Justia Vermont Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the denial of her motion to enforce a provision in the parties’ final divorce order that gave her the option to purchase jointly owned real property from defendant. The property at issue was a five-acre parcel of land with buildings on the Connecticut River where the parties lived and operated a marina business during their marriage. In the final divorce order, the court gave each party the option to buy out the other’s share of the property. If plaintiff chose not to exercise the purchase option and defendant wished to do so instead, he had to notify plaintiff and send her a check. If neither party wished to purchase the property and business, it was to be sold through a realtor and the proceeds would be split between the parties. In January 2022, plaintiff moved to enforce her option to purchase the marina property. Plaintiff asserted that an April 2020 court order had given her thirty days to notify defendant of her intent to purchase. She argued that the order was stayed by her motion to alter or amend the judgment and subsequent notice of further proceedings, and did not become final until the trial court issued a November 2021 decision. According to plaintiff, she had thirty days from that date to exercise the option and did so by sending a letter with a $25,000 check to defendant on November 30, 2021. Defendant opposed plaintiff’s motion and filed his own motion to enforce the sale of the property to him. Defendant asserted that after plaintiff indicated in her motion to alter or amend that she did not want to purchase the property, he had notified her of his intent to purchase it on June 1, 2020, and mailed her a $25,000 check. At that time, plaintiff responded by offering to sell the property for a much higher price but did not express any interest in purchasing it herself. After the court issued its decision on remand, defendant sent plaintiff a check for the remaining $217,500 along with a quitclaim deed for her to complete. Defendant argued that plaintiff’s first appeal did not stay or alter the deadlines for exercising the purchase option, which expired in June 2020. The family division of the superior court concluded that plaintiff’s purchase option had expired and that defendant effectively exercised his option to purchase the property instead. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Thurber v. Thurber" on Justia Law

In October 1987, defendant William Wheelock, III shot and killed James Brillon with a shotgun. He was convicted by jury of second-degree murder and sentenced to seventeen-years-to-life, with a split sentence to serve seventeen years. Following defendant’s release from probation in 1999, his Vermont probation officer (PO) filed three separate violation-of-probation (VOP) complaints against him in 1999, 2002, and 2003. In 2004, after the third VOP complaint was filed the year before, the VOP court concluded that defendant violated three probation conditions, revoked probation, and imposed the original sentence of life imprisonment. Defendant remained incarcerated since his 2003 arrest on the most recent VOP complaint, more than twenty years ago. In April 2018, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), arguing that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to appeal the 2004 revocation decision. The PCR court granted the petition and permitted defendant to appeal the 2004 violations and revocation of probation to this Court. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the probation violations and reversed and remanded the court’s revocation of probation. "When the VOP court revoked defendant’s probation after failing to consider all of the evidence but following consideration of prior conduct, in contravention of 28 V.S.A. § 303(b), it clearly prejudiced defendant’s defense and adversely affected the integrity of the judicial process. ... we conclude that defendant is entitled to a new probation-revocation-disposition hearing." View "Vermont v. Wheelock" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kyle Wolfe appealed the dismissal of his lawsuit against Vermont Digger and its editor (collectively, “VT Digger”), arguing that dismissal was improper and alleging that VT Digger’s publication of articles about him was defamatory and constituted a hate crime. VT Digger cross-appealed, arguing that its special motion to strike under Vermont’s anti-SLAPP statute should not have been denied as moot after its motion to dismiss was granted. In October 2021, plaintiff was arrested at the Vermont Statehouse on charges of aggravated disorderly conduct, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest based on conduct directed toward the Speaker of the Vermont House of Representatives. VT Digger published an article in October 2021, titled, “Man arrested at the Vermont Statehouse after threatening House speaker.” In December 2021, plaintiff was released on conditions that required him to stay in Rutland County and prohibited him from possessing firearms or contacting the House Speaker. The same day, VT Digger published an article titled, “Defendant who threatened House speaker released with several conditions.” In February 2022, plaintiff allegedly posted annotated photographs of firearms to his social media accounts, “tagged” the House Speaker in a Facebook post, and asked others to contact the House Speaker, noting in a comment on Facebook, “Yes, I am aware this is technically ‘illegal.’ ” Due to this conduct, plaintiff was charged in March 2022 with violating the anti-stalking order. VT Digger subsequently published an article on March 3, 2022, detailing plaintiff’s new conditions of release. Finally, on March 7, VT Digger published another article describing plaintiff’s social media posts that led to the charge of violating the order against stalking and his conditions of release. Plaintiff filed a complaint against VT Digger in May 2022 accusing it of defamation by libel and slander and requesting the civil division enjoin VT Digger from publishing further articles about him. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim, but concluded the trial court should have granted VT Digger’s motion to strike, and therefore reversed and remanded for the court to award attorney’s fees to VT Digger pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Wolfe v. VT Digger et al." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, Parents challenged the termination of their residual parental rights to K.G. and L.G., and the denial of their post-termination motion to set aside the merits and disposition orders in this case under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) based on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Vermont Supreme Court found it was unnecessary to decide if parents had a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in juvenile proceedings and affirmed both decisions. View "In re K.G. & L.G." on Justia Law

