Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Wilbur Shriner, the holder of a homeowner’s insurance policy from Amica Mutual Insurance Company (Amica), appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Amica and denial of his cross-motion for summary judgment. Shriner owned a glassblowing studio in Burlington until he sold the property in December 2007 and moved the glassblowing equipment to his home in Charlotte. He and his friend set up the equipment in the garage at Shriner’s property and began making glass in late 2008 or early 2009. From 2009 to 2012, Shriner and his friend “sometimes made glass for a week or two, and then would shut down for weeks due to lack of money.” During that three-year period, they made glassware approximately one time per week on average, and glassmaking was never more than an occasional or part-time activity for him. Throughout those three years, Shriner earned income from glassblowing, as well as from the redevelopment and rental of investment properties and from an organic honey and vegetable operation. In early 2012, the furnace exhaust system in a piece of glassmaking equipment malfunctioned and caused a fire that destroyed the garage and all of the property and equipment inside it. At the time, Shriner’s home was covered by his homeowner’s policy with Amica, which covered losses from fire and provided replacement coverage for buildings and personal property. The policy carried a $25,000 deductible and contained an exclusion from coverage for structures from which a business was conducted. Shriner submitted a personal property inventory for the property destroyed in the fire, with a replacement cost totaling $88,354.91. Amica accepted Shriner’s fire-loss claim and determined the replacement cost of the garage to be $42,422.97. Amica applied the policy’s $25,000 deductible and made an actual cash-value payment of $1460.53 as an advance partial payment to Shriner for the garage. Amica then changed positions and, asserting that Shriner’s glassblowing activities constituted a “business” for the purposes of the policy’s exclusion, refused to make any further payments to replace the garage. Amica paid Shriner $11,613 for nonbusiness property that was destroyed in the garage but capped its payment for other property in the inventory at $2500, which was the maximum reimbursement permitted under the policy for “business” personal property. Shriner brought suit to recover the full amount of his claim, and the court granted summary judgment to Amica. This appeal followed. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shriner v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A group of landowners (neighbors) adjacent to a proposed planned unit development (PUD) challenged the Environmental Division’s affirmance of the PUD permit. On appeal, neighbors argued that the Environmental Division improperly required them to amend their original statement of questions and then erred by refusing to consider all of the issues raised by neighbors’ Amended Statement of Questions. Neighbors also claimed that the court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that adequate notice was posted of the public hearing on the PUD permit. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The court did not err when it required neighbors to file an amended statement of questions under Environmental Proceedings Rule 5(f). The Supreme Court did concluded, however, that, after requiring neighbors to file a new statement of questions, the court was obligated to resolve all of the issues raised by the Amended Statement of Questions. “The court limited its decision on the merits to those issues specifically relating to PUD regulations. This was error. By declining to specifically address these regulations, the court left open issues presented by the Amended Statement of Questions.” Because the parties presented evidence on the regulations and the regulations were before the court, the Environmental Division should have addressed them in its decision. The Supreme Court concluded the Environmental Division did not err when it determined that Atwood satisfied the notice requirements to obtain approval of the project. View "In re Atwood Planned Unit Development" on Justia Law

In late 2016, Vermont State Police received a call from defendant William Bailey in which defendant told the police that he had accidentally shot his friend Daniel Hein and that Hein was likely dead. When the police arrived at the scene, they found Hein’s dead body in the back seat of defendant’s car; he had been shot in the head. Defendant was charged with manslaughter, and the court set bail at $50,000. Defendant later filed a motion to review bail, and the court held two bail review hearings. The court lowered bail to $25,000, but determined, after hearing testimony from both defendant’s father and defendant’s girlfriend, there was no responsible adult to whom defendant could be released. In cases of bailable offenses, there is a presumption that the defendant may be released before trial either on his or her own recognizance or on an unsecured appearance bond. However, the presumption is rebutted if the court determines that such conditions are insufficient to assure the defendant’s appearance at future court proceedings. Defendant appealed the trial court’s order to set bail at $25,000 and its determination that neither his father nor his girlfriend were responsible adults to whom he can be released. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the trial court’s requirement that he post a secured appearance bond in the amount of $25,000 with a ten percent deposit to be paid to the court. Defendant was being held for lack of bail, and he argued that the amount set by the trial court was excessive. Although a court must consider a defendant’s financial resources in determining conditions of release, the Supreme Court concluded that neither the U.S. nor Vermont Constitution nor the applicable Vermont statutes required trial courts to find that a defendant has a present ability to raise bail in the amount set by the court. "Although courts must consider a defendant’s financial resources when they set bail, courts may set bail at a level that a particular defendant cannot secure. In setting bail, courts must always be guided by the goal of securing a defendant’s appearance at trial, and should not set bail at an unattainable level for the purpose of detaining a defendant rather than assuring the defendant’s appearance." View "Vermont v. Pratt" on Justia Law

