Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Toby Charbonneau pleaded guilty to felony possession of stolen property and misdemeanor possession of stolen property. He was subsequently ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $35,791. On appeal, he challenged the restitution order, arguing: (1) whether an order of restitution had to relate to the damage caused by the criminal conduct for which defendant pleaded guilty; (2) whether restitution was limited to items that were not recovered and returned to the victim; and (3) whether the trial court was required to make findings as to a defendant’s ability to pay in a restitution order. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed on the first issue: "Defendant was not charged with burglary, and pleaded only to possession of stolen property, a plea based on the recovery of some of the victims’ stolen property from his residence. The restitution order, however, was based on the value of the property burgled from the victims’ residence. [. . .] That defendant had in his possession some of the property stolen from the victims’ home does not mean the criminal act for which defendant was convicted included the burglary of the victims’ home. Possession of stolen property and burglary are entirely separate crimes." View "Vermont v. Charbonneau" on Justia Law

Husband appealed a final divorce order, arguing that the Family Division: (1) inequitably divided the marital assets; (2) committed reversible errors of fact; and (3) issued a decision based on impermissible bias. Finding no reversible error in the Family Division's order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Casavant (Allen) v. Allen" on Justia Law

Following an altercation with his wife and an ensuing conflict with police, defendant Miles Dow was charged with several counts, related to his conduct both towards his wife and to the responding police officers. During trial, based on improper questions from defense counsel, the court declared a mistrial on all counts involving defendant’s wife (the complainant). The trial continued, and the jury found defendant guilty of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer with a deadly weapon and attempted simple assault by menace on a law enforcement officer. Defendant appealed, arguing there was insufficient evidence, the jury instructions were faulty, and his convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Defendant also moved to dismiss the charges for which a mistrial was granted, arguing that the grounds for a mistrial were insufficient and jeopardy had attached. The court denied this motion, but granted defendant’s request to bring an interlocutory appeal. After its review of defendant’s direct and interlocutory appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s aggravated-assault conviction, vacated his simple assault conviction and reversed the court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. View "Vermont v. Dow" on Justia Law

Defendant Kerri Nicholas was convicted of one count of domestic assault, and one count of cruelty to a child. The child's teacher observed bruises and notified the Department of Children and Families. Defendant had a romantic relationship with the child's mother and moved in with the mother in April 2012. The teacher observed the bruises when school started that year in September. On appeal, defendant argued that the child-cruelty conviction should have been reversed because the trial court’s jury instructions allowed for a non-unanimous verdict, and that the State’s conduct during the trial created a risk of undue prejudice with respect to both counts. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "Vermont v. Nicholas" on Justia Law

The lender Cenlar FSB appealed a judgment in favor of the borrowers Laurie and Joseph Malenfant, Jr. in the lender’s second action for a judgment on the note and foreclosure, after the first was dismissed with prejudice. The lender argued that the first dismissal could not be interpreted as vacating the judgment on the note and for foreclosure that the trial court had previously issued in that case. Alternatively, the lender contended that its notice of default in the initial foreclosure action was sufficient to satisfy its notice obligation in connection with its second foreclosure action. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of the first action on the promissory note and complaint for foreclosure did effectively vacate that court’s prior judgment for lender on the note and for foreclosure. Furthermore, the lender was not, on this record, entitled to pursue a second action because it had not taken any steps to reinstate borrower’s monthly payment obligations after lender had accelerated the note. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Cenlar FSB v. Malenfant, Jr." on Justia Law

In an environmental enforcement action, the Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) issued a violation and imposed a penalty of $10,000 against defendants Hugh and Eileen McGee for placing unpermitted fill in a Class II wetland. Defendants appealed and, following a site visit and evidentiary hearing, the Environmental Division concluded that the land was not exempt, upheld the violation, and reduced the penalty to $3647. On appeal, defendants argued that the land was used for grazing horses and it therefore met the requirements for a farming exemption in the wetlands regulations. After its review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that the evidence supported the Environmental Division’s finding that the area had not been used consistently to grow food or crops since 1990 and therefore any exemption had expired, and affirmed. View "Agency of Natural Resources v. McGee" on Justia Law

This case came before the Vermont Supreme Court following the Environmental Division's decision on remand that a rock-crushing operation by North East Materials Group, LLC, (NEMG) was exempt from Act 250 as a preexisting development. The Environmental Division reached the same conclusion in its first decision, but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the court used the wrong legal standard in deciding that the rock-crushing operation did not constitute a cognizable physical change to the preexisting development and that one of the main factual findings in support of the decision was clearly erroneous. Appellants, a group on thirteen neighbors to the operation, appealed, arguing that the Environmental Division erred in applying the Supreme Court's instructions on remand. After review a second time, the Supreme Court concluded that, even assuming that crushing operations were part of the preexisting quarrying development, findings on the location and volume of the crushing operations were too limited to support a conclusion that the present operations did not constitute a cognizable change to the existing development. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re North East Materials Group LLC Act 250 JO #5-21" on Justia Law

May 7, 2015 was the second day of Kenneth and Melissa Coons' divorce hearing. Near the end of the hearing, the trial court called a brief recess and asked counsel to meet in chambers. According to the trial court, during the meeting, it told the parties that “it would not and could not distribute [husband’s] military retirement because he had not yet served the requisite number of years to vest in the system. In short, there was not yet anything to distribute because [husband] had no entitlement to the benefit.” The trial court indicated that the benefits could be distributed only once they vested; because husband was ten months shy of a full twenty years of service as of the final hearing date, there was nothing to distribute. Following this conference in chambers, the parties entered into an stipulation resolving all outstanding issues. With respect to property division, wife agreed to accept a lump-sum payment of $15,000 and waived any claims to husband’s expected but not-yet-vested military retirement benefit. Wife affirmed on the record her satisfaction with the stipulation, and the trial court incorporated the stipulation into the final divorce decree. The court signed the final order the next day. Wife sought to set aside the stipulated final order for divorce on the ground that she entered into the agreement in reliance on that in-chambers “weather report” in which the trial judge misstated the applicable law. Finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion in declining to set aside the stipulation, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Coons v. Coons" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a decision of the environmental division of the superior court affirming several permits issued to appellee Costco Wholesale Corporation for the expansion of its existing retail store and the addition of an adjacent six-pump gasoline station in the Town of Colchester. Appellants R.L. Vallee, Inc. and Timberlake Associates LLP owned retail gasoline-service facilities located near the planned development. Appellant Vallee argued the trial court erred in: (1) determining that Costco’s proposed traffic-mitigation measures were sufficient for issuance of an Act 250 permit; (2) making findings concerning the impact of an underground stormwater outlet pipe, and with respect to which the court limited cross examination by Vallee’s counsel; (3) concluding that the project would not adversely affect a Class 2 wetland for issuance of an individual wetland permit; and (4) excluding testimony and a related exhibit prepared by appellant Vallee’s wetland consultant. Appellant Timberlake argued that the trial court erred in relying on a presumption with respect to the project’s impact on water pollution and waste disposal under Act 250. The Supreme Court found no error in the environmental division's order and affirmed it. View "In re Costco Stormwater Dishcharge Permit" on Justia Law

The information filed by the State charged Serendipity Morales with six counts of unauthorized practice of law. Morales was an inmate at the Marble Valley Regional Correctional Center, and it was alleged she engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by helping fellow inmates in their cases, including performing legal research and drafting motions. In this probable cause review, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's consideration was whether there was probable cause to believe that Morales committed the alleged offenses. The Court concluded that there was not and accordingly dismissed the State’s information without prejudice. View "In re Serendipity Morales" on Justia Law