Defendant James Menize was convicted by jury on one count of aggravated sexual assault of a victim under the age of thirteen, and one count of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child. Defendant raised multiple arguments on appeal: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting prior bad-act evidence, not curing J.M.’s trial testimony which characterized the bad acts as each occurring on more than once occasion, and providing a jury instruction that failed to cabin the resulting prejudice; (2) the court should have suppressed all the inculpatory statements he made during a March 3, 2010, interview as either unconstitutionally elicited during a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings or as involuntary; (3) the timing of the amended information prejudiced his ability to put on an effective defense because the new charge contained a different mental state for which he did not have time to adequately prepare; and (4) the court erred in overruling his objection to the state's expert witness testimony regarding another expert's testimony. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "Vermont v. Menize" on Justia Law

This case was the second appeal in this partition action, which involved a parcel of property jointly owned by plaintiff Simeon Bruner and defendant Bradford Gee. Plaintiff argued the court erred in assigning the property to defendant and ordering defendant to pay plaintiff for his share. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that the trial court applied the correct legal standard and that its findings were supported by the evidence presented, and therefore affirmed. View "Bruner v. Gee, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant on their legal-malpractice and Vermont Consumer Protection Act (VCPA) claims. Mongeon Bay Properties, LLC (MBP) owned property abutting Lake Champlain in Colchester, Vermont, and leased the property to Malletts Bay Homeowner’s Association, Inc. Under the lease, the Association had the obligation to keep the property in good condition. In 2011, following major erosion damage on a portion of the embankment on the lakefront, MBP’s manager notified the Association it was in default for failing to maintain the property and gave the Association forty-five days to make specified, substantial repairs. After the Association failed to make the repairs, MBP filed a complaint against the Association seeking damages and to void the lease for the Association’s violation of its terms. The Association retained defendant Heilmann, Ekman, Cooley & Gagnon, Inc. In the following months, the Association took steps to address MBP’s complaints. However, following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the Association breached the lease and was in default but declined to grant MBP’s request for lease forfeiture. Instead, it awarded MBP damages for remediation and attorney’s fees and costs. Both parties appealed. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision, concluding that the Association breached the lease and that MBP was entitled to termination of the lease. Ultimately, the lease was terminated, and the Association’s members were evicted. Members then sued the Association, alleging that it was negligent in its administration of the provisions of the lease requiring it to keep the property in good condition. Members and the Association settled in 2018. As part of the settlement, the Association assigned members its right to sue defendant for legal malpractice. The Association and members filed a complaint against defendant in the instant case in December 2019, alleging legal malpractice and a violation of the VCPA. The crux of their legal-malpractice claim is a lost opportunity to settle. They proposed that, had defendant tried to settle, the Association and MBP would have likely agreed to terms involving repairs and payment of MBP’s attorney’s fees thus avoiding lease termination and eviction of the Association’s members. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded summary judgment was appropriate on the legal-malpractice claim but not on the VCPA claim, and thus reversed and remanded. View "Mansfield, et al. v. Heilmann, Ekman, Cooley & Gagnon, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Energy Policy Advocates challenged a trial court’s conclusion that certain communications between different state attorney general offices were protected from disclosure under a public-records request, and further, that the trial court erred in declining to grant in-camera review of these documents. Additionally, plaintiff argued the trial court improperly granted only half of its fees despite substantially prevailing. The Vermont Attorney General’s Office (AGO) cross-appealed the trial court decision granting plaintiff any fees, arguing plaintiff was not entitled to fees as it did not substantially prevail. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court decision with respect to the withheld documents and reversed regarding the award of attorney’s fees. View "Energy Policy Advocates v. Attorney General’s Office" on Justia Law

Defendant Joshua Boyer challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence gathered in a consented-to search of his residence. In April 2018, M.B. complained to police that defendant had sexually assaulted her multiple times, including the previous day. M.B. resided in the house where the alleged assaults occurred with defendant, his wife, and other children. Defendant was arrested and released on conditions, including that he should not return to the family home where M.B. was then residing. Several days later, a police detective and an investigator from the Department for Children and Families (DCF) met with M.B. at a friend’s home where she was temporarily staying and asked if there might be DNA evidence present in M.B.’s family home. M.B. said that defendant might have disposed of a condom in her bedroom wastebasket and used a pair of her underwear to wipe himself off after the assault. Knowing that defendant and his wife would likely be away from their home to attend defendant’s arraignment, the detective asked M.B. if she would be comfortable returning to the house to locate this potential evidence. M.B., the detective, and the DCF investigator then went to the home. M.B. went outside and opened a trashcan by the exterior of the house, which she noted “had been gone through.” The detective seized the trashcan. The police later searched the trashcan pursuant to a warrant, which revealed a condom wrapper, stained paper towels, pharmacy receipts, and a rug. M.B. identified the rug as from her bedroom, and a subsequent forensic analysis confirmed the presence of defendant’s semen on the rug. Appealing the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence found at the house, defendant argued fourteen-year-old M.B. lacked authority to consent to the search. Defendant also argued his constitutional speedy-trial rights were violated. Because the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the search was lawful and that defendant’s speedy-trial rights were not violated, it affirmed the trial court’s decision. View "Vermont v. Boyer" on Justia Law

Defendant Theodore Colehamer appealed two convictions by jury: (1) felony driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense; and (2) misdemeanor eluding a police officer. He contended the trial court abused its discretion in denying defense counsel the opportunity to ask a question of potential jurors at voir dire, that it made multiple errors on evidentiary rulings, and that it improperly selected a jury foreperson. He also argued the eluding conviction should have been vacated because he did not violate the statute’s plain terms. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the court did not abuse its discretion on any of the evidentiary or jury issues but agreed with defendant that he did not elude law enforcement as charged. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the DUI conviction and vacated the eluding conviction. View "Vermont v. Colehamer" on Justia Law