Paternal grandmother and paternal aunt appealed a decision by the probate court dismissing their petition for guardianship over N.P., and a decision declaring as moot their motion to transfer guardianship proceedings to the family court. The probate court dismissed the petition for appointment of guardian because it believed it “may not even consider a Petition for Appointment of Guardian” because the family division “has exclusive jurisdiction over the child.” The Supreme Court concluded that while the probate court was correct in asserting the general statement on jurisdiction, it failed to recognize the responsibilities imposed upon it when confronted with the petition for guardianship and the motion to transfer the cause to the family division. It failed to comply with the statutory procedures set forth in Title 14 designed to avoid judicial duplication and confusion and to assist in prompt resolution of child custody issues. The Supreme Court therefore reversed and remanded the probate court for further proceedings. View "In re Guardianship of N.P." on Justia Law

Testator Elaine A. Holbrook died on February 3, 2013. She was survived by six children, including appellant-executors David and Cheryl Holbrook, appellee Amy Holbrook, and seven grandchildren, including appellant-grandson Charles Holbrook III. Testator did not have a surviving spouse. Testator signed a three-page handwritten document entitled "My Last Will & Testament." The will was in the form of a letter and was addressed "To all my children." The main source of contention between testator’s children reads: "In the event that I don’t make it through surgery on Thurs the 23rd of Jan. ’03, I wish to bequeath you all of the property and personal belongings divided equally to the six of you & to the seven grandchildren." Testator did, in fact, survive the surgery in January 2003 and lived for ten more years before her death in 2013. In April 2013, appellee Amy Holbrook filed a motion with the probate court seeking clarification of the will. Appellant-executors responded with two motions questioning whether the will was properly allowed, raising issues concerning the will’s execution, ambiguity in its devise, notice to the grandchildren, and whether the will was “conditional” and therefore invalid. The question presented in this will contest was whether the trial court correctly determined on summary judgment that the testator intended her last will and testament which she executed on the eve of surgery to be absolute rather than contingent on her surviving the surgery. The Supreme Court concluded that summary judgment was premature in this case because material factual issues remained in dispute concerning the testator’s intent, and therefore reversed. View "In re Appeal of the Estate of Elaine A. Holbrook" on Justia Law

Plaintiff in this wrongful-death action appealed a trial court judgment dismissing her complaint as untimely. Plaintiff contended the trial court erred in: (1) denying her motion to amend the complaint to include a certificate of merit; (2) declining to treat the motion to amend as a petition to extend the statute of limitations; and (3) dismissing a claim for personal injuries incurred during the decedent’s lifetime. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "McClellan v. Haddock" on Justia Law

Father appealed a family court judgment modifying the disposition plan and terminating his parental rights to the minors A.M., E.M., and L.M. After review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that a single transgression by father, in the face of otherwise positive evidence and findings as to his compliance with the case plans and his observed parenting abilities, did not support a finding of changed circumstances to warrant modification of the case plan goal. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "In re A.M., E.M., L.M." on Justia Law

This case concerned the taxable status of Schulmaier Hall, a building owned by the Vermont College of Fine Arts (VCFA), two-thirds of which VCFA rented to agencies of the State of Vermont (State) during the 2013 and 2014 tax years. The City Assessor of the City of Montpelier (City) found the property nonexempt for those tax years. In response, VCFA brought a motion for declaratory judgment in the trial court, and both parties moved for summary judgment. Granting summary judgment for the City, the court found: (1) that VCFA had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before moving for declaratory judgment but also (2) that the property was not exempt on the merits. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont College of Fine Arts v. City of Montpelier" on Justia Law

The patient in this case, G.G., appealed a trial court’s denial of requests by him and his counsel to let him represent himself in his mental-health proceedings and from the court’s subsequent orders of continued treatment and involuntary medication. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precluded G.G. from proceeding without representation in his involuntary medication and involuntary commitment hearings, given the State’s exceedingly strong interest in an accurate determination on the merits of those hearings. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of G.G.’s motion to waive counsel and his attorney’s motion to withdraw. Additionally, the Court affirmed the decisions on the merits of G.G.’s continued treatment and involuntary medication orders. View "In re G.G." on Justia Law