Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The altercation leading to defendant’s conviction occurred on July 29, 2014, at a Middlebury residential facility for persons with major mental illnesses. In a sworn statement admitted without objection, the complainant claimed that defendant initiated the altercation by pointing his finger at the complainant. The complainant responded by kicking defendant’s hand twice and telling defendant that he “needed a kick in the ass.” Suddenly, the complainant experienced blurred vision, pressure, and heat on the left side of his face. Although he initially did not know what had happened, after he saw defendant talking to him, he concluded that defendant had hit him. Defendant appealed his conviction for simple assault, arguing that the trial court erred by instructing the jury to consider simple assault as a lesser-included offense of domestic assault, the crime for which he was charged. Specifically, defendant contended: (1) that, as instructed to the jury, simple assault was not a lesser-included offense of domestic assault; and (2) that the court could not instruct the jury to consider a lesser-included offense over the defendant’s objection. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Bean" on Justia Law

Petitioner D.C. appealed the denial of post-conviction relief (PCR), alleging that the change-of-plea hearing that preceded his adjudication of juvenile delinquency was constitutionally inadequate. The superior court held that the PCR statute did not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings and that the only remedy available to petitioner was through 33 V.S.A. 5113 and Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), but that route was foreclosed because petitioner’s claim was untimely raised. On appeal, petitioner argued that the case was not moot, despite the fact he was over the age of majority at the time of his appeal (and no longer committed to state custody), and that the PCR statutes permitted juveniles to collaterally attack their adjudications. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed, reversed the superior court’s order dismissing petitioner’s PCR complaint, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re D.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-lender Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (as trustee) appealed a superior court decision to grant defendant-borrower Kevin Pinette's motion to dismiss. The lender tried to foreclose on property of Pinette, but the superior court dismissed its claims on foreclosure, the unpaid balance on a promissory note, and a deficiency judgment on the ground that they were barred by claim preclusion, as lender had previously instituted an identical action against borrower in 2013, which had been dismissed for failure to prosecute. On appeal, the lender argued that because the 2013 action did not actually adjudge the enforceability of the note and mortgage, the dismissal did not have preclusive effect. Further, lender urged the Vermont Supreme Court to hold that in the mortgage foreclosure context, dismissals with prejudice did not bar subsequent actions based upon new defaults occurring after dismissal of the prior action. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Deutsche Bank v. Pinette" on Justia Law

The State appealed mental health orders involving D.H. and B.C. The State's Attorney contended it was entitled to a hearing on its motions for the continued treatment at the expiration of the mental health orders at issue; both D.H. and B.C. had been charged with criminal offenses. The criminal division found the State’s Attorney had no standing to seek continued treatment at the expiration of a mental health treatment order and denied the State’s motion. Finding no reversible error in the orders, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. B.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. (lender) and Sears, Roebuck and Co. (retailer) appealed a superior court decision affirming the determination of the Vermont Department of Taxes (Department) that the parties, who had partnered to operate a private label credit card program through retailers’ stores, were not entitled to sales tax refunds related to bad debts. The Department denied lender’s refund requests because it was not a registered vendor under Vermont law that remitted the sales tax it sought to recover, and denied retailer’s deductions because it did not incur the bad debt at issue. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that because they acted in combination to facilitate the sales giving rise to the bad debts, they were not barred from obtaining relief. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Dept. of Taxes" on Justia Law

This case arose in early July 2012, when the State filed a CHINS (child in need of care and supervision) petition and request for an emergency care order based on concerns about mother’s ability to care for the minor I.B. The parents had a history with Department for Children and Families (DCF); several older children had been previously adjudicated CHINS based on mother’s continuing use of opiates, and their parental rights to the children were ultimately terminated. Father appealed a family court post-disposition order transferring custody of the minor I.B. to the Department for Children and Families (DCF). He argued the court violated his due process rights by: (1) transferring custody without making an express finding of changed circumstances; and (2) applying a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof. The Court of Appeal took these arguments into consideration, as well as whether the order at issue is a final appealable order. The Court concluded that it was, and affirmed. View "In re I.B." on Justia Law

This appeal centered on two petitions filed on behalf of sixty-nine sworn law enforcement officers of the Vermont Department of Fish & Wildlife, Vermont Department of Liquor Control, and Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles. Here, the New England Police Benevolent Association (NEPBA) filed a petition seeking an election of collective bargaining representatives among the sworn officers, currently represented by the Vermont State Employees’ Association (VSEA) as part of the Non-Management Bargaining Unit. VSEA moved to dismiss the petition. The State agreed, and notified the Board by letter that the proposed bargaining unit would not be an appropriate unit. NEPBA appealed an order of the Vermont Labor Relations Board dismissing the petition. Finding no reversible error in the Board's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Petition of New England Police Benevolent Association" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether, and under what circumstances, a court may decline on equitable grounds to enforce a provision in a long-term ground lease giving the lessor the right to terminate the lease and reenter the premises in the event of a default. Plaintiff Mongeon Bay Properties, LLC (MBP) sued defendant Mallets Bay Homeowner’s Association seeking to void a multi-year ground lease for property abutting Lake Champlain on account of alleged breaches of the covenants in that agreement. After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the Association had violated its obligations under the lease by failing to reasonably maintain the embankments abutting Lake Champlain to protect them from erosion. However, the court declined to enforce the forfeiture clause in the lease against the Association, and awarded MBP damages to enable it to undertake the necessary restoration and bank protection. The Association appealed the ruling that it breached the lease, and MBP appealed the trial court’s award of damages in lieu of forfeiture. After review of the particular facts of this matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s determination that the Association breached the lease, but reversed its refusals to declare termination of the lease and to issue a writ of possession to MBP. The case was remanded for reconsideration of MBP’s remedy. View "Mongeon Bay Properties, LLC v. Mallets Bay Homeowner's Assn." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a road rage incident in which defendant Jason Gagne chased a couple across town, eventually pulling up next to their truck and pointing a rifle at them. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the results of an alcohol breath test on the ground that he was not able to meaningfully communicate with his lawyer before submitting to the test due to his belief (which turned out to be well-founded) that his conversation with counsel was being recorded by the police. The trial court denied the motion, and following trial, a jury convicted defendant of aggravated assault, simple assault, reckless endangerment, driving under the influence, and negligent operation of a vehicle. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred: in denying his motion to suppress; failing to instruct the jury that the definition of “threat” for the purposes of aggravated assault and simple assault was based on an objective standard; and in allowing convictions for aggravated assault, simple assault, and reckless endangerment for the same conduct, in violation of defendant’s double jeopardy rights. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s ruling on the suppression motion and reversed and remanded defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence. The Court upheld the trial court’s jury instructions; and affirmed the aggravated assault and reckless endangerment convictions. The simple assault conviction was reversed on double jeopardy grounds. View "Vermont v. Gagne" on Justia Law

Defendant Amy Koenig appealed the denial of her motion to suppress evidence that ultimately led to her arraignment for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Defendant’s main argument on appeal was that the arresting trooper's entrance into the attached structure to her home (a "carport") and the resulting discovery of the damage to her vehicle constituted a warrantless search of the curtilage of her home in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. Defendant contended that the trooper conducted an investigative stop in an area in which she had an expectation of privacy by approaching the residence through the attached structure, which was not a means of public access to the residence, and that a reasonable visitor would understand that the illuminated entranceway marked by a walkway was the normal access route. The Supreme Court was unpersuaded by defendant's argument, concluding the trooper’s conduct was reasonable and not in violation of the Fourth Amendment or Article 11. View "Vermont v. Koenig" on Justia Law