Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his “Petition for Extraordinary Relief” under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 and Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 21. Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in construing and dismissing his pleading as a successive petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) that raised claims decided on the merits in an earlier PCR proceeding under 13 V.S.A. 7134. He argued that the bar on successive applications does not apply to his extraordinary relief petition and, in any event, his petition was not a successive application because his claims regarding his unlawful conviction, particularly those alleging he has endured “severe collateral consequences” as a result of the conviction, were never heard on the merits. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that, despite plaintiff’s characterization of his petition as a pleading pursuant to Rule 75 and Rule 21, the trial court correctly recognized it as a successive PCR action and affirmed the dismissal. View "Chandler v. Vermont" on Justia Law

Applicants Cynthia and Charles Burns wanted to make modifications to a two-unit residential building they owned in Burlington. A group of nineteen Burlington residents (neighbors) appealed a Superior Court, Environmental Division decision declining to reach the merits of neighbors’ claim that applicants converted their home into a duplex without a zoning permit on the grounds that the challenge was precluded by a prior decision under 24 V.S.A. 4472(d) or to consider whether a permit was required for applicants’ other modifications. On appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court, neighbors argued: (1) that their challenge was not precluded under section 4472(d) because the prior decision had not been rendered by the Burlington Zoning Administrator as the statute requires; (2) that preventing an appeal without affording notice and opportunity to be heard violated their due process rights; and (3) that they were entitled to a determination by the Environmental Division of whether applicants’ other modifications violated the zoning ordinance because they were done without a permit. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Burns Two-Unit Residential Building (Long, et al. Appellants)" on Justia Law

The issue this interlocutory appeal presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review centered on whether 12 V.S.A. 462 created an exemption from the general six-year limitation for Vermont’s claims against a host of defendants for generalized injury to state waters as a whole due to groundwater contamination from gasoline additives. On the basis of the statute of limitations, the trial court dismissed the State’s claims insofar as they were predicated on generalized injury to state waters as a whole. On appeal, the State argued that section 462 exempted the State’s claims from the statute of limitations, and, alternatively, that the State’s claims arising under 10 V.S.A. 1390, a statute that established a state policy that the groundwater resources of the state are held in trust for the public, were not time barred because that statute became effective less than six years before the State filed its complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Atlantic Richfield Company, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction by jury of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and disorderly conduct. Defendant was acquitted of reckless endangerment. Defendant was charged with these crimes after allegedly pointing a shotgun at and threatening to shoot two men who were repossessing a vehicle from a tenant parking lot on his property. Defendant admitted confronting the men with a gun, but steadfastly denied pointing it at them or threatening to shoot them. Defendant argued on appeal that the court committed plain error by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on self-defense, defense-of-others, and defense-of-property. He contended that the court compounded its error through its instruction on repossession of collateral. The Supreme Court found no plain error, and affirmed. View "Vermont v. Buckley" on Justia Law

In 2014, Defendant was convicted by jury of simple assault and placed on probation. He petitioned the Supreme Court to reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial because the trial court improperly defined reasonable doubt for the jury, thus lowering the standard of proof. In the alternative, he raised three arguments regarding his probation conditions: (1) that they were unlawfully imposed on the grounds that the sentencing court mistakenly believed they were “standard”; (2) that the court failed to inform defendant of the content of the conditions at sentencing; and (3) that the imposed individual conditions were overbroad and vague, impermissibly delegated court authority to his probation officer, were unrelated to his offense, rehabilitation, or public safety, and were not supported by factual findings. The Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s conviction and conditions "H," "J," and "L," but remanded on condition "I" and struck all the other complained-of conditions. View "Vermont v. Levitt" on Justia Law

Defendant Shawn Kelley argued that the Vermont Supreme Court should have vacated his domestic assault conviction because numerous reversible errors occurred during his jury trial. Specifically, he claimed that: (1) the trial court improperly admitted two pieces of hearsay evidence; (2) that the trial court incorrectly denied his motion for judgment of acquittal; and (3) that the State made prejudicial remarks during its closing statement. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Husband Walter Lourie argued the family division of the superior court: (1) failed to consider the relevant statutory factors before incorporating the parties’ pretrial separation agreement into the divorce order; (2) erroneously awarded wife Sharlee Lourie an arrears judgment based on their agreement even though the agreement had not been submitted to the court or incorporated into a temporary order prior to the final divorce hearing; and (3) abused its discretion by awarding wife the bulk of the marital estate in addition to a substantial maintenance award. After review of the specific facts of this case, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the divorce decree, but reversed with regard to the maintenance award, property division and judgment of arrears.The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lourie v. Lourie" on Justia Law

In 2010, E.R. was voluntarily admitted to the Psychiatric Department at Central Vermont Medical Center (CVMC) with a “psychotic disorder” after having threatened young children in his home. During his first few days at CVMC, E.R. was easily agitated, made threatening remarks, reported auditory hallucinations, was easily agitated, and had fair-to-poor judgment. The examining physician tentatively diagnosed E.R. with a schizophreniform disorder. This case arose out of the assault of Michael Kuligoski by E.R. after E.R. was discharged from another treatment facility, Brattleboro Retreat, and while he was undergoing outpatient treatment with Northeast Kingdom Human Services (NKHS). Plaintiff Carole Kuligoski, individually and on behalf of Michael, Mark Kuligoski, and James Kuligoski (collectively “plaintiffs”), filed suit against defendants Brattleboro Retreat and NKHS, raising claims of failure to warn of E.R.’s danger to others, failure to train E.R.’s parents in handling E.R., failure to treat, improper release, and negligent undertaking. The superior court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and plaintiffs appealed. After review, the Supreme Court reversed on the failure to warn and train claims, and affirmed on the failure to treat, improper release and negligent undertaking claims. View "Kuligoski v. Brattleboro Retreat" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed a superior court’s order granting judgment to the State on his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) challenging his third conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) following his sentencing for a fourth DUI offense that had been enhanced by the DUI-3 conviction. He argued that the trial court that accepted the plea agreement that led to his conviction for DUI-3 did not ensure his guilty plea was voluntary and supported by a factual basis as required by Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(d) and 11(f). As relief, he sought an order vacating the DUI-3 conviction. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the plea colloquy for the DUI-3 was inadequate to establish the factual basis required by Rule 11(f), but that Vermont's established law did not provide for an order vacating the DUI-3 conviction. Because the remedy for the improper conviction for the DUI-3 lied in the post-conviction challenge to the sentence for the DUI-4, the Court reversed and remanded with instructions to the trial court to enter a judgment vacating the 2014 sentence for DUI-4 and conduct a resentencing on that charge. View "In re Wight Manning" on Justia Law

This appeal raised "a narrow, but novel, issue:" whether offenders previously convicted of home improvement fraud could be found guilty under the same statute if they subsequently perform home improvement activities but claim lack of knowledge of the statutory obligation to notify the Attorney General and file a surety. Defendant Robert Witham argued that the statute’s notice and surety section necessarily included a scienter element. The State asserted that the section should be read without a fault element. The trial court held that the notice and surety section delineated a strict liability offense. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Witham" on Justia Law