Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Armand Brisson was the owner of a two-story brick structure built around 1850 and located in the Town of Milton. He had lived in that building for most of his life. At the time of the events in question, he was living on the second floor of the building and utilizing the large attic for storage, while renting the first floor for use as a small bar/restaurant. In 2012, the Milton Police Department notified the Town’s deputy health officer that bricks were falling off the western exterior of the building onto the street and sidewalk below. After confirming this and observing that a part of the western brick wall was bulging out, the health officer issued an emergency health order later that same day condemning the building and declaring it unfit for any use or occupancy. Defendant did not contest either the civil penalty or the compensatory costs for engineering fees assessed against him by the court, but contended that the court’s award of attorney’s fees was neither authorized under the applicable statute nor warranted under an equitable exception to the American Rule requiring each party to bear the cost of its own attorney’s fees. After review, the Supreme Court agreed and therefore vacated the attorney’s fee award. View "Town of Milton Board of Health v. Brisson" on Justia Law

Prior to a March 3, 2015 town meeting, plaintiffs submitted three separate petitions to amend the Brattleboro town charter. Among other things, the petitions sought to: (1) allow residents sixteen and older to vote at town meetings; (2) allow voters to seek a referendum on articles authorizing the Town to spend more than $2 million; (3) limit the terms of town meeting representatives;1 (4) hold the elections of town representatives and town officials in November rather than March; (5) require employers within the Town to provide two hours paid leave for employees to vote at town meetings; and (6) have the town grand juror enforce the minimum wage and function as a district attorney for the Town. An "information sheet" was prepared by the selectboard, then emailed to town meeting representatives, the media, selectboard members, town staff, and a few other persons who requested it. Among other things, the information sheet stated that: (1) setting term limits would be “anti-democratic” in that it would “ban Brattleboro residents from [t]own meeting[s] because they had attended six years in a row”; (2) moving elections from March to November “would damage the link between . . . important parts of government and leave Brattleboro out of step with the rest of Vermont”; (3) requiring employers to provide paid leave for employees to attend town meetings “would mandate Brattleboro employers to pay employees to attend town meetings in other towns and states” and would impact “Brattleboro residents [who] already face very steep property taxes”; (4) giving powers to the town grand juror, which “is essentially obsolete in this modern era,” is unnecessary “because enforcement of laws and ordinances is handled by other elected officials and clear structures”; and (5) “setting separate rules for voter review of budget items over $2 million is confusing and arbitrary.” On March 3, 2015, town voters defeated the three petitions. Plaintiffs appealed a superior court order granting the Town summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs’ lawsuit claiming that the town selectboard unlawfully interfered (by way of the information sheet) with an election on their petitions to amend the town charter. Finding no reversible error in the superior court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Daims v. Town of Brattleboro" on Justia Law

K.A., a twelve-year-old, middle-school boy, committed "inappropriate acts" outside his school, for which he was adjudged delinquent under a Vermont statute prohibiting lewd acts relating to prostitution. The charges stemmed from a school-yard game of four-square: "S.K." and K.A. were friends. K.A. approached, said his hands were cold, and asked to put his hands in her jacket pockets. S.K. said no, but K.A. reached his hands into her pockets anyway. Then K.A. began walking backward towards a snowbank a few feet away, pulling S.K. with him by her pockets. As he pulled her, K.A. pressed against S.K. and told her to kiss him or he would throw her in the snowbank. S.K. again said no and tried to remove his hands from her pockets. Then, the trial court found, K.A. tried to get his hands under the waistband of the girl’s jeans while his hands were still in her outside coat pockets. S.K.’s belt prevented K.A.’s hands from going down the front of her pants. Ultimately, K.A. did not kiss S.K. or throw her into the snowbank; instead, he pulled her back towards the school, again using his hands in her pockets as leverage. As the two neared the building, a teacher saw them and yelled at K.A. to take his hands out of S.K.’s pockets. The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that K.A committed simple assault and engaged in a prohibited act, lewdness. The trial court granted the judgment of acquittal with regard to simple assault, but not with regard to engaging in lewdness. K.A. argued on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that, beyond a reasonable doubt, K.A. attempted to commit a prohibited lewd act; and (2) the trial court improperly amended the charge from committing a lewd act to attempting to commit a lewd act. The Supreme Court concluded that the charge against K.A. failed for insufficient evidence that his actions were an attempt to engage in a lewd act of prostitution. “Discretion to prosecute persons who have committed crimes is one thing; prosecutorial discretion to decide whether conduct is criminal in the first instance is another. The latter invites arbitrary enforcement and contravenes the separation of powers inherent in our constitutional government.” View "In re K.A." on Justia Law

The Town of Rutland and five adjoining landowners (“neighbors”) appealed the Vermont Public Service Board’s grant of a certificate of public good (“CPG”) to Rutland Renewable Energy, LLC (“RRE”) for construction of the Cold River Solar Project (“Project”), a 2.3 megawatt (Mw) solar photovoltaic electric generation facility. The Town and neighbors argued that the Board incorrectly held that the project will not unduly interfere with the orderly development of the region, would not have an undue adverse effect on aesthetics, and would not have an undue adverse impact on historic sites. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Petition of Rutland Renewable Energy, LLC" on Justia Law

The State appealed the dismissal of three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, filed against defendant Julianne Graham, a high school employee, based on her having engaged in sexual acts with a student over the summer break between defendant’s school contracts. The issue was whether the circumstances of this case supported the charges. The Supreme Court concluded that they did not, and affirmed the dismissal. View "Vermont v. Graham" on Justia Law

Police arrested defendant Stephen Howard for driving under the influence (DUI). The State appealed the granting of defendant’s motion to exclude evidence collected from a traffic violation stop of his car. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case because it concluded that the trooper who conducted the stop did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant committed a traffic violation. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed: once "defendant crossed the center line, the trooper had a reasonable suspicion that defendant committed a traffic violation as soon as this crossing occurred." View "Vermont v. Howard" on Justia Law

Defendant James Anderson appealed a trial court’s decision finding he violated two conditions of probation for his failure to complete sex offender programming to the satisfaction of his probation officer during the unsuspended portion of his sentence. Defendant was convicted in 2003 and sentenced nineteen to twenty years, all suspended except eleven years. The sentencing court indicated that the split sentence was intended to deliver a “severe sanction” while giving defendant an option to make good on what he claimed was remorse and what he claimed to admit doing. For this reason, the trial court explained at sentencing that the split sentence was contingent on defendant completing sex offender treatment programming during the to-serve portion of his sentence. In 2014, while serving the unsuspended portion of his sentence, defendant entered the Vermont Treatment Program for Sexual Abusers, a six-month sex offender treatment program. On June 10, 2014, defendant was suspended from the treatment program for ninety days for his failure to admit responsibility for the sexual assault underlying his conviction. At that time, defendant was advised that readmission to the treatment program required that he answer and submit to his caseworker five standard questions no later than one week prior to the end of the ninety-day suspension period. In July, defendant’s probation officer filed a complaint, alleging that defendant had violated the terms of his probation for failing to participate fully in and complete the Vermont Treatment Program for Sexual Offenders. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding no probable cause for a violation of probation because the affidavit in support of the complaint did not include an allegation that defendant had received written notice of the conditions of his release. Consistent with V.R.Cr.P. 36, the trial court subsequently directed its clerk to prepare a probation warrant placing defendant on probation with the standard conditions, specifically including special conditions "K" and "31." Two months later, defendant's probation officer again filed a complaint that he violated the special conditions of his probation. At a merits hearing, the trial court found defendant violated the special conditions. After review of defendant's arguments on appeal of the trial court's findings, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant failed to meet his burden of persuasion that he did not violate his probation. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Vermont v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Defendant Dylan Stinson appealed a judgment finding him liable to plaintiffs Kevin and Linda Flanagan for damage to their vacation home from a fire started in an outdoor fireplace on their deck by a group of teenagers who were there without their permission. Stinson contended that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to find him liable for the damage under a concerted-action theory; (2) it was improper for the trial court to admit and rely on evidence of the actual cash value of the lost personal property; and (3) the pre and postjudgment interest rate awarded by the trial court was unconstitutional under the U.S. and Vermont Constitutions. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Concord General Mutual Insurance Company v. Gritman" on Justia Law

Husband Bryan Zink appealed a trial court order denying his request to modify his spousal maintenance obligation and granting wife’s motion to enforce. He argued that the court erred in finding an absence of changed circumstances, and in finding that wife did not agree to accept reduced payments in satisfaction of past spousal maintenance obligations. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. To the extent that the trial court found that husband had failed to prove that wife had agreed to a permanent prospective modification of his spousal maintenance obligation, that finding was supported by the record. The Court did not read the trial court’s decision as addressing the question of whether, when, and to what extent, wife may have forfeited her ability to collect retroactive support payments that would have been due under the divorce order as a result of agreement, waiver, or equitable estoppel. On remand, in connection with wife’s claim for spousal maintenance arrearages, the trial court was mandated to address these questions. View "Zink v. Zink" on Justia Law

Convicted sex offender, defendant Owen Cornell, appealed the imposition of six probation conditions ordered by the sentencing court. He argued four of the conditions, that he reside or work where his probation officer approves, attend counseling programs ordered by his probation officer, refrain from violent and threatening behavior, and avoid areas where children congregate, had already been deemed unlawful by the Vermont Supreme Court and should have been struck down. He further argued that the remaining two conditions, giving his probation officer warrantless search and seizure privileges and banning home computer and internet usage, imposed unduly restrictive and invasive terms that infringe upon defendant’s liberty, privacy, and autonomy rights. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with defendant as to the residence and employment, counseling, search and seizure, and home computer and internet use conditions, and remanded to the sentencing court for further justification, amendment, or elimination. The Court affirmed the imposition of the conditions prohibiting violent or threatening behavior and restricting access to areas where children congregate. View "Vermont v. Cornell" on Justia Law