. The defendant argued that the court erred in considering his acts of physical violence as threats under the stalking statute, and that his actions were justified in defense of personal property. The court rejected both arguments.First, it held that physical violence can constitute a threat under the stalking statute because it communicates an intent to inflict physical harm. The court reasoned that by using violence against the plaintiff on two occasions, the defendant conveyed a message that he was willing and able to inflict physical harm, and therefore threatened the plaintiff within the meaning of the statute.Second, the court ruled that the common law defense-of-property privilege is not a defense to a civil stalking order. The court noted that the purpose of the stalking statute is to protect individuals from "severe intrusions on personal privacy and autonomy" and to limit "risks to the security and safety" of the individual. The court concluded that the "critical question in such proceedings is not who was at fault, but who, if anyone, is in need of protection." Therefore, the defendant's actions were not privileged and the court did not err in failing to consider his defense-of-property argument. As a result, the court upheld the no-stalking order against the defendant. View "Haupt v. Langlois" on Justia Law

In this case, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Vermont Public Utility Commission approving a contract under 30 V.S.A. § 248(i) for the purchase of out-of-state renewable natural gas by Vermont Gas Systems, Inc. (VGS). The contract, which was proposed to last for fourteen-and-a-half years, required VGS to purchase a minimum volume of renewable natural gas that would be produced and transported from a landfill in New York. The contract was part of VGS's efforts to invest in nonfossil gas and incorporate renewable natural gas into its gas supply to meet regulatory requirements and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.The appellant, Catherine Bock, a ratepaying customer of VGS, challenged the Commission's findings with respect to the contract’s contribution towards satisfying emissions reductions under the Vermont Global Warming Solutions Act of 2020. Bock also disputed the Commission’s finding that the contract, with a condition imposed by the Commission, would comply with least-cost planning principles.The court rejected Bock's arguments, finding that the Commission's conclusions were supported by the evidence in the record and were not clearly erroneous. The court noted that the contract was only one of VGS's strategies to reduce emissions pursuant to the Vermont Global Warming Solutions Act of 2020. It also pointed out that there was sufficient evidence to support the Commission's determination that the contract was cost-effective and consistent with least-cost planning principles. View "In re Petition of Vermont Gas Systems, Inc." on Justia Law