Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, the parents of a newborn baby, alleged that on June 12, 2012, their son died as a result of the medical malpractice of the Hospital defendants and the Baker defendants (Richard Baker, M.D. and Mary Beerworth, M.D.). It was undisputed that this filing was within the period established by the applicable statute of limitations. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the denial of motions to dismiss filed by the Hospital defendants and the Baker defendants. Both sets’ motions were predicated on plaintiffs’ failure to timely serve process. On appeal, the Baker defendants argued that the trial court’s grant of an enlargement of time to serve process expired prior to plaintiffs’ serving of the summons and complaint, while the Hospital defendants contended that although they signed a waiver of service, plaintiffs failed to file that waiver with the court before the expiration of the service period. Both sets of defendants also appealed the trial court’s conclusion that even if plaintiffs’ service was found to be untimely, it retained the authority to retroactively grant a motion for enlargement of time and extend the period for service after the running of the statute of limitations on the basis of excusable neglect. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Clark v. Baker" on Justia Law

In 1990, the City of Burlington obtained a land-use permit for the Waterfront Park (the Park). The City hosted a number of events at the Park in the summer of 1993 and may have hosted others prior to that time. In December 1993, the City applied for an amendment to its permit to allow for hosting of festivals and public events at the Park. During the amendment process, the City argued against any express permit condition regarding the timing, duration, and frequency of events and sound levels, taking the position that the City Parks and Recreation Commission should regulate these matters. In February 1994, after considering the impact on neighboring residents caused by noise and traffic from events, the district commission granted the amendment and imposed twenty-six conditions, some of which related to the maximum sound levels associated with events at the Park, when and where to measure those sound levels, and the timing and number of events that could be held at the Park. In August 2008, Allison Lockwood purchased her property located at 200 Lake Street, adjacent to the Park. Prior to purchasing the property, she researched and read the 1994 Permit, and specifically relied on the permit conditions governing the timing and frequency of events at the Park and the maximum allowed sound levels. At the time of her purchase, the neighbor was aware that festivals and events would take place at the Park, but she understood these events would be limited by the conditions in the permit. Neighbor was nevertheless significantly impacted by the events and festivals, experiencing loud noise for extended periods of time, significant vehicular and pedestrian traffic congestion, and limits on her ability to sleep, spend time outdoors, open her windows, and enjoy her property. This case began in November of 2012 when the City filed an application with the district environmental commission to amend a number of conditions in the 1994 permit. Lockwood appealed the amended land-use permit to the Environmental Division, then appealed when the Environmental Division awarded summary judgment to the City of Burlington. The Environmental Division ruled that the City is entitled to seek an amendment to its Act 250 permit covering the Waterfront Park located on the shores of Lake Champlain. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Waterfront Park Act 250 Amendment (Alison Lockwood, Appellant)" on Justia Law

Defendant Leo Reynolds was charged with four felony counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child and one felony count of aggravated sexual assault on a victim younger than thirteen. Defendant was sixty-seven years old at the time of the charged conduct, and the alleged victim, defendant’s neighbor Z.Z., was seven years old. Defendant filed a motion to suppress in October 2014, arguing that the incriminating statements he made were the product of police coercion and thus taken in violation of his constitutional rights. In an interlocutory appeal, the State challenged the trial court’s suppression of defendant’s pre-arrest confession to police. The State argued that the court erred in concluding that the confession was involuntarily made. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's suppression order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Plaintiff TLOC Senior Living, LLC, owned and operated a senior living community in Middlebury, Vermont, doing business as “The Lodge at Otter Creek.” In July 2013, defendant Albert Bingham registered the name “The Lodge at Otter Creek” under his own name with the Vermont Secretary of State’s Office after plaintiff lapsed in its re-registration of the name. In December 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging slander of title, trade infringement, unfair competition, and tortious interference with contract. Plaintiff claimed that despite Bingham’s actions, his registration of the name did not bestow him with any rights to actually use it as a trade name. Rather, plaintiff contended that it retained the exclusive common law rights to the continued use of “The Lodge at Otter Creek” as its trade name. Bingham filed several counterclaims. He argued in relevant part that by registering the name “The Lodge at Otter Creek” as his business name, he effectively foreclosed any right that plaintiff had to the name. The court concluded that although Bingham had been able to register “The Lodge at Otter Creek,” plaintiff’s failure to re-register the name did not allow Bingham to use it. Defendant appealed, and finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "TLOC Senior Living, LLC v. Bingham" on Justia Law

The Burlington Administrators’ Association and Nicolas Molander (collectively the Association) appealed a trial court’s confirmation of an arbitration decision that Molander, in his capacity as an interim assistant principal, was not entitled to the contractual and statutory protections applicable to regular assistant principals who were not hired on an interim or acting basis. In particular, they challenged the trial court’s conclusion that it had no authority to review the merits of the arbitrator’s ruling for “manifest disregard of the law,” and argued that in this case, the arbitrator’s ruling evinced such a disregard. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the arbitrator’s award did not in any event reflect a manifest disregard of the law, it did not address the question whether the trial court had authority to review an arbitration award under such a standard. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burlington Administrators' Ass'n v. Burlington Bd. of School Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Mother and father separately appeal from a family court judgment terminating their parental rights to the minor D.S. In March 2014, a CHINS petition as to D.S. was filed shortly before his birth based on the parents’ pattern of neglect of his older siblings. At the termination hearing, the trial court found no evidence that mother had made any progress in addressing her mental health and substance abuse issues, neither parent had visited the child consistently, and neither had taken advantage of parenting services and educational opportunities. Furthermore, father had not obtained suitable housing. Based on these findings, the court concluded that neither parent could resume parental responsibilities within a reasonable time measured from the perspective of a young child’s paramount need for permanence. The child, in the interim, had adjusted well to his foster home and community. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interests. On appeal of the termination, both parents contended the trial court erred in: (1) failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether to transfer custody of D.S. to the State following his birth; and (2) barring relitigation of factual findings from an earlier CHINS adjudication concerning D.S. and termination-of-parental rights proceeding concerning D.S.’s siblings. Father also contended the court erred in terminating his parental rights based on factors beyond his control. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re D.S." on Justia Law

Mother and father separately appeal from a family court judgment terminating their parental rights to the minor D.S. In March 2014, a CHINS petition as to D.S. was filed shortly before his birth based on the parents’ pattern of neglect of his older siblings. At the termination hearing, the trial court found no evidence that mother had made any progress in addressing her mental health and substance abuse issues, neither parent had visited the child consistently, and neither had taken advantage of parenting services and educational opportunities. Furthermore, father had not obtained suitable housing. Based on these findings, the court concluded that neither parent could resume parental responsibilities within a reasonable time measured from the perspective of a young child’s paramount need for permanence. The child, in the interim, had adjusted well to his foster home and community. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interests. On appeal of the termination, both parents contended the trial court erred in: (1) failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether to transfer custody of D.S. to the State following his birth; and (2) barring relitigation of factual findings from an earlier CHINS adjudication concerning D.S. and termination-of-parental rights proceeding concerning D.S.’s siblings. Father also contended the court erred in terminating his parental rights based on factors beyond his control. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re D.S." on Justia Law

Defendant Thomas Gauthier appealed a trial court’s order revoking his probation. In May 2009, defendant was charged with one count of engaging in a sexual act with a person under the age of sixteen, a felony, and one count of furnishing alcohol to a person under the age of twenty-one. The charges arose from an April 2009 incident in which defendant, then age twenty, had intercourse with a fifteen-year-old girl in the back of a car after a night of drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana. In June 2010, the State filed a violation-of-probation complaint against defendant, alleging that he had been out of state without permission in violation of one of the conditions in his deferred-sentence agreement. On appeal, defendant argued that the probation conditions that the trial court determined he had violated are unenforceable because he claims the conditions were not part of “a certificate explicitly setting forth the conditions” of probation, as required by 28 V.S.A. 252(c). Defendant also raised challenges to specific conditions, arguing that they are contradictory or vague and not enforceable. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Gauthier" on Justia Law

Defendant Thomas Gauthier appealed a trial court’s order revoking his probation. In May 2009, defendant was charged with one count of engaging in a sexual act with a person under the age of sixteen, a felony, and one count of furnishing alcohol to a person under the age of twenty-one. The charges arose from an April 2009 incident in which defendant, then age twenty, had intercourse with a fifteen-year-old girl in the back of a car after a night of drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana. In June 2010, the State filed a violation-of-probation complaint against defendant, alleging that he had been out of state without permission in violation of one of the conditions in his deferred-sentence agreement. On appeal, defendant argued that the probation conditions that the trial court determined he had violated are unenforceable because he claims the conditions were not part of “a certificate explicitly setting forth the conditions” of probation, as required by 28 V.S.A. 252(c). Defendant also raised challenges to specific conditions, arguing that they are contradictory or vague and not enforceable. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Gauthier" on Justia Law

M.W. was born in August 2010. M.W. lived with his young parents in the maternal grandparents’ home for several months before moving into an apartment that the maternal grandfather built over a garage located fifty feet from the grandparents’ home. During the approximately three years that the parents lived there, the mother and her parents were M.W.’s primary caregivers, as father worked two jobs and was away from the home much of the time. In 2013, father was arrested and charged with four counts of aggravated sexual assault on minors under the age of thirteen and four counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child. Father was also charged with two counts of obstructing justice, one count of violating an abuse prevention order, and one count of violating conditions of release. M.W. was not the putative victim of any of the charged crimes. Ten of the twelve counts were felonies, the most serious of which (aggravated sexual assault on a minor under the age of thirteen) had a potential life sentence with a mandatory minimum of ten years to serve. The lewd-and-lascivious-conduct counts had a mandatory minimum sentence of two years to serve. The Department for Children and Families (DCF) substantiated father for abuse based on the conduct that led to the criminal charges. Father administratively appealed the substantiation, and that appeal was stayed pending resolution of the criminal charges. In the meantime, a petition was filed to terminate his parental rights as to M.W. He appealed a superior court order that ultimately terminated those rights, contending that an extended pre-trial incarceration could not support the family court’s termination order. Finding no reversible error as to the termination petition, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re M.W." on Justia